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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF STRONG STATE TRADITION  
ON THE EARLY REPUBLICAN REFORMS OF SECULARIZATION  
IN TURKEY (1923-1938) 
 
Hakkı Taş 
M.A., Department of Political Science  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 May, 2005 
 
 
This thesis aims at identifying the implications of strong state tradition from the 
Ottoman Empire to the Early Republic within the case of the secularization process. 
It relies on the theory that the Turkish nation-state has inherited from its predecessor 
a strong state tradition, in which the state is more than the sum of sectional interests 
within the society. In the Ottoman-Turkish polity, the state enjoyed a supreme 
position, which resulted in a pragmatic view toward social institutions like religion. 
 iv 
In addition, elitism appeared through the conception of state as the sole agent for 
total development. Atatürk maintained the same mentality parallel to the Turkish 
state tradition: he had a pragmatic approach to religion along with the conception of 
the supreme state. He also continued the elitist top-down modernization launched by 
the Ottoman reformers. This thesis argues that in Turkish practice, it is the state that 
prevails.   
 
Key Words: Strong State Tradition, Turkey, Secularization, Early Republican 
Reforms 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE GÜÇLÜ DEVLET GELENEĞİNİN  
ERKEN CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİ LAİKLEŞME DEVRİMLERİNE ETKİSİ 
(1923-1938) 
 
Hakkı Taş 
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
Mayıs, 2005 
 
 
Bu tezin amacı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan Erken Cumhuriyet dönemine güçlü 
devlet geleneğinin etkilerini laikleşme sürecini ele alarak tanımlamaktır. Çalışma, 
Türk milli devletinin Osmanlı’dan, devletin toplumdaki çıkar öbeklerinin 
toplamından fazlasını ifade ettiği güçlü devlet anlayışını miras aldığı görüşüne 
dayanmaktadır. Osmanlı- Türk siyasasında, devlet üstün bir konuma sahipti ve bu, 
din gibi sosyal kurumlara karşı faydacı bir tutuma yol açtı. Bunun yanında, devletin 
 vi 
bütün gelişmeden sorumlu tek özne olarak kabul edilmesinden kaynaklanan bir 
seçkinci anlayış belirdi. Atatürk, Türk devlet geleneğine paralel olarak aynı zihniyeti 
devam ettirdi: Üstün devlet kavramının yanında dine karşı faydacı bir yaklaşımı 
benimsedi. Ayrıca Osmanlı yenilikçilerinin başlattığı seçkinci ve tepeden inme 
modernleşmeyi de devam ettirdi. Bu tez, Türkiye özelinde, egemen olanın hep devlet 
olduğunu öne sürmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Güçlü Devlet Geleneği, Türkiye, Laikleşme, Erken 
Cumhuriyet Devrimleri 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
STATE MATTERS! 
 
For many observers of Turkish politics, secularism is the essence of the Turkish 
Revolution. (Timur, 1968: 117) Although a straightforward reading of Atatürk’s 
Turkey would indicate a strong commitment to positivist secularism, the Kemalist 
political and intellectual elites have rather a dual understanding of religion and 
secularism: While they have seen Islam as the source of backwardness and tried to 
erase it from all public visibility, they have at the same time incorporated religion 
into some aspects of the polity. In their conception of religion, for instance, a non-
Muslim person is usually considered as a minority person or as a Turkish citizen, but 
not a Turk. ‘Turk’ implies an ethno-religious characteristic of the political 
community. Moreover, the politicians often talk about “our religion,” although the 
secular system is not assumed to have such an element. “Our religion” refers to all 
citizens with Islamic credentials regardless of the various sects. In addition, 
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missionary activities and cases of conversion are commonly considered as almost 
“subversive” acts. Islam was not supposed to legitimize the regime or to be an 
appropriate base for political action, “yet one’s claim to membership in the political 
community, in behavioural terms, was validated by the possession of Islamic 
credentials.” (Turan, 1991: 38-40) As reflections of the Kemalist mixed conception 
of religion, these examples illustrate that there must be something else that dominates 
Turkish politics. 
Despite the centrality of the issue, it is commonly observed that students of Islam 
and Turkey have not sufficiently conceptualized the position of Islam in Turkey and 
its interaction with the “evolution of regimes of power and knowledge.” The 
contextual patterns of power holding in both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic still need much clarification, when the concern is the peculiar interactive 
relationship between state and religion. (see Silverstein, 2003) In fact, “Islam is not 
a phenomenon of today or yesterday in Turkey.” It has been an intrinsic part of 
Turkey’s sociological reality. Islam has played an important role in Turkish politics 
since the very early days of the Republic. (Mango, 1993: 740-742) 
The Turkish political literature about Islam and religious fundamentalism in Turkey 
has usually been influenced by Orientalist examinations pioneered by Bernard Lewis 
(Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xv) and by other foreign observers’ Middle Eastern 
studies. Therefore, it can, to a great extent, miss the peculiarity of the Turkish path to 
modernity due to some generalized assumptions about state-Islam interactions. In 
fact, every revolution has its own peculiar national characteristics. According to 
Taner Timur (1968: 2), despite their international targets, the French Revolution was 
primarily French, and the Russian Revolution Russian in character. The Turkish case 
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is distinctive because of its long state tradition, in which the state has always had 
primacy vis-à-vis religion. This study tries to examine the mixed understanding of 
religion of the Kemalist elite in the light of the concept of Turkish state tradition, by 
which I primarily refer to the superiority of the state as the sole agent responsible for 
all social and political changes. 
Unlike previous studies on this subject, which have primarily examined the 
influence of religion on politics, this thesis aims to analyze how the state has shaped 
and utilized religion in Turkey. Rather than focusing only on the institutional 
developments, it tries to shed light on the influence of Turkish political culture, 
which would consequently configure the institutional and political developments of 
the Turkish modernization process.  This thesis is a modest attempt to explore the 
impact of strong state tradition on the Early Republican secularization reforms as 
part of a continuum with the Ottoman past. Such a short analysis could never do 
justice to this broad subject. However, as this study shows, despite ongoing heated 
debates regarding the so-called growing threat of Islam in Turkey, the nature of 
Early Republican secularization reforms indicates that the state has traditionally had 
primacy over religion in Turkish practice.  
The secularization reforms have been taken as the objects of this thesis because they 
are the most prevalent examples for exploring the influence of Turkish state tradition 
on the Turkish Republic. In the Turkish context, religion, as a very sensitive issue, 
can be considered as the only social force to mobilize the masses. As this study 
reveals, in Turkish political history we observe a pragmatic attitude toward even 
Islam, i.e., the state has benefited from religion whenever it was useful for state 
matters, and suppressed it whenever it was seen as an obstacle. As a consequence of 
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this pragmatic attitude of the state, Islam has never been able to pose a threat to the 
superiority of the state. It is the state that supersedes all other factors in Turkish 
practice. 
Since “variation in early state-building experiences” has some “implications for the 
subsequent form and substance of political activity” (Heper, 1985: 7), my study is 
centered on the examination of the Early Republican period, which is taken here to 
comprise the period of the presidency of the founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of the 
Turkish Republic, from 1923 to 1938. Although the Early Republican period is 
commonly considered as to have continued from 1923 to 1940 or 1945, namely from 
the foundation of the Republic to the beginning of multi-party system, I chose to 
omit the İnönü period (1938-1945). This is because Kemalism, the official ideology 
of the Turkish Republic, was basically formulated in Mustafa Kemal’s time, and the 
political developments in İnönü’s period display a strong continuity with those of his 
predecessor’s era in terms of ideology and raison détat. 
Kemalist ideology, which developed as an immediate response to the needs of the 
modernization process, was not based on a detailed examination of Turkish political 
and social patterns. Modernization in the Republican period was shaped inevitably 
by the difficult conditions of the War of Independence and inter-war periods; the 
principles of Kemalism arose largely from the practical requirements of this process. 
Accordingly, the Republican elite formulated their guidelines in a pragmatic way. 
As these principles, especially nationalism and secularism, emerged and developed 
according to some historical conditions and specific events, a mere conceptual 
analysis of secularism in terms of the meaning of its Western counterpart cannot 
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adequately explain the political developments in Turkey. Therefore, secularism in 
Turkey should be studied through historical analysis. 
Having analyzed recent studies of Turkish politics, Özbudun and Kazancıgil (1997: 
2) give two reasons as to why a historical perspective is necessary in the study of 
Kemalism. First, “certain doctrinaire Kemalists” in Turkey and some foreign 
observers consider the foundation of the new republic as a sudden and total 
transformation from the so-called theocratic Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-
state. Second, Islamists and third-world critics of Kemalism see it as an alien and 
forcible imposition of secularization upon a Muslim society through isolation from 
its cultural and political past. In fact, both are “historical over-simplifications.” 
This study, hence, employs a historical approach to elaborate its thesis on the 
peculiarity of Turkish state tradition and its relation to Turkish secularism. In line 
with Heper’s (1985: iv) recommendations, a more historical approach that would 
also compare Turkey with both the Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries 
will be used. Such a position, instead of a solely conceptual analysis, will be used to 
explore the roots of Turkish secular developments in its Ottoman past, as well as to 
identify the continuum that existed in the state tradition and the modernization 
process between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. 
Besides having a historical point of view, this thesis follows a state-centered 
formulation. As Migdal (1994: 8) observes, “recently, a more state-oriented 
approach has attracted much attention.” It is, in fact, rather than a mere 
methodological preference, a practical necessity for students of Turkish politics to 
put the state at the core of their studies. This is because Turkey experienced a state-
led modernization in which society remained passive in keeping with the Turkish 
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state-centered political culture. According to Barkey (2000: 87), “Turkey has always 
been regarded as one of the best examples of modernizing strong states.” 
Following this first introductory chapter, Chapter II aims to outline the theoretical 
framework upon which the thesis will be structured. Starting with the definitions of 
religion and state as political concepts, this chapter mainly deals with the paths taken 
by secularization as a consequence of modernization, which differentiate according 
to diverse state traditions. Modern science, having equated the secular with the 
modern and progressive, has designated the traditional as “backward.” The secularist 
approach has “created the Oriental ‘other’: Islam.” According to Yavuz and Esposito 
(2003: xv), such scholars of Islam, who defend the idea of there being a unity of 
religion and polity in Islam, are exemplified by Bernard Lewis (1994: 135-136), 
who claims that “Islam was … associated with the excessive use of power from the 
very beginning… This association between religion and politics, between 
community and polity, can … be seen in … the religious texts in which Muslims 
base their beliefs”. Unfortunately, this superficiality, which appears due to a lack of 
historical analysis, has prevailed in much of the Turkish studies (for instance Berkes, 
1995). This chapter draws attention to the danger of such Orientalist assumptions. In 
practice, “the boundary between the religious and the political is not fixed and text 
centered, but rather fluctuating and depends on the specific context.” (Yavuz and 
Esposito, 2003: xv) Therefore, religion, Islam in particular, is taken here in its 
relation to the specific historical contexts. 
The same charge of superficiality is valid in the case of the secularization thesis, too. 
The basic assumption of the secularization thesis is that the development of 
modernity gradually decreases or even erases the influence of religion. Actually, as 
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Brown (1992: 38) says, empirical evidence as opposed to merely a conceptual 
analysis proves that “religion can and has retained its social significance across the 
change from preindustrial to industrial society.” Moreover, very much like Islam, 
which has been perceived and experienced differently in diverse settings for varying 
purposes, the secularization process is not a unique path of modernization, but 
differs according to varying levels of state autonomy, by which we refer to “the 
insulation of the state from societal pressures and to its freedom to make important 
decisions.” (Özbudun, 1996: 134) 
 
Chapter III examines the Ottoman state tradition, the basic patterns of which are: the 
patrimonial and bureaucratic configuration of the state, with a strong center versus a 
weak periphery; elitism; the state predominance over religion; and, state-led 
modernization. Kemalist historiography from the 1920s onwards has tended to 
emphasize the novelty of the new Turkish republic and a clean break with the 
Ottoman past. Feroz Ahmad’s Making of Modern Turkey is a recent example of 
scholarship that points up the contrast between the backward past and the progressive 
new nation-state. From the 1950s, however, pioneering scholars such as Tarık Zafer 
Tunaya, Şerif Mardin and Niyazi Berkes in Turkey and Bernard Lewis and Stanford 
Shaw in the West have presented a different approach, which has dominated Turkish 
studies. They have observed a link between the former and the latter and 
acknowledged “the debt of the republic to its immediate predecessors”. (Zürcher, 
2004: 99-100) 
 
Understanding the Ottoman legacy is important for grasping the foundation of 
Republic because the members of Republican elite were once Ottoman pashas. 
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Despite the dramatic change from a multiethnic, multi-religious empire to a 
“monolithic” nation-state, the same political culture remained salient in determining 
state policies. Within this framework, the state was the major, in fact, the sole force 
for political and social change in the Ottoman Empire, in which there existed a strong 
center and a weak periphery. (İnalcık, 1964: 3-5) The elimination of the alternative 
political and economic forces strengthened the center and erased any possibility of an 
opposing periphery balancing the imperial capital, Istanbul. Even when such an 
alternative force arose from religion, the state elite did not hesitate in suppressing 
religious scholars and institutions, as it did other individuals and institutions. Despite 
the religious character of the Empire, they were able to consider it legitimate to make 
secular decisions about a state matter even if religion assumed the contrary. The 
Turkish Republic was born on the basis of such a political inheritance. The secular 
reforms in the Republic cannot be understood without having insight into the 
Ottoman state tradition and modernization reforms, especially in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The modern secular Turkish nation-state was an eventual 
consequence of the earlier developments, and it was a dream that many Westernist 
Ottoman reformers had envisaged for a long time. 
 
Chapter IV aims to investigate the secularization reforms launched in the Early 
Republican period. The Turkish case of modernization has been quite distinctive 
among its counterparts. Regarding the types of modernity, Ernest Gellner proposes 
an analogy of bride (culture) and groom (state). According to him, the way to 
modernity can be divided into four time and space zones. The first three are 
European: a) The West –the Atlantic coast and Britain– had the happiest marriage of 
all; bride and groom were ready at the same time. b) The center –Italy and Germany– 
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had a difficult marriage at the beginning; the bride was ready, but it took some time 
for the groom to be found. c) The East –Eastern Europe– had a painful union; neither 
bride nor groom was ready, necessitating both cultural and political engineering. The 
fourth zone is unique to Turkey. According to Gellner, none of the above typology is 
valid for the Muslim world, since nationalism has always been rejected by Islam, but 
the Turkish case is peculiar within the Muslim world. The groom (state) was ready 
and chose a bride. (Çataltepe, 1994) For the wedding, however, Turkey needed many 
reforms. 
 
These reforms were initiated accross a broad spectrum varying from the acceptance 
of the Western hat and the adoption of the Gregorian calendar to the abolition of the 
Caliphate. Scholars of Turkish politics agree that secularization reforms in Turkey 
had a strong impact on different facets of politics and social life. (Heper, 1981: 355) 
The secular developments in the Early Republican period manifested a strong desire 
to modernize the new country. However, despite the strong commitment of the 
founding elite to positivist secularism, we observe a dual attitude toward religion. In 
a continuum with the Ottoman pragmatism about religion, the new political elite 
readily benefited from Islam whenever they found it useful, and eliminated the old 
religious authorities and institutions whenever they saw Islam as an obstacle to 
modernization. The continuity appears clearly in the establishment of the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs. Here, the Republican elite did not separate religion from the 
state, but incorporated it into the state apparatus, just as it had been in the Ottoman 
Empire. Rather than separating state and religion, in the Turkish version of 
secularism, the state could manipulate and control religion through its own apparatus 
without allowing it to form alternative civil sources of power. The continuity of the 
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state tradition between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic appears in the 
case of the state-led modernization, as well. The state has been the sole agent for 
modernization. This elitist approach had its reflections in the early state-building 
process of the new nation-state. 
 
As has been indicated above, political developments in Turkey cannot be evaluated 
without taking the peculiar historical and cultural context into consideration. In this 
respect, the relationship between Islam and state in Turkey displays the same 
peculiarity as an example that best reflects the Turkish state tradition.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
Nations come and go, empires rise and fall. But Islam persists and continues 
to include the nomads and the settlers, the builders of civilizations within Islam 
and those who destroy them. What then are the factors that keep together 
as one ummah those many people that consciously or not inclined 
to maintain their individuality while cultivating their tie 
with universal Islam as their most precious spiritual possession? 
Von Grünebaum 
(1962:52-53 in Davutoğlu, 1994: 63) 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Defining the Concepts 
 
 
It is necessary at the beginning to define the two concepts of greatest importance for 
this study: religion and state. The social sciences, for a long time, promoted the 
assumption that religion is more or less irrelevant to the domains of modern life. 
(Robertson, 1987: 5) Religion, which, in fact, remains one of the most ambiguous 
objects of social study, has recently regained considerable interest among political 
scientists. (Brown, 2000:1) Similarly, we observe the return of scholarly concern 
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with the state. (Hall and Ikenberry, 1989: 1) The “state” has been issue for heated 
debate between different theoretical and ideological views for quite some time now. 
(Nalbantoğlu, 1993: 346) 
 
Defining the concept of religion is crucial for this study, because whether one sees 
modern society as secularized or as undergoing a process of secularization depends 
very much on what one means by religion. Discussions about secularization stem 
from the conflict among the radically different conceptions of what religion is. 
Functional definitions approach religion in terms of “what it does,” whereas 
substantive definitions say “what it is.” (for the discussion see Bruce and Wallis, 
1992: 9-11) As a result, those who use “functionalist definitions” tend to reject the 
secularization thesis while those using “substantive definitions” are more likely to 
support it. (Hamilton, 1995: 166) 
 
Substantive (theological) definitions largely emphasize the spiritual or “irrational” 
component of religious belief and practice. Such definitions of religion include, for 
instance, Schleiermacher’s conception of the “feeling of absolute dependence”, 
Rudolf Otto’s emphasis on “awe, a unique blend of fear and fascination before the 
divine” or Mircea Eliade’s view of religion as “embodied in sacred space and time”. 
(King, 1987: 283-285)  Unfortunately, these definitions prove of limited use from the 
perspective of the social sciences.  
 
Durkheim, whose work is perhaps the cornerstone of the sociology of religion, 
defines religion as "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, 
that is to say, things set apart and forbidden –beliefs and practices which unite in one 
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single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them". (Coser, 
1977: 136) Clifford Geertz (1973: 90) gives a more functional definition, describing 
what religion does, by defining it as 
a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and 
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions 
of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such 
an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic. 
 
Geertz points out that religion is a set of symbols which may either stand for 
something, represent or express something or act as a sort of instruction for what to 
do. Religion does these things through formulating concepts of general order. People 
need these concepts because they need to see the world as meaningful and ordered. 
Moreover, Geertz sees religious beliefs as attempts to bring abnormal events and 
experiences “within the sphere of the explicable.” (Hamilton, 1995: 158) 
 
Scholars, thus, have not been able to develop a widely accepted definition of 
religion. In general, what all of these approaches, both substantial and functional, 
share in common is the idea that there is a distinct and universal social phenomenon 
called “religion” that can be clearly distinguished from other aspects of social reality. 
The current definitions usually link the concept to belief and behavior transcending 
the empirical reality. The belief in a deity is taken as the absolute truth about human 
existence. Most religions have some ethical norms. As a consequence, religious 
beliefs have influences on the thinking and behavior of human beings in ordinary 
life. Religion influences the world view of its believers. (Nielsen, 1992: 8) Bruce and 
Wallis (1992: 10-11) combine both substantial and functional aspects well and define 
religion as consisting of 
actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the 
existence of either supernatural entities with powers of agency, or 
 14 
 
impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral purpose, which have 
the capacity to set the conditions of, or to intervene in, human affairs. 
 
The other concept we are dealing with is the “state.” The term “state”, which is 
derived from the Roman law concept “status rei Romanae”, the public law, refers to 
an independent political community ruling a specific territory. (Nielsen, 1992: 8) The 
state is a relatively modern institution, dating back to the sixteenth century when the 
nation-state emerged from the feudal system and the central power gained control 
over the military forces and powers of legislation and taxation for the entire territory 
under its domination. Hall and Ikenberry (1989: 1-2) give a composite definition of 
state including three elements. The state is, firstly, a set of institutions (especially 
those of violence and coercion). Secondly, these institutions function within a 
geographically-bounded territory. Thirdly, the state has a monopoly on rule-making 
in that territory. 
 
As centers of power, states regulate collection and distribution of resources, control 
policy making, and deeply affect many aspects of their citizens’ lives. (for instance, 
see Trimberger, 1978) They are the most important determinants of sociopolitical 
change in modern times. It is therefore not possible to satisfactorily explain social 
changes without considering the state. How much states can get done, and how much 
of the lives of their citizenry they control, are functions of their strength. Thus, what 
constitutes strength and weakness in a state, and how that influences politics, 
economics, and social change, is very important (for a detailed analysis, see Migdal, 
1988). 
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Another way of looking at the state is based on an intellectual tradition that is built 
around an abstract theory of the state. This tradition dates back to Plato, and is the 
“cumulative contribution” of numerous philosophers and thinkers, among whom 
Machiavelli, Locke, Jefferson, Rousseau, Mill and Weber are only some of the more 
notable names. (Ozay, 1990: 56) According to it, good government, being the 
implementing arm of the state, is one which succeeds in improving living standards 
by means of public policy in education, housing, employment and social services, 
and in establishing appropriate economic, legal, cultural and national institutions. 
 
Initially, the issue of applying all these religious and political ideas to the non-
Western world appears as an epistemological problem: an attempt to use Western 
phenomena to understand the non-Western world. Thus, a fundamental problem 
arises when one tries to apply social categories such as religion and state to non-
Western contexts. For example, Jeff Haynes (1998: 8) suggests that the universal 
application of western social categories is problematic because it tends to force one 
to perceive social reality, not in terms of the society itself, but in terms of the West: 
When we think of Church-state relations we tend to assume a single 
relationship between two clearly distinct, unitary and solidly but 
separately institutionalized entities. In this implicit model built into 
conceptualization of the religio-political nexus there is one State and one 
Church; both entities’ jurisdictional boundaries need to be carefully 
delineated.[…] In sum, the conventional concept of State-Church 
relations is rooted in prevailing Western conceptions of the power of the 
state of necessity being constrained by forces in society, including those 
of religion. 
 
In this way, Haynes argues that the study of state-church relations is biased in 
content, possessing some assumptions about the nature of religion and politics in 
society. Haynes (1998: 9) concludes that 
In their specific cultural setting and social significance, the tension and 
the debate over Church-state relations are uniquely Western 
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phenomena… overloaded with western cultural history; these two 
concepts cannot easily be translated into non-Christian terminologies. 
 
 
On the other hand, one should also notice another danger in this understanding; i.e., 
the deep-rooted Western tendency to “obscure” Islam and Muslims through “veils of 
esoterica” and –in extreme forms– even to suggest that entirely different rules of 
logic and evidence are required to take the measure of Islam and Muslims. “This is 
nonsense. Muslims can be understood, just like other people.” (Brown, 2000: 19) 
Although there are problems in “translating” religion and politics into a different 
context, this does not mean that states and societies will not try to reformulate 
themselves. 
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2.2 The Functions of Religion 
 
There are different opinions regarding the essential functions of religion. 
Nevertheless, for most members of advanced societies, religion performs certain 
individual and social functions at least to some extent, as it does for traditional 
societies. Essentially, religion, Islam in particular, as identified by Heper (1981: 346), 
is a “multi-functional institution” because it has been taken advantage of different 
groups for different purposes. When analyzing the functions of religion, it is almost 
essential to start with Emile Durkheim. 
 
Durkheim [1995 (1915): 489] identifies three basic functions of religion. One of the 
functions of religion, according to Durkheim, is social cohesion. Religion brings 
people together through shared symbols, values, and norms. Religions can be 
powerful forces in society.  By reinforcing group norms, they facilitate the formation 
of social homogeneity. They can provide a basis for common purposes and values 
that maintain social solidarity. Religion, in this way, integrates and unifies. 
According to Collinson (1999: 53), religion creates a bond, not only legitimizing and 
strengthening existing social constructions like churches, sects, and nations, but also 
inventing, “imagining” them. The Jewish nation is an obvious example, as is the 
Armenian. 
 
Another function of religion is social control. Societies may use religious doctrine to 
promote conformity.  In most societies, religions play an important role in social 
control by defining what is right and wrong behavior.  Thus, religion has a vital role 
in social maintenance. It also gives sanctity, more than human legitimacy and 
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transcendent importance to some values; for example, regarding marriage as a 
sacrament, much law breaking as sinful, and occasionally, the state as a divine 
instrument. 
 
Providing meaning and purpose is the third function of religion. "Religious beliefs 
offer the sense that the vulnerable human serves a greater purpose. [Thus] people are 
less likely to collapse in despair when confronted by life's calamities". [Durkheim, 
1995(1915): 489] The sacred texts of religions usually set forth examples for proper 
behavior in common situations. The religious system provides a body of ultimate 
ends for a society.  
 
O’Dea (1966 in Hamilton, 1995: 120-121), one of the best-known functionalists, 
gives six functions of religion for the individual and society: 
1. It provides support for established values and goals. 
2. It ensures stability of the social order and often helps maintain the status quo. 
Through cult and ceremony, it provides emotional security and identity and a 
fixed point of reference among a variety of conflicting ideas.  
3. It “sacralizes” norms and promotes group goals above individual goals. 
4. It can be a basis for criticisms of existing social patterns. It can form a basis 
for social protest. 
5. It helps the individual in understanding him- or herself and provides a sense 
of identity. 
6. It is important in aiding the individual during life crises and in transition from 
one status to another and is, consequently, part of the educational process. 
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O’Dea does not think that these functions are always fulfilled by religion, but notes 
that they have been practically universal in known social systems. (Hamilton, 1995: 
121) He also admits that religion may have actual dysfunctions and again lists six of 
these, which correspond to its positive functions: 
1. It may hinder protest against injustice by reconciling the oppressed. 
2. Sacralizing norms and values may hinder progress in knowledge. 
3. It may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances through its 
conservativism. 
4. It can lead to utopianism and unrealistic hopes for change and, consequently, 
inhibit practical action to this end. 
5. It can attach individuals to groups to the point where conflict with other 
groups is promoted and adjustment prevented. 
6. It can create dependence on religious institutions and leaders, and in this way, 
it may prevent maturity. 
 
Especially notable for purposes of this thesis is what functions religion provides in its 
relation with the state. The state can be based on either coercion or legitimate 
authority through popular support. Because the use of force tends in the long run to 
be costly and inefficient, government will seek to establish a basis of ideological 
legitimacy for its rule. Religion can provide perhaps the strongest basis for the 
legitimation of the government. Thus, government may need the support of religious 
authorities, or at least seek to avoid open conflict with them. (Nielsen, 1992: 20) 
 
According to Weber, officials and bureaucrats are, in fact, little inclined towards 
religion. (Hamilton, 1995: 140-141) Nevertheless, they are greatly interested in the 
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maintenance of order, discipline and security, and they regard religion as a useful 
instrument for achieving these goals.  
 21 
 
2.3 State in Islam: Dawlah 
 
 
Know that you can have three sorts of relations with princes, governors, 
and oppressors. The first and worst is that you visit them, 
the second and the better is that they visit you, and 
the third and surest that you stay away from them,  
so that neither you see them nor they see you. 
Ghazzali, Muslim theologian of the twelfth century  
(Robbins and Robertson, 1987: 183) 
 
 
 
Before analyzing the relation between Islam and state, it would be beneficial to take 
notice of Khalidi’s (1992: 28) caution that one should always be somewhat 
suspicious of sentences in which Islam appears as the subject, such as “Islam is x, y 
and z”, or “Islam teaches a, b, c”, “Islam demonstrates that”, “Islam has shown that”, 
and so forth. It should be perfectly obvious that the Islam of one time and one place 
is quite different from the Islam of another time and another place. On the other 
hand, as Esposito claims, a “selective presentation and analysis of Islam” also 
distorts its image. (Göle, 1996b: 21) Both the theological and historical aspects of the 
subject should be reckoned together. 
 
The Islamic tradition of the state, as it evolved after the death of Muhammad, differs 
radically from the western secularist state. The idea of a secular state is “the by-
product of European positivism.” In the positivist tradition, the raison d’etre of the 
state is the collective good, i.e., national progress or development. The nation is a 
culturally and geographically distinct entity, and this sustains social cohesion and 
political consensus. The strength and survival of the nation is secured through 
legislation, which articulates the political consensus, implementing it through public 
policy for the sake of improving the human condition. (Ozay, 1990: 56) Such a 
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concept of state, with its modern connotations, did not form a part of Islamic political 
thought in the classical period, and the modern conceptualization of state is surely a 
Western one, which evolved in relation to the phenomena of the Renaissance and 
capitalism. For this reason, ‘state’ will be used here only as a monopoly of political 
power or authority. For the same reason again, it is natural not to find such a concept 
in Islamic thought prior to the modern era, either. The term dawlah, which is used 
today to connote state in European sense, existed in the Qur’an. However, according 
to Lewis (1988), the first time that the term dawlah (devlet in Turkish) appears in its 
modern meaning of state, as distinct from dynasty and government, is in a Turkish 
memorandum in 1837.  
 
The state has, theoretically, no independent basis in Islam. An independent basis was 
accorded only to the umma, the community of believers, which was supposed to live 
not by the commands of the ruler but by the Shari’ah, the holy law. This law was to 
be known through the Qur’an and the hadiths, the sayings of the Prophet as reported 
by his companions. The ruler had no role in this theoretical framework, although the 
situation was complicated by the fact that the first four rulers, or caliphs, were also 
companions, who certainly made an effort to gain a say in fixing the form of the 
community. (Gerber, 2002: 66)  Abu Bakr and Umar, the first two “rightly guided 
caliphs”, emphasized the aspect of legitimacy by applying to as great an extent as 
possible the principles of shura (inner consultation), aqd (ruler-ruled contract), and 
bay’ah (oath of allegiance). (Shahrough, 1995: 319) These principles were used in 
the appointment of their successor, Uthman. Gradually, however, shura was 
overlooked, and then aqd and bay’ah were also dropped with the establishment of 
the Umayyad family.  
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One should also note that, given the limited nature of political provisions in the 
Qur’an and the hadiths, Muslims had to borrow and improvise in developing their 
political systems. The Islamic systems have been inspired by Shari’ah, as represented 
in the Qur’an and the hadiths, by Arabian tribal traditions and by the political heritage 
of the lands Muslims conquered, especially the Persian and Byzantine traditions. 
Further evidence for the argument that the form of the state and the nature of 
government cannot be deduced directly and only from the Qur’an and the hadiths is 
provided by the fact that the few polities both in the past and present that have called 
themselves Islamic states are very different from each other in their most important 
political aspects. (Shahrough, 1995: 318) 
 
After the holy Migration (Hicret), Muslims were not only a religious community, but 
also a political one, whereas Christianity could not form a political entity until three 
centuries after its emergence. This fact alone leads many readers to think 
simplistically that Islam envisages a theocracy. (Watt, 1995: 76) Accordingly, it is 
commonly argued in Islam, unlike Christianity, that there is no tradition of a 
separation of church and state. At least, this is “the oft-repeated statement” contrasting 
the two religions. One simple reason for this difference between Islam and 
Christianity is that Islam knows no “church” in the sense of a corporate body whose 
leadership is clearly defined, hierarchical, and distinct from the state. The 
organizational arrangement of ulama, Muslim religious scholars, makes an 
institutional confrontation between Muslim church and Muslim state virtually 
impossible. A Muslim scholar may speak out against a ruler, but there is “no 
canonical way” he can summon a Muslim “church council.” (Brown, 2000: 31) 
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In fact, the understanding of the unity of religion and politics in Islam has resulted in 
the subjugation of the former by the latter because it does not allow religion to build a 
corporate body for itself. Throughout Islamic history, the state has always had great 
power to influence the ulama. The state has always assumed the right to appoint and 
dismiss qadis (religious judges and local administrators) and teachers in Muslim 
seminaries, has exercised control over financial aspects of Muslim religious properties 
such as mosques and medreses (religious schools), and has used state police power to 
punish, imprison, and exile unruly Muslim religious leaders. In certain cases, state 
control over the Muslim religious establishment became so pervasive that the ulama 
virtually became an arm of government. The best example was the Ottoman Empire, 
in which the ulama were largely integrated into the state apparatus. (Brown, 2000: 35) 
From a broader view, some cleavages and conflicts among religious schools and 
religiously oriented parties have occurred occasionally in the Islamic communities, 
but there has been no conflict between Islam and state. (Dursun, 1993:78) 
 
Brown (2000: 54) cites appropriate examples when explaining that this passive 
attitude of the Sunni religious authorities toward the state was justified substantially 
by the primary resources, where obedience to the rulers is very much emphasized: 
“O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in 
authority.” (Qur’an, 4:59) This Qur’anic advice became “the scriptural foundation” 
for a submissive attitude toward political authority that reached its zenith in the oft-
cited maxim “Better sixty years of tyranny than one hour of anarchy.” The Islamic 
tradition asserts, in effect, that mankind’s need for government is so overwhelming 
that it makes the quality of that government decidedly secondary. For instance, 
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Suhrawardi, a highly regarded twelfth-century Sufi scholar wrote that “Prayer is 
permitted behind any imam, pious or impious … Revolt is prohibited even if the 
ruler is unjust.” 
 
The uniformity that hinders opposition and revolt similarly is underlined in the 
hadiths: “He who separates himself even a single span from the community, removes 
the noose of Islam from his neck.” “The hand of Allah is with the community. He 
who stands alone stands alone in hell.” “He who seeks to divide your community, 
slay him.” (Brown, 2000: 58) Although there are some other hadiths encouraging 
revolt against cruelty (e.g., “If men see evil and do not change it, God will swiftly 
blind them with His punishment”), yet, on balance, the weight of Muslim historical 
tradition was on the side of political submission. (Brown, 2000:55) 
 
Based on the lack of prescriptive information in the primary sources of Islam and on 
the submissive positioning of religious authorities in practice, Islamic political 
thought actually provides enough material for both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes, depending on the nature of the specific political culture and the attitudes of 
the political elite. The particular historical development (for instance, economic basis 
and class structure) of Muslim lands and the international network of economic 
relations should be taken into account in the analysis of Islamic political ideas. 
Therefore, we cannot make a clear-cut statement regarding Islam’s relation to the 
modern idea of statehood. 
 
According to Duran (2001: 43-44), the discussion of the interplay between Islam and 
modern nation-state can best be summarized by two views. The first view, which 
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sees the emergence of the nation-state in the West as a result of the process of 
secularization (limiting religion to one’s private life), is best represented by P.J. 
Vatikiotis. Referring to the unity of religion and politics in Shari’ah and the 
nonterritorial/universal aspect of the Islamic community, Vatikiotis (1987: 36) 
claims that Islam is not compatible with nationalism, which is a constructive loyalty 
to a territorially defined national group. This approach also emphasizes that the 
concept of the nation-state has no equivalent in classical Islamic writings. On the 
contrary, classical Islam stresses a division of the world into two hostile realms: dar 
al-Islam (the realm of Islam or peace) and dar-al harb (the realm of war). With its 
insistence on holy war, Islam has the aim of conquering the non-Islamic world at the 
expense of other beliefs. 
 
The second view, which stresses compatibility between Islam and the nation-state, is 
best articulated by James P. Piscatori (1986: 144), who observes some indications of 
“territorial pluralism” in classical Islamic theory. A significant indication of the 
acceptance of territorial pluralism is found in the verse of the Qur’an that states that 
God divided mankind into nations and tribes for the purpose of their better knowing 
one another. After discussing the Islamic historical experience as the record of 
pragmatic adaptation to diversity under different states and empires such as the 
Ottoman, Persian and so forth, Piscatori (1986: 77) underlines the important effect of 
Islamist sentiments on the establishment of the some nationalist movements and in 
validating the idea of a territorial separation between “them” and “us”. 
 
Stemming from the fact that the original Islamic sources, the Qur’an and the Hadith, 
do not set forth a specific type of government, Islamic political thought, especially in 
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the last centuries has given rise to some differing opinions on the issue of the 
connection between Islam and democracy.  
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2.4 The State as an Agent of Social Change and 
Modernization 
 
Recently, in the field of political science, a more state-oriented approach to the 
question of social transformation has attracted much attention. (Migdal, 1994: 8) In 
this approach, the state is not just a legal entity having a monopoly over violence as 
argued by Weber, but a political entity shaping the course of policy making and the 
content of the polity. (Skocpol, 1985) In this formulation, the state is not a simple 
reflection or sum of sectional interests, but rather a concept based on the public 
interest developed independently of classes and sections of society. (Heper, 1987: 3) 
In the same vein, Pierre Birnbaum (1996: 203) argued that “the state is seen as an 
independent variable around which the entire system in all its aspects recognizes 
itself.” The state is considered to be independent of society and social groups, an 
autonomous agent shaping social groups and imposing policies on society.  
 
As stated by Özbudun (1996: 134), “state autonomy refers to the insulation of the 
state from societal pressures and to its freedom to make important decisions.” In 
other words, the state as formulated here is taken vis-à-vis civil society, and, as 
Metin Heper (1987: 3) noted, to the extent that there is a state highly differentiated 
from society, we can talk of the phenomenon of the state and the levels of stateness 
corresponding to the different institutionalization patterns of various polities. Since 
the institutionalization patterns show significant differences among countries, the 
level of “stateness” also differs regarding the polities of these countries. We can 
claim that “in empirical reality there are states not the state.” (Heper, 1987: 5) 
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The state autonomy or “stateness” is not a fixed phenomenon. It shows major 
differences among polities and within the same polity at different periods. (Heper, 
1987: 4) It can be said that a society having an autonomous state tradition has a state 
high in capacity, whereas a stateless society is expected to have a state with low 
capacity. Kenneth Dyson (1980: 51-52) summarizes the overall characteristics of the 
state societies and stateless societies as follows: 
State societies exemplify strongly non-economic, non-utilitarian attitudes 
towards political relations, which attitudes deny that the public interest is 
simply the sum of private interests; a rationalistic spirit of inquiry; a 
stress on the distinctiveness of state and society, whether in terms of the 
special function of the state or in terms of the peculiar character of its 
authority; a consciousness of institutions which reflects the strength of 
legalism and codification within the political culture and reveals itself in 
the ubiquity of formal organizations and their detailed constitutions; a 
concern for formalization and depersonalization which lend a 
“republican” character to the political system....  
 
By contrast, the “stateless” societies are characterized by the lack of a notion of 
autonomous public interests, an instrumental conception of government and a 
pragmatic view of politics, a tradition of pluralism and debate, mutual respect and 
tolerance among citizens and a high level of civility. (Dyson, 1980: 52) It is the 
existence of this intellectual heritage in Britain and the United States that leads 
Dyson to characterize them as “stateless” societies. Britain, in his view, “lacks a 
historical and legal tradition of the state as an institution that ‘acts’ in the name of 
public authority..., as well as a tradition of continuous intellectual preoccupation with 
the idea of the state right across the political spectrum.” (Dyson, 1980: viii) 
 
There are also some historical, intellectual and cultural factors central to the 
existence of an autonomous state. (Yılmaz, 2002: 58) Accordingly, if there is a 
historical tradition of an isolated sovereign state in a society, there emerges a strong 
state. Intellectual factors operate insofar as that if the political ideas and the norms of 
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policy making in any society incorporate a sovereign state, the possibility of the 
emergence of a strong state is high. There is also a cultural element in terms of the 
ideas held by individuals in a country about a generalized concept and cognition of 
the state. If this concept of the state is active in the perceptions and actions of 
individuals, the probability of existence of a strong state is high. (Nettle, 1988: 312 in 
Yılmaz, 2002: 58) In shaping the modern institutional dynamics of societies, 
specifically, in the direction of either strong or weak institutionalization patterns, 
antecedent cultural traditions have special importance. 
As indicated, different “levels of stateness” are very much attached to the different 
state traditions by which it is referred to “clusters of institutions and cultural 
practices that constitute a set of expectations about behavior” (Perez-Diaz 1993:7 in 
Peters, 2000). Peters (2000) identifies four distinctive state traditions in the West: 
1) Anglo-Saxon (minimal state)  
2) Continental European: Germanic (organicist)  
3) Continental European: French (Napoleonic)  
4) Scandinavian (mixture of Anglo-Saxon and Germanic)  
The basic difference is between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European 
traditions. In the former, the state does not exist as a legal entity but rather one 
speaks of "government" or "government departments". In the latter, by contrast, the 
state is a separate entity “capable of entering into legal contracts with other moral 
persons (such as regions, communes, universities, etc.)”.  
In the Germanic tradition, including much of continental Europe, and perhaps Japan, 
(Dyson 1980) the state is a transcendent entity. In spite of the inevitable division of 
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government into departments and agencies, the authority of the state is not 
considered divisible or bargainable. In this tradition the servants of the state are to 
some degree “the personifications of the power and centrality of the State”. In short, 
because the state is so central to political life, servants of the state must have a firm 
moral and legal foundation. (Peters, 2000) 
The Anglo-Saxon tradition is evident in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
“Whereas in the Germanic tradition state and society are conceptualized as a part of 
one organic entity, within the Anglo-American tradition the state commonly is 
conceptualized as arising from a contract among members of society”. (Peters, 2000) 
The boundaries between state and society are therefore more distinct, and perhaps 
more flexible. The separation of politics and administration is important in a good 
deal of thinking about governance in the Anglo-American tradition. Possible 
bureaucratic dominance of public policy has been most salient in the Anglo-
American democracies, too. (Peters, 1992) 
The Napoleonic State is conceived as unitary and indivisible, much like the 
Germanic State (Hayward,1983 in Peters, 2000). Indeed, this state form evolved as 
part of a nation-building project aiming at overcoming deep divisions in civil society. 
In the French case, nation building was largely, if not completely, successful. In 
other countries, such as Spain and Belgium, the process was far less victorious. The 
Napoleonic conceptualization of government naturally has been associated with “a 
highly centralized state structure to ensure the uniformity of policy throughout the 
political system”. The most obvious difference between the Napoleonic and the 
Germanic traditions is that the later relies more fully on the legal framework of the 
state to guide action by policy makers. The Germanic tradition therefore permits, or 
 32 
 
even encourages, federal solutions, whereas the Napoleonic tradition relies more on 
the direct imposition of central state authority over its citizens. (Peters, 2000) The 
Turkish state tradition resembles the French one most. 
The Scandinavian state tradition is in-between the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic 
traditions. The characteristic that most distinguishes this tradition is, that of the 
welfare state. If the state has any kind of existence that extends beyond a simple 
contract with its population, it also has extensive rights as well as extensive rights in 
dealing with those population. (Peters, 2000) 
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2.5 Secularization as a Consequence of Modernization 
 
Secularization is the process whereby the domains of social activity and human 
experience previously organized around religious norms are “desacralized” by their 
reinterpretation and reorganization in terms of ideals of a less sacral nature. (Berger, 
1967: 106-108) The societal aspect of secularization manifests itself in the 
institutions as the significant decline of the influence of religion. In Western history, 
this process was experienced as the separation of church and state, expropriation of 
church lands, and secularization of education. The cultural aspect of secularization 
implies a gradual decline of the religious content in art, philosophy, literature and 
science. Moreover, science becomes the most important secular perspective on the 
world. So, an analytical distinction can be made between the “objective” side of 
secularization as the secularization at the socio-structural level, and the “subjective” 
side, or secularization at the level of consciousness. (Berger, 1967: 107-108)  
 
Donald Smith (1974: 7-8) conceptualizes “secularization” by dividing the term into 
five analytical categories: 
1- Polity-separation secularization: the institutional separation of religion and 
politics, removal of religious influence in a polity, non-recognition of a state 
religion (e.g., the Peace of Westphalia in 1648). 
2- Polity-expansion secularization: the growing extension of the political system 
into areas of social life previously dominated by religion such as education, 
law, and the economy (e.g., Nepal, Burma, Turkey, Latin America). 
 34 
 
3- Political-culture secularization: transformation of values; secular notions of 
political community replacing traditional ways of thinking (e.g., the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment in the West). 
4- Political-process secularization: the decreasing significance of both religious 
issues and leaders or interest groups in political matters (e.g., Latin America 
in the twentieth century). 
5- Polity-dominance secularization: revolutionary efforts to push religion out of 
politics or modify it according to official ideologies (e.g., the French, 
Mexican, Russian and Soviet, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions).1 
 
The orthodox model of the secularization thesis claims that modernization leads to a 
decrease in the social significance of religion. Three patterns of modernization are 
crucial in this process: social differentiation, societalization and rationalization. 
Social differentiation refers to the process in which specialist institutions are 
developed to handle specific functions previously carried out by one institution 
(religion). “The differentiation of lifeworlds encourages a differentiation of 
metaphysical and salvational systems along lines more suited to each class or social 
fragment.” Secondly, societalization, by which life is organized more societally (in 
society), rather than locally (in the community), allows religion to become privatized. 
Religion is no more a matter of necessity, but “a matter of preference”. The third 
                                                 
1 In Turkey, polity-separation secularization did not occur, since religion maintained its position 
within the state apparatus after the foundation of the new Republic. The secularization reforms in 
Turkey are, however, good examples of polity-expansion secularization whereby the Republican elite 
removed religion from all social and economic domains of life. The third category, political-culture 
secularization, is difficult to apply to countries such as Turkey and Russia, which did not experience 
the Renaissance and Enlightenment processes. Political culture in Turkey was secularized in a top-
down manner. This condition is a consequence of polity-dominance secularization in Turkey, where 
secularization had not appeared as a social force at the periphery, but rather in the top-down policies 
of the Republican elite at the center. The Kemalist revolution was also successful in terms of political-
process secularization to a great extent. Despite some fluctuations in political orientation, religion has 
in general remained relatively marginal to political matters. 
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important process, rationalization, involves changes in the way people think and act 
and entails “the pursuit of technically efficient means of securing this-worldly ends.” 
Consequently, the growth in technical rationality and technology displaced 
supernatural considerations. (Bruce and Wallis, 1992: 11-14) 
 
The revisionist model of the secularization thesis criticizes the orthodox model 
basically upon empirical evidence. (see Brown, 1992) Instead of a unilinear classical 
understanding, the revisionists claim that the social significance of religion can rise 
and fall according to the social and economic context. Moreover, religion does not 
necessarily have a negative correlation with the growth of human knowledge and 
rationality, and with urbanization and industrialization. In fact, religion can suffer as 
a result of dramatic social and economic changes, but it can eventually adapt itself to 
the new setting. (Brown, 1992: 55-56) In short, they claim that secularization, rather 
than diminishing the significance of religion, encourages it to take different forms. 
 
It will also be useful to evaluate secularization in terms of its position among 
different theoretical approaches to the church-state relationship. According to Vergin 
(1994: 5-23), with regard to the relationship between the state and religion, four main 
groups of theoretical views can be identified. The first group sees the state as 
subordinate to religion. The state has no existence independent from religion and is 
based on norms derived religion. Thinkers who were also the members of clergy, 
such as Calvin and Luther, developed this view. The second group gives primacy to 
the state and sees religion as subordinate to the state. Influential political 
philosophers including Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu and Rousseau adhered to 
this view. They sometimes speak of religion serving the state, and sometimes claim 
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that the state should determine religion. The third group demands the full divorce of 
state and religion. Locke and de Tocqueville, in particular, exemplifies this more 
liberal outlook, which sees state and religion as different and independent domains.  
De Tocqueville says the state has no competence in religion, and religion should be 
free and should have an autonomous area in society. This tradition of secularization 
developed particularly in Anglo-American traditions. The last view, offered by 
August Comte, not only claims the primacy of state over religion, but also offers a 
new religion for society. For him, humanity had replaced God although his functions 
were still valid. What Comte offered was nothing other than a secularized religion 
based on atheistic-humanistic tenets. This form of secularization differs from the 
previous three views. For example, it allows for the interference of the state in 
religious matters, and strongly indicates that the state has the right to make 
judgments on religious issues and to impose these upon society. This is what has 
been called “laicism” and has developed primarily on the basis of the French political 
experience. The instances in which the state develops an alternative ideology and 
imposes it on society fall into this category.  
 
The form of secularization in a given place and time depends upon the political 
culture in question, particularly the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis civil society. The 
weaker the state is, the more liberal a form of secularization develops, and in such 
“stateless societies,” the state-church separation takes place in a relatively peaceful 
manner in the course of the secularization process. (Dyson, 1980: 51) This form of 
secularization characterizes the Anglo-American traditions. Conversely, it is highly 
possible to find an extreme secularity in state-dominated societies, along with deep 
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conflicts and confrontations in the secularization process. This is the case in France 
and to some extent in Turkey. 
 
Within this framework, Martin E. Marty’s classification of the different experiences 
of secularization provides useful categories for understanding these traditions of 
secularization in different contexts. Marty (1969: 10) differentiates continental 
secularity from the Anglo-American tradition of secularity on the basis of the state’s 
attitude towards religion. In continental Europe, particularly in France, we observe 
“maximal secularity,” which “involved a formal and unrelenting attack on gods and 
churches and a studied striving to replace them.” In the Anglo-American historical 
experience, there was a gradual and increasing disregard of gods and churches 
without attempts to replace them. He calls this type of secularism “mere secularity.” 
In England and the United States, a smooth reconciliation between the state and 
religion has occurred in the process of the formation of modernity.  
 
As an ideal example of a weak state tradition, the English form of secularization did 
not produce a radical secularist attitude towards religion. Unlike the case of France, 
“the Protestantism of England has prevented any massive confrontation of religion 
with secular radicalism.”(Martin, 1978: 123) The English secularists were not against 
religion; rather, their goal was the separation of the state and the “church.” They 
demanded to establish a national church, not to destroy the religious establishment.  
As the best example of the strong state tradition in the West, the French state has 
always been suspicious of religion. Secularism can be seen as the primary indicator 
of progress in the state-building process in France, marking the step-by-step 
separation of the state from all other social systems. (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 
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110) It was not surprising that the Revolution took harsh measures against 
established religion and instituted legal secularization in a decisive manner. The 
numbers of the clergy were reduced, the religious orders were banished, and the 
church lands were taken under state control. Education was removed away from the 
control of the church. (Marty, 1969: 23) 
 
In short, two modes of secularism evolved from two different contexts and state 
traditions. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xv) The French model of secularism is 
antireligious and seeks to eliminate or control religion. The second model of 
secularism, evolved from the Anglo-American experience, seeks to protect religions 
from state intervention and encourages “faith-based social networking” to 
consolidate civil society. The first model sees the state as the agent of social change 
and the source of the “good” life, whereas the second treats the state with suspicion 
and sees civil society as the source of change and of the “good” life. 
 
In Turkey, then, the experience of secularism, is apparently not that which occured in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, where the state simply claimed no say on the issue of 
religion, which was increasingly being transferred to the realm of the “private.” The 
Turkish model is much closer to French “laicism,” in which religion is not separated 
from something called public life, but rather dominated by a state that considers itself 
to be founded on principles not grounded in a “religious” regime of power and 
knowledge. (Silverstein, 2003) It is not an accident that the picture in Turkey 
resembles to that of France, since both societies have similar state traditions. Because 
of the lack of peripheral feudal forces in its past, the state in Turkey is even stronger 
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than that of France; thus, one comes across a more extreme form of secularism, 
which is all but absent in Western countries. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
OTTOMAN LEGACY 
 
 
 
 
There is a considerable literature about the Turkish nation-state’s link with its 
Ottoman past. (for instance, see Zürcher, 1993; Shaw and Shaw, 1977; Özbudun, 
1996) The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state 
tradition and a weak civil society, and the bureaucratic elite continued to conceive of 
the state as vital for holding together the community. (Heper, 1985: 16)  The creation 
of the new republic was involved addressing the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. 
The founders of the nation-state aimed to break away from the influence of its 
predecessor in many terms. Nevertheless, the early Turkish Republic can be better 
understood as a re-construction of existing religious and political legitimacy 
structures through the creation of a new nation-state. Thus, it is important for this 
study to elaborate what we should understand about the Turkish state tradition 
inherited from the Ottomans. 
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Devlet, the Turkish equivalent of the term “state,” linguistically refers to bliss, 
felicity and luck. Therefore, it is an old usage of the same word that people used in 
greeting others, saying “devletle, ikbal ile” (with bliss and fortune). It means God-
sent blessing (nimet), as well. (Banarlı, 1985: 9) The word devlet is used in the well-
known couplet of the Suleyman the Magnificient with two different meanings: 
Halk içinde muteber bir nesne yok devlet gibi 
Olmaya devlet cihanda bir nefes sıhhat gibi 2 
As Özbudun’s study clearly shows, the state has been considered as a sublime entity 
in both popular and official usage: 
The state is valued in its own right, is relatively autonomous from 
society, and plays a tutelary and paternalistic role. This paternalistic 
image is reflected in the popular expression devlet baba (father state). 
Another popular saying is Allah Devlete, Millete zeval vermesin (may 
God preserve the State and the Nation). Ottoman writings on politics and 
government are replete with such terms as Devlet-i Aliye (Sublime State), 
hikmet-i hükümet (raison d’etat), and Devletin ali menfaatleri (sublime 
interests of the State). Such notions readily found their place in the 
political discourse of the Turkish republic. Indeed, the preamble of the 
1982 Turkish constitution described the State (always with a capital S) as 
kutsal Türk Devleti (sacred), adding that no thoughts or opinions could 
find protection against “Turkish national interests”– presumably meaning 
state interests as defined by the state apparatus. (Özbudun, 2000: 128) 
 
Some scholars of Turkish history argue that the Turkish state tradition resembles the 
shepherd-flock metaphor. One of them, İsmet Bozdağ, explains that in the Turkish 
state tradition, the rulers have been considered as shepherds, and the ruled society as 
their flock. This understanding has to do with the responsibilities of the state, rather a 
humiliation of society. Without the flock, the existence of the shepherd is 
meaningless. The shepherd is responsible for the flock’s survival and maintenance. If 
something bad happens to the flock, the shepherd will be considered guilty and 
                                                 
2 Nothing is as worthy among people as the state 
   No blessing can be like a breath of health 
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removed from his position. If, on the other hand, the shepherd can protect his flock 
from possible dangers and provide the conditions the flock needs, he can continue in 
his position. (Taşar, ny) This metaphor is actually a good illustration of the state-
centered political culture of the Turkish society, where society is the submissive 
recipient and the state is the sole agent for development. 
 
“Within the Islamic community of peoples Turks have had a special State tradition 
from the time they entered and controlled the Islamic world in the eleventh century.” 
This tradition can be defined as “recognition of the state’s absolute right to legislate 
on public matters.” (İnalcık, 1980: 7) Although the Turks have adopted the Arabic 
word for the “state”, in practice, the Turkish devlet is different from the Arabic 
dawlah. Count Ostrorog (1927: 42 in Ozay, 1990: 69-70), the legal advisor to the last 
Ottoman Sultan, outlined the Arabic and Turkish understandings of the state some 
eighty years ago: 
The Arab mind remained inviolably faithful to the following 
fundamental conception [of legislation]: Legislative power belongs to the 
Calife; the Doctors of the Law, who interpret the Law, are the 
indispensable intermediaries between God and the Calife. The 
consequence of that conception was that no such thing as a Statue, an 
Edict, drafted in systematic legal shape and promulgated as binding, is to 
be found in the whole of Arab Mohammedan history. 
 
Not so with the Turks. The Turkish Hans professed to be, and certainly 
were, very good Moslems, but from the outset they asserted their right to 
enact regulations that were to be obeyed because they so willed, because 
at the top of the document they deigned to write in their purple Imperial 
ink: Mujebinje’amel oluna! Which I think may be adequately translated 
by, ‘Be it acted as enacted’ – or because they caused their sign-manual 
Tughra, figuring the impression of their open hand, to head the document 
as a mark of its Imperial origin. 
 
In a similar vein, the Ottoman state tradition is very different from the classical 
Islamic state tradition. According to Gerber (2002: 67-68), the Ottoman Empire 
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presents a new political reality, one that can be summarized as follows: First, the 
historical caliphate disappears, and the Ottoman sultan becomes the successor of the 
caliph. Second, the division between the actual and nominal ruler ceases to exist. The 
sultan is the real and nominal ruler, even at the nadir of the empire in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Third, political stability is sustained as never before in 
Islam, particularly since the late fifteenth century. There is not even a change of 
dynasty, no instance of power usurped by force, not one real break in the orderly 
succession of rulers. All this is “unprecedented in Islam”, and extremely unusual in 
world history. Fourth, with the division between ulama and ruler completely gone, 
the Ottoman state is, on the whole, highly legitimate. There are no known ideological 
attacks on its validity, whether by ulama or by other intellectuals; no governor of any 
province is known to have ever attempted formal separation from the empire. In fact, 
“as remarkable as the low level of legitimation of the late classical Islamic state is the 
high level of legitimacy of the Ottoman state, even in its latter days.” Lastly, the 
Ottoman Empire never saw itself, or depicted itself to others, as just another state, 
certainly not as just another Turkish state (dawla turkiyya). (Haarman, 1988, in 
Gerber, 2002) On the contrary, it was to a certain extent a rebuilding of the polity of 
the rightly guided caliphs, inasmuch as Islam never again geographically spread its 
message at such high speed as under the Ottomans. Even in relative decline, the 
Ottoman Empire stood as the only safeguard against the infidels. In other words, the 
Ottoman Empire was unique in Islam in being throughout its history “the cutting 
edge” between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb. This role was naturally an 
extremely potent factor in its legitimation. Gerber describes the Ottoman state as a 
novel model: “the non-caliphal, religiously relevant state.” 
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3.1 The Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Character of the 
Ottoman State 
 
According to Kazancıgil (1991: 349), the strong and centralized Ottoman state 
tradition was relatively unique among Islamic societies. Although the Ottoman state 
had a strong religious dimension, the legal role of Islam was often moderated by the 
state’s pragmatic concerns. (Gerber, 1994: 76) Notions of the political and the 
religious were both ultimately derived from and closely connected to the state.  
 
The Ottoman state, as one of the most enduring multi-religious and multi-ethnic 
empires, survived for half a millennium. The Ottomans tried to establish an immortal 
state which they called Devlet-i Aliye-i Ebed-Müddet (Eternal Sublime State). The 
state was the center of the polity and the source of justice as the famous Ottoman 
maxim (circle of justice) expressed by Naima: a ruler could have “no power without 
soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, 
and no popular well-being without justice.” (İnalcık, 1964: 43)  
 
According to Tursun Beg, a well-known Ottoman statesmen and historian of the late 
fifteenth century, “harmony among men living in a society” could be achieved only 
by statecraft. Every society should have one ruler with absolute power, and the 
authority to issue non-religious laws. The ruler should, at the same time, preserve the 
social order and ensure justice. These ideas constituted the political philosophy of the 
Ottoman state. The Ottomans maintained the traditional view that everyone should 
be kept in his appropriate place. (İnalcık, 1964: 3-4) Thus, there existed clear 
 45 
 
boundaries between the center and the periphery. According to Halil İnalcık (1964: 
5) Ottoman society was divided into two groups: 1) the askeriya, such as officers of 
the court, army, civil servants and ulama, to whom the Sultan delegated the religious 
and executive power, 2) the reaya, consisting of all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects 
who paid taxes but were excluded from administrative positions. 
 
Again according to İnalcık (2000: 65-76), the Ottoman state tradition had two roots: 
the Central Asian and the Sassanid. Summarizing his findings, we may say that the 
Ottomans derived from their Central Asian roots the belief that the state existed 
through the maintenance of törü or yasa – a code of laws laid down directly by the 
ruler. In doing so, the Sultans from very early on unified political with legislative 
power. Similarly, the Ottomans and the Seljuks inherited from the Sassanids a 
political understanding that equated the state with the absolute authority of the 
sovereign and his maintenance of justice. The fairness of the government therefore 
ultimately depended on the sovereign’s ethical qualities. 
 
These Central Asian and Sassanid legacies, İnalcık argues, played an important role 
in the development of an Ottoman tradition of absolutism based on sultanic order, 
which often went beyond what Islamic law allowed. Accordingly, in the classical 
institutional structure of the Empire, the absolute nature of Ottoman political power 
was evidenced by the extent to which all civilian, military and religious officials 
depended directly on the Sultan. The state’s ownership of the land and the presence 
of a centralized system of taxation were additional dimensions of Ottoman 
absolutism. Such a political and economic framework of centralist absolutism was 
designed essentially to hinder the development of peripheral feudal structures. 
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The Ottomans eliminated any potential alternative economic or political center of 
power. The accumulation of wealth could not pave the way to democracy, as it did in 
the West. As Özbudun (2000: 126) aptly states, the relationship between the 
economic and political powers in the Ottoman Empire was the opposite of that in 
western Europe: i.e., rather than economic power leading to political power, political 
power provided access to wealth. The accumulated wealth could not be transformed 
into private property, and it remained liable to be taken away by the state. The 
Ottomans never favored the development of a powerful merchant class. Sipahis (the 
fiefholders) and ayans were the nominal landowners, but ultimate ownership of the 
lands was still in the hands of the state. The sipahis were not land-based aristocracy, 
and their titles could be removed by the state. The ayans, on the other hand, lacked 
the political legitimacy of an aristocracy, in the sense of the feudal aristocracy in 
Western Europe. The local notables, who emerged during the later centuries, on the 
other hand, remained “local” in the real sense. In addition, because the Ottomans 
were constantly threatened by powerful Turcoman ghazis (warriors), they also 
pushed those warriors to the periphery so as to keep everyone in their place. (Heper, 
1985: 15) In short, no important threat to the power of the state elites existed. The 
Kemalist elite would later benefit from this situation.  
 
Keyder (1997) underlines the fact that because of “the absence of large landlords” 
and “the relative independence of the bureaucracy”, the Republican revolutionists did 
not face strong opposition in the early Republican period. In the absence of a strong 
landlord class that might have demanded economic liberalism and civil and political 
rights for its narrow constituency, no group in society found it possible to challenge 
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the absolutism of the state. In terms of political functioning, the polity of the 
Ottomans was “patrimonialism,” while the case in England was “centralized 
feudalism” in its past, and the French one, “decentralized feudalism”. “Whereas in 
both centralized and decentralized feudalism central authority is effectively checked 
by countervailing powers, in patrimonialism the periphery is almost totally subdued 
by the centre.” (Heper, 1985: 14) 
 
Sunar (1974: 4) portrays the patrimonial character of the Ottoman Empire by a 
quotation from Machievelli’s The Prince (1950: 15-16): 
Examples of these kinds of government in our time are those of the Turk 
and the King of France. All the Turkish monarchy is governed by one 
ruler, the others are his servants, dividing his kingdom into 
“sangiacates”, he sends to them various administrators, and changes 
them or recalls them at his pleasure. But the King of France is 
surrounded by a large number of nobles, recognized as such by their 
subjects, and loved by them; they have their prerogatives, of which the 
king cannot deprive them without danger to himself. 
 
Machiavelli admired the Ottoman paradigm of order particularly for its strength and 
durability. Political authority so penetrated the social sphere of life so that society 
was considered as being under the state, and the ruler closely controlled economic 
life. (Sunar, 1974: 5-6) The quoted passage points out that the sultan ruled through a 
body of officials having the legal status of household slaves. Taken from the 
adolescent children of Christian families and trained either by some Muslim families 
or within the sultan's palace, they had no substatially independent social identities or 
loyalties. The ministers of the Ottoman sultan, "being all slaves and bondsmen," 
were loyal and obedient servants of their master, but lacking any connection to the 
subject population, they could not "carry the people with them." The actual Ottoman 
slave official (kul), a product of specific measures of recruitment and training, took 
his place in a centralized bureaucracy. (For a detailed analysis see Meeker, 2002.) 
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These slave officials (kul) were unchallenged by any system of estates. There was no 
aristocracy ruling its own people and territory, and no bourgeoisie granted the 
privilege of governing its own cities. The sultan possessed a sovereign power, which 
any other monarch in early modern Europe never had.  
 
Regarding the Oriental empires, Weber saw one line of political/bureaucratic 
development as theoretically moving toward patrimonial bureaucracy, which might, 
in turn, reach an extreme form in “sultanism”: “With the development of a purely 
personal administrative staff, especially a military force under the control of the 
chief, traditional authority tends to develop into patrimonialism”. Where absolute 
authority is maximized, it may be called “sultanism.” (Brown, 2000: 65) Although 
this part of the thesis tries to depict the patrimonial character of the Empire, one 
should also realize that the issue is not as simple as Weber’s concept of “sultanism”. 
An article by Halil İnalcık (1993: 16) states that while official Ottoman discourse 
depicted the sultan as above any law and authority, the reality was much more 
complicated. The masses possessed means to influence the sultan ─for example, by 
deserting villages─ and the government could not ignore such possibilities. In 
contrast to the theory that nothing restricted the sultan stands the claim that the sultan 
was in fact severely restricted by the concept of adalet, justice. In addition, the 
Islamic concept of hisba functioned as a social contract between the ruler and the 
ruled in order to assure the welfare of society. (İnalcık, 1993: 9-18) 3 
 
In addition to its centralized nature, the Ottoman Empire was a truly bureaucratic 
state as well. This characteristic is especially important in terms of the secularization 
                                                 
3 Vienna Şikayet Defteri, a book containing some 2500 complaints, all relating to the year 1675, sent 
by citizens from all over the empire to the sultan about wrongs committed primarily by officials, is a 
good example of the extension of the phenomenon of justice. (see Gerber, 2002: 79) 
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reforms during the Turkish Republic. For instance, Mardin (1997: 192) claims that 
Atatürk’s secularization reforms had two antecedents in the Ottoman experience, 
which influenced his opinions as to the functions of religion in society and the 
methods, which he used to implement his ideas into policy. The first was the 
“empiricism of Ottoman secular officialdom”, and the latter was legislation as the 
sole means of secularizing the country. In order to understand the former, one should 
look at the adab tradition.  
 
On the basis of principles like ‘necessity’ and ‘reason’, as well as the norms of 
rationality, the Ottoman centre created a new viewpoint for the ruling elite. It was 
called adab; this was “a secular and state-oriented tradition” which “developed as a 
consequence of efforts ‘to identify the state with established values’.” (Heper, 1985: 
25) The adab tradition was a kind of “organizational socialization” based upon a 
formulation of “a particular outlook that provided ideals and values for the ruling 
strata” and “developed as a consequence of efforts to identify the state with 
established values”. It was so pervasive that from the seventeenth century on, the 
sultans lost their primacy, which was now attributed to the state itself. “The sultans 
could be now deposed in the name of the state.” (Heper, 1981: 347) Heper (1985: 25) 
further argues that this institutionalization of the state around certain norms (adab) 
resembles the state institutionalization of France in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century around such values as order, hierarchy, secularism and solidarism. 
 
Mardin (1997: 194-197) describes the “bureaucratic style” of the Ottoman 
government as “hard-headed, empirically minded and pragmatic” as a result of their 
training, which was different from that of the ulama. The ulama were trained in a 
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specific curriculum in schools known as medrese, the graduates of which were 
expected to be scholars in one of the religious fields. They were very adept at finding 
religious justification for many activities, like the charging of interest, that were 
literally prohibited in the Koran. However, they still had some idealism in their 
thinking. The bureaucrats, on the other hand, were sent to government bureaus after 
their elementary education. Consequently, their perspective was shaped by the power 
struggles of the real world. All of the Westernizing developments of the later 
Ottoman period were the result of typical mentality of this secular Ottoman 
bureaucracy: their desire to restore the state’s power and pragmatism, in the sense 
that if western institutions could strengthen the empire, they should be adopted. 
These bureaucrats, having usually come from the Ottoman recruitment system 
(devşirme), had no ties with any interest group. As slaves of the state, they struggled 
for the existence and supremacy of the state. This motivation caused them to 
approach other values in a pragmatic way. The next chapter will show that the 
founders of the new republic were of the same mentality. 
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3.2 State vs. Religion  
 
Religion was not an alternative force to the empire’s strong central administration. A 
considerable number of scholars think that it is difficult to consider the Ottoman state 
to have been a theocratic system because the laws of secular authorities, rather than 
religious instructions, dominated the system in the political and social contexts. 
(Ortaylı, 1986: 162) The Ottoman state was sovereign vis-à-vis Islam. One cannot 
deny that the aim of the state was to realize the ideals of Islam. In addition, religion in 
the Ottoman Empire linked the popular structures with the ruling institution, assuring 
the state’s legitimacy. It was also as the sole source of social control the core of the 
socialization process. (Mardin, 1971: 205-206) However, while Islam was definitive 
in private matters, it was inadequate in terms of public policies. (Heper, 1985: 27) 
Islamic rule does not recognize corporate identities. The Ottoman religious class was 
not a corporate body, but dependent on the state for its appointments, promotions, and 
salaries. (Özbudun, 2000: 127) The members of the religious institutions were 
appointed and removed by the Sultan. “The Şeyhülislam had no right to interfere 
directly in the government or in legal administration.”  (Heper, 1985: 27)  In addition, 
the Ottomans, following the earlier Turkic-Iranian tradition, could take measures that 
conflicted with the sacred law, if the public interest required it. Heper argues that the 
Ottomans incorporated “the early Turkic idea of a supreme law (yasa/yasak) that the 
ruler had to enforce with justice regardless of his personal wishes”. As a derivative of 
yasa, the Sultans developed örf-i sultani, which refers to the will and command of the 
sultan as a secular ruler. (Heper, 1985: 24-25)  
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In this respect, the Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a long-
standing tradition of raison d’etat, which often emphasized state hegemony over 
religion. In the Ottoman context, such political supremacy over the religious realm 
was achieved through the incorporation of the Islamic establishment into the 
administrative apparatus of the empire. In apparent continuity with Ottoman patterns, 
secularism in modern Turkey did not attempt to separate state and religion. Instead, 
the Republican regime maintained tight control over the religious establishment by 
monopolizing Islamic functions and incorporating the religious personnel into the 
state bureaucracy. Analyzing this historical continuity will therefore greatly improve 
our understanding of Turkish laicism, as well. 
 
Throughout Islamic history, state control over the Muslim religious establishment 
became so pervasive that the ulama virtually became an arm of government. (Brown, 
2000: 35) In comparison to other Muslim states, ulama were more clearly integrated 
into the state apparatus in the Ottoman Empire. Considering their control over the 
educational, judicial and administrative network, one can conclude that they acted as 
agents of the state and ensured the state’s control of social life. “Ottoman 
government was therefore both ‘Islamic' and ‘bureaucratic’.” (Mardin, 1997: 194)  
 
While the Ottomans may have sought to give a religious appearance to their policies 
and actions, in reality they exercised their power over different ethnicities and 
religions in rather secular ways. Their policies and actions, in short, largely 
responded to political, economic, and social necessities. “Here perhaps lies the secret 
of the longevity of an empire that privileged the political over the religious factor in 
its pre-modern forms.” (Nalbantoğlu, 1993: 355) Mardin (1983: 138-140) describes 
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this attitude by saying that the raison d’etat in the empire was the foundation of 
political practice, and that the Ottoman state always had primacy in the well-known 
formula of din-u devlet (din wa dawlah). 
 
Religion, in the centralized political and economic context of the Ottoman Empire 
served to legitimize state power. Indeed, starting with its backing by the majority of 
the Turkic tribes in Central Asia, Islam came to play an important role in the 
consolidation of central authority. Most importantly, the new religion brought with it 
means of sociopolitical control and a belief system that proved more appropriate than 
the mystical and “esoteric” world of shamanism for the functioning of patrimonial 
kingdoms. As a result, Turkish states like the Seljuk strongly encouraged conversion 
to Islam throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries and began to defend its core 
values. (Taşpınar, 2002: 11) 
 
In addition, the new religion’s devotion to gaza – the ideology of holy war in the 
name of Islam─ well suited the “nomadic” and “combative” culture of Turkic 
principalities bordering the Byzantine Empire. During the centuries that followed the 
Seljuk defeat of the Byzantine army in 1071, the religious motivation of gaza 
motivated Turkmen tribes, including the Ottomans, to conquer the Christian lands of 
Asia Minor. It is therefore important to note that conversion to Islam ─beyond the 
undeniable religious convictions involved─ had a functional dimension aimed at 
territorial expansion and stabilization of political authority. (Taşpınar, 2002: 11-12) 
 
Since Islamic values took root in Ottoman society, the Shari’ah emerged as a sort of 
“social contract” between the state and its Muslim population. In that sense, an 
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Islamic moral and legal framework came to play an important role in supporting the 
patriarchal machinery of the state. Yet, the founding dynasty remained reluctant to 
let Islam determine the political and legal limits of state power. Given the mobilizing 
power of religion, even the ulama ─the guardians of Islamic law─ could become 
suspect in the eyes of Ottoman rulers. With such a cautious frame of mind, the 
Ottoman answer to all potential threats coming from Anatolian society was to 
establish bureaucratic control over the religious establishment. In that sense, the 
Ottoman sultans considered their patrimonial authority over the guardians of Islamic 
orthodoxy as a natural extension of state supremacy. In this framework, the members 
of the religious institutions were appointed and removed by the Sultan. (Heper, 1985: 
27)  
 
The characteristic features of the mutually beneficial relationship between the ulama 
and the state involved integration and subordination. “High” and “proper” Islam, 
represented by the Şeyhülislam at the top of the ulama hierarchy, was incorporated 
into the state apparatus. The livelihood and office of the Şeyhülislam, like those of 
the rest of the religious class, were granted by the state, and the Sultan determined 
the path he traveled in his career. The Şeyhülislam, as the supreme religious official 
and head of judicial system, sat on the Imperial Council. However, despite his high 
position within the state hierarchy, he could, like all government officials, be easily 
dismissed during any serious conflict with the Sultan. For instance, Özek (1962: 42 
in Taşpınar, 2002: 15) gives the case of a Şeyhülislam, who in 1702 tried to obtain 
for himself the position of Grand Vizier and paid for his presumption with his life. 
Another example comes from İnalcık (1964: 43-44), telling how “once, when 
Şeyhülislam Ali Cemali Efendi came over the seat of the government to protest a 
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decision of Sultan Selim I, which he thought contrary to the Shari’ah, the Sultan 
denounced him as interfering in state affairs.” The Şeyhülislam, hence, had no right 
to interfere directly in the governmental affairs. 
 
In the eyes of the religious establishment, the legitimacy of the state came from its 
ability to protect the Islamic realm. Therefore, endangering the state, by definition, 
made a movement heretical. In this political framework, the religious class could 
very rarely object to the secular laws related to the administrative functions of the 
state. Ultimate authority and sovereignty rested with Ottoman palace officials and 
with the Sultan himself. As Mardin (1991: 116) argues, 
Trained in the religious seminary (the medrese), the ulama had to endure 
a period of practical apprenticeship to assuage their shock as they 
discovered that the rule of Muslim law did not discover all cases brought 
before them, and that there existed an Ottoman reason of state which 
operated independently of Islamic values. 
 
 
The Ottoman raison d’etat was in historical continuity with the previously mentioned 
Central Asian-Turkic precepts of Yasa. Accordingly, the Sultan could make 
regulations and enact laws entirely on his own initiative. These laws, independent of 
the Shari’ah and known as Kanun or Örf-i Sultani, as mentioned previously, were 
based on rational rather than religious principles and were enacted primarily in the 
spheres of public, administrative and criminal law as well as state finance. (Berkes, 
1998: 185) Secular lawmaking by the rulers was based on the Islamic conception of 
Urf. “This theory stated that where the Shari’ah did not provide a solution to existing 
problems, the measuring rods of ‘necessity’ and ‘reason’ could be used to enact 
regulations with force of law”. (Mardin, 1962: 102) Moreover, in practice, one can 
observe some Kanuns contrary to the Shari’ah. For instance, while in Islamic law, 
punishment of adultery for a married person was death by stoning (recm), in the 
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Ottoman Kanuns, adulterers were charged to pay “according to their means─ three 
hundred akces [Ottoman lira] for the middle-income group, and one hundred akces 
for the poor. For illegal sexual relations, unmarried persons were fired one hundred, 
fifty, forty, or thirty akces, according to their means.” (İnalcık, 1973: 74) 
 
Given the supremacy of the state over the religious realm, it is not hard to imagine 
the Ottoman Şeyhulislam and other members of ulama being involved in the 
intellectual exercise of fitting the Kanun within the proper Islamic framework. 
Türköne (2003: 182) exemplifies this with a case from Ottoman history that 
concerned putting a stamp on promissory notes. When the Spanish ambassador 
somehow saw a contradiction in terms of religious concerns, the Reisül-küttab of 
Selim III, Ebubekir Ratıp Efendi, replied to this objection by stating that every 
benefit can be justified in religious terms. (Her maslahatın vech-i şer’isi bittaharri 
bulunabilir) As another example, in summarizing the position of Ebu Suud Efendi, 
an Ottoman Şeyhulislam, Mandaville (1979: 298 in Gerber,2002: 73) says: “What 
appears is an appeal to continued popular usage (ta’amul and ta’aruf), to the welfare 
of the people (istihsan), and to both throughout with a tone of ‘Let’s be practical,’ an 
appeal to commonsense.” What these words meant in real terms is made clearer in 
the detailed letter of a Sufi sheikh to the sultan: “God’s legislation has no other 
purpose than to ease the way of His servants through the exigencies of the time… 
One uses inadmissibility at times because it is better for the people of that time, at 
other times one does the opposite.” He further cites an opinion that says: “Be guided 
by whatever is more harmonious with how the people are living, what is kinder, 
better for them.” (Mandaville, 1979: 302-303 in Gerber, 2002:73) 
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What partly facilitated the Ottomans’ being able to maintain the state’s supremacy 
and open a secular space in which to legislate, was the nature of the religion they 
adopted. Ottomans were Sunni, a sect within Islam that allows enough room for new 
judgments in accordance with new necessities. Moreover, in the Sunni tradition, 
administration is not a primary (aslî) issue, but rather a secondary (talî) concern. The 
Shia tradition, on the other hand, takes the issue of imamet as being of primary 
importance. (Türköne, 2003: 253) Additionally, in the Sunni understanding, the 
existence of the state is more important rather than its quality. For instance, 
Mawardi, a distinguished Islamic scholar of the eleventh century, claimed that if 
someone takes political power through coercion and violence, one should evaluate 
his subsequent behavior. If he acts within the scope of religious rules and of justice, 
his acts can be approved for the sake of preventing divisions and chaos within the 
umma. (Türköne, 2003: 256) This approach enabled Muslim rulers to act according 
to their own will.  
 
In this framework, orthodox Islam had only narrow opportunities to develop into a 
source of opposition. As a result, in contrast to what was going on in western Europe, 
there was no Ottoman equivalent of the confrontational relations between state and 
church. The Ottomans succeeded in creating a strong state where power was 
centralized in the hands of the Sultan and a group of officials entirely loyal to him. 
 
On the basis of these findings, as Heper (1981: 348) states, in the Ottoman Empire 
“there was little need for `institutional secularization as disengagement’, or change 
from ecclesiastical control to public administration, because the state as a distinct 
entity, with ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’, and supporting resources, always existed.” 
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Even in the sixteenth century, at the height of Islamic influence, the Empire was not a 
real theocracy.  
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3.3 The Impact of Modernization 
 
The Westernization reforms are the most lingering example of the Ottoman legacy 
because Kemalism was “an intensification of this earlier modernization trend.” It was 
not “an alien model imported from the West”, but a result of historical processes that 
occurred through the Empire’s interactions with Europe. (Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 
1997: 3) Obviously, the Kemalist Republic is much different from the Ottoman 
Empire. However, Atatürk and his friends did not directly import their ideas from the 
West; rather, they used the intellectual treasury accumulated by Ottoman reformers 
up to that time. Furthermore, “Kemalism constituted a continuum with the Tanzimat, 
Young Ottomans and Young Turks, insofar as its major concern was the state, 
considered as the unique mediating mechanism and source of legitimacy in the 
society, prevailing over market relations.” (Kazancıgil, 1997: 37, 48) In the Turkish 
Republic, the bureaucratic elite continued to conceive of the state as being vital to 
hold the community together. (Heper, 1985: 16) 
 
When analyzing the impact of the Westernization process during the Ottoman period 
on political developments in the Republic, one should keep in mind the specific 
features pointed out below. Differently from other countries of the so-called third 
world, Turkey initiated the modernization process under its own state apparatus. The 
Turkish modernization process is different in some ways from its precursors.  One of 
its distinct features is that the administrative elite took “the survival of the state” as 
its primary concern throughout the modernization process. In the interaction between 
the public and the ruling elite, the priority of the state has remained a common space, 
as in the old traditions. The second point appears a logical consequence of the first 
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one. Modernization efforts occurred in order to strengthen the state and making it 
compatible with the West, or at least to enable it to survive. The sovereignty of the 
state would be preserved through the modernization of society; therefore, 
modernization has been perceived as the concern of the state. Such a perception 
explains why modernization projects have been planned by the state and 
implemented in a top-down manner. Throughout Ottoman history, each initiative was 
handled by the state. Moreover, contrary to developments in the Western Europe, 
there were no classes that would be able to resist on the basis of their interests. 
(Ahmad, 1986: 34) The reforms were discussed and implemented only by the 
military-bureaucratic elite, who did not feel the need to expand their ideas into the 
broader society. In addition, modernization was perceived by Ottoman intellectuals 
as Westernization. Beyond that, throughout the nineteenth century, what they meant 
when talking about the West was in fact only France. This is one reason of why 
Turkish secularization resembles the French case so much. They were so eager to 
imitate France that, as Türköne (2003: 23) relates, after “civilization” entered into 
“Dictionaire de I’Academie Française” in its present meaning, the Ottoman elite 
invented the equivalent “medeniyet” only two years later.  
 
The realization that the West was superior to the Ottomans dawned first during wars, 
and gradually this opinion was applied beyond the military matters to the social life. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans were well aware that they had 
begun to lose battles, mainly against the Austrians and Russians, which they used to 
win. The situation as it presented itself to the Ottomans was essentially this: "Given 
that it is a fact that we are in possession of the true faith, why are we losing wars to 
infidels?” (Silverstein, 2003) The question was considered to be essentially a 
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technical one involving expertise and equipment, and the eventual strategy was the 
well-known reorganization of the military beginning with Selim III's Nizam-i Jedid 
in the late eigtheenth century. Selim III (1789-1807) has been regarded as initiator of 
Westernization in the Empire; however, his reforms aimed only to restore military 
power. “Despite his personal conservatism, Selim III created in Ottoman society a 
trend toward Westernization and a sense of the necessity for rapid and progressive 
change.” (İnalcık, 1964: 10-11) The reforms continued under the Tanzimat after 
Mahmud II's destruction of the Janissary corps in 1826. (For a classical treatment, 
see Berkes, 1964) The importance of the reforms initiated by Mahmud II should not 
be underemphasized. Under his rule, there came about 
the emergence of the idea of an Ottoman state, composed of peoples of 
diverse nationalities and religions, based on secular principles of 
sovereignty as contrasted with the medieval concept of an Islamic empire. 
The real beginning of modernization and secularization was in this 
charge. (Berkes, 1964: 90)  
 
Mahmud II (1808-1839) increased the pace of the Westernization reforms, and 
removed the Janissary corps and put a modern army in its place. During his reign, the 
Sened-i İttifak (Covenant of Union) was signed in 1808 to settle the conflict between 
the center and the ayans, the local notables. Like Magna Carta, it limited the Sultan’s 
power to some extent, but to be sure, it was not a preparation for a liberal democracy.  
The ayans were later suppressed brutally. It should be, however, noted that the state 
but not the sultan himself was regarded as party to the agreement. He soon restored 
the state’s power. (İnalcık, 1964: 12-14) 
 
It is important to recognize that the incorporation of modern techniques into the 
Ottoman administration did not take place as a result of colonialism, but rather as 
sovereign state reform on the part of a Muslim polity. Moreover, this process did not 
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appear to have been experienced by the Ottomans as a capitulation to the enemy's 
“cultural imperialism” even in later periods, as Keyder (1993:22) has pointed out: 
"Unlike other nationalists of the Third World, the Ottomans did not feel particularly 
resentful toward the West." Nevertheless, one should note that all of the 
developments were the efforts around the typical goal of the secular Ottoman 
bureaucracy: the restoration of the state’s power.  (Mardin, 1997: 197) If Western 
institutions could strengthen the empire, they would be adopted. What was new in 
this adoption of the techniques  of modern disciplines was the relative authority and 
prestige accorded to this knowledge. Silverstein (2003) argues that this is the origin 
of the arrangements that later was called secularism in Turkey,  and which in the 
Turkish context does not so much represent the separation of religion from 
something called public life, but refers in practice primarily to institutional issues of 
“how much power is to be accorded to those whose authority derives from their 
knowledge of the Islamic tradition”. The question, as it posed itself to the Ottomans 
and to the early Republican generations who had just fought three wars over the 
course of little more than a decade for their own survival, was not a philosophical 
one, nor was it an identity issue.  (For a detailed discussion see Silverstein, 2003 and 
Türköne, 2003.) 
 
In a similar vein, the conditions, which moved the Ottoman ruling elite to enact the 
Tanzimat Decree, represented as the main turning point for Westernization, were, in 
general, security concerns. The Ottoman statesmen believed that in order to stop the 
Egyptian armies, which had come as far as Kütahya, they had to modernize the 
country. Modernization was for them, first of all, a security issue. (Türköne, 2003: 
72) Accordingly, after the defeat of the armies of Mahmud II by Ali Pasha of Egypt 
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in 1838 and 1839, a new generation of reformers emerged “to save the state from 
total destruction”. (Heper, 1985: 25) The reformers were mostly from the 
bureaucracy whose members were trained within the kul system. The Tanzimat 
reform period (1839-1876), which was based on Sultan Mahmud II’s (1808-1839) 
reforms, was initiated with the Gülhane Imperial Edict of 1839 through the efforts of 
those bureaucrats. Some important changes were launched within the administrative, 
military, legal and education systems. (Özdalga, 1998: 7) “Equality before the law 
and the securing of life, honor, and property for all subjects were the revolutionary 
ideas in the rescript.” (İnalcık, 1964: 19) In fact, Tanzimat reformers wanted to 
westernize the administration, while preserving the traditional institutions like 
Shari’ah. Later, radical Westernists would blame the reformers of the Tanzimat 
period for this “dualism.” (İnalcık, 1964: 224) 
 
The last century of the Empire witnessed the rise of, basically, three ideological 
orientations that influenced the political framework of the Empire during some 
periods of this time: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism. In order not 
to overstep the framework of the subject at hand, only one aspect will be highlighted; 
which is that although these three appear as totally different ideologies, they 
coincided in their target: they all aimed to save the state. The destruction of the old 
state was never an option. The primacy of the state remained even during this shaky 
era. (see Türköne, 2003) 
 
The modernization process was going on in the hands of the changing elites in power 
who ascribed these different ideologies. The First Constitutional Period (1876- 1878) 
was important but only a “short-lived exception.” Following the Young Turk 
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Revolution in 1908, the Second Constitutional Period was initiated. In 1913, the 
Committee of Union and Progress (the Young Turks) staged another coup d’état one 
year after being removed from power. (Özdalga, 1998: 8) Not surprisingly, the 
administrative elites who were instrumental in the establishment of this Republic had 
been born and launched their careers in the late Ottoman environment, i.e. during the 
reign of Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) and, especially, the subsequent Young Turk 
regimes of the Committee of Union and Progress (1908-1918). (Silverstein, 2003) The 
Young Turks deserve special attention, since they were the precedents of the 
Republican elite in terms of ideology. 
 
The major characteristics of the nationalist Young Turks, who were trained in secular 
schools, were: a) absolute faith in positivism as a guide to polity and society; b) 
determination to create a modern society to consolidate the power of the state; and c) a 
passion for elite rule. Owing to these three characteristics- positivism, statism, and 
elitism- the Young Turks were neither liberal nor democratic. They were indeed 
strong Westernists. According to Abdullah Cevdet, one of the pioneering intellectuals 
of the Young Turks, “there is no second civilization; civilization means European 
civilization, and it must be imported with both its roses and its thorns”. (Lewis, 1968: 
236 in Özdalga, 1998: 9)  
 
In addition, like the former ones, the political elites of the Young Turks saw 
themselves as the basic force to change the Empire, and the Ottoman-Turkish society 
as a project. The people could be only the objects of this project. (Kasaba, 1997: 24) 
Although they stressed the significance of the parliamentary system and 
constitutionalism as a way of coping with ethnic challenges in the Balkans, their first 
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and foremost goal was to protect and consolidate the power of the Ottoman state. 
Even the attempts to create “Ottoman citizenship” were aimed at expanding the 
social basis of the Ottoman state. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xx) The oft-quoted 
dictum “How can the state be saved?” belongs to the Young Turks. “It is no 
exaggeration to say that for them, constitution and parliament were a means to 
further the modernization process by making the subjects into stakeholding citizens, 
rather than an end in themselves.” (Atabaki and Zürcher, 2004: 3) Their commitment 
to the parliamentarism is not for the sake of freedom, but it represents their aim to 
strengthen the state. (Köker, 2004: 130) “As a result, the legacies of an authoritarian 
state structure and a new administrative military-civilian bureaucratic style 
punctuated the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.” (Yavuz and Esposito, 
2003: xx) 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE TURKISH NATION  
UNDER “CONSTRUCTION” 
TOWARD A SECULAR COUNTRY 
 
 
 
“The irony of history is that for centuries the Turks, who symbolized  
Muslim and barbarian -the ‘other’ for Europeans-  
now tried to enter the circle of the ‘civilized.’  
And, even more ironically, they have had to reinvent their own ‘barbarians,’ 
 those who are considered an obstacle to civilization 
who were first the Muslims and today the Kurds.” 
 (Göle, 1996b: 23) 
 
 
Kemalist reforms were a consequence of the Westernization process that started early 
in the Tanzimat period, and they did not envisage a totally “alien model imported 
from the West.” (Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 1997: 3) As Kazancıgil (1997: 48) also 
points out, Kemalism displays strong continuity with the modernization process after 
the Tanzimat period since it too was centered around the state, which was considered 
as the sole agent of political activity and the only source of legitimacy.  
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In terms of illustrating the continuity in the concept of modernization between the 
Ottoman past and the new Republic, Abdullah Cevdet’s article entitled “A Very 
Wakeful Sleep”, written in 1911, is a remarkable example. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-
1932), one of the forerunners of Westernism and of the founders of the Committee of 
Union and Progress, and an Ottoman medical doctor of Kurdish origin, envisaged a 
“dreamland” which would later be realized by Atatürk and his followers: 
… the fez would be abolished, and a new head-gear adopted; existing 
cloth factories would be expanded, and new ones opened,  and the 
Sultan, princes, senators, deputies, officers, officials, and soldiers made 
to wear their products; women would dress as they pleased, though not 
extravagantly, and would be free from dictation of interference in this 
matter by ulema, policemen, or street riff-raff; they would be at liberty to 
choose their husbands, and the practice of match-making would be 
abolished; convents and tekkes [dervish lodges] would be closed, and 
their revenues added to the education budget, all medreses would be 
closed, and new modern literary and technical institutes established; the 
turban, cloak &c., would be limited to certificated professional men of 
religion, and forbidden to others; vows and offerings to the saints would 
be prohibited, and the money saved devoted to national defence; 
exorcists, witch-doctors, and the like would be suppressed, and medical 
treatment for malaria made compulsory; popular misconceptions of Islam 
would be corrected; practical adult education schools would be opened; a 
consolidation and purified Ottoman Turkish dictionary and grammar 
would be established by a committee of philosophers and men of letters; 
the Ottomans, without awaiting anything from their government or from 
foreigners would, by their own efforts and initiative, build roads, bridges, 
ports, railways, canals, steamships, and factories; starting with the land 
and Evkaf [religious foundations] laws, the whole legal system would be 
reformed. (Lewis, 1968: 236 in Özdalga, 1998: 5-6) 
 
His dream would become real less than fifteen years later. This example 
demonstrates that we cannot assume a Kemalist revolution putting the Ottoman past 
aside. The new regime was established upon the Ottoman intellectual heritage. 
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4.1 Secularization: A Sine Qua Non for the Republic 
 
Having left the War of Independence (1919-1922) successfully behind, the 
Westernist elite put into motion the steps to transform Turkey into a modern and 
secular nation-state. Unsurprisingly, the Kemalist principle of nationalism was 
contrary to Islam’s universalistic conception of umma, the Muslim community. 
Atatürk wanted to establish a new state upon the ruins of the collapsed empire and a 
new culture in place of the old one that could not renew itself. (Timur, 1968: 9) 
Following the foundation of the new Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal initiated a 
series of reforms to build a homogeneous nation-state through eliminating ethnic and 
religious identities under the guidance of a state-determined Turkish nationalism. 
These reforms, known as Kemalism, sought to control religion, as well, to create a 
new order. 
 
The Kemalist republic was born under peculiar historical circumstances.  It was 
established over a “multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire”. 
Therefore, the new elite assumed that national consciousness could be achieved by 
erasing the Ottoman past. The revolution, which drew much inspiration from the 
French model of secularization, adopted a strict secularism and the concept of a 
centralized nation-state in which citizenship is based on the rights of the individual 
rather than on any ethnic or religious identity. (Rouleau, 1996: 70) Secular 
citizenship was intended to create a homogenous nation committed to modernity. For 
this purpose, it was necessary to meld the various ethnic and religious differences 
into a national identity, through violence and suppression if need be. The Kemalist 
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republic tried to establish national unity by imposing a Latinized Turkish alphabet 
and promoting a new culture cut off from the Ottoman past.  
 
In the Fourth Congress of the People’s Republican Party in 1935, Mustafa Kemal 
codified his ideas and goals as “Kemalism,” which consisted of six “eclectic” 
principles to guide the party and the state: nationalism, secularism, republicanism, 
statism, reformism, and populism. The Kemalist doctrine was informed by the 
dominant European authoritarian ideologies of the 1930s and perceived 
modernization as Westernization. In practice, Kemalism became the ideology and 
practice of eliminating class, ethnic, and religious sources of conflict by seeking to 
create a classless, national, and secular homogenized society. Thus, fear of 
differences became the guiding principle of the Kemalist state. (Yavuz and Esposito, 
2003: xx-xxi) Moreover, again owing to the impact of French positivism, the 
Kemalist project’s sole legitimate agent of change was the state itself. Change is was 
acceptable only when carried out by the state. Thus, in the process of building a 
Kemalist state, any form of bottom-up modernization of civil society became a 
source of worry and suspicion.  
 
 The Kemalist version of laicism is not obviously an Anglo-Saxon understanding of 
secularism. (Yavuz, 2000: 33) Instead of being neutral on the question of the 
religious practices and beliefs of its citizenry, the laicist state, with its origins in the 
Jacobin tradition of the French revolution, seeks to remove all appearances of 
religion from the public sphere and put it under the strict control of the state. 
Kemalist ideology has historically justified this position by placing its progressive 
and modernizing mission in opposition to Turkey’s Islamic heritage. This struggle 
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against the traditional “forces of darkness” uses a “militant laicism” to justify an 
authoritarian military-bureaucratic position. 
 
One of the distinctions of the Kemalist revolution in comparison to other 
modernization movements in the Islamic world is its greater emphasis on secularism. 
(Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 1997: 3) In the late 1920s, laicism became the basic 
principle of the Kemalist project. The overemphasis on secularism in the Kemalist 
revolution is not without a basis, Toprak (ny: 2-4) says, and lists five reasons for this. 
First, unlike Christianity Islam favors the unity of the political and religious realms. 
Second, it has a great potential for mass mobilization. Religion, especially in 
traditional societies, usually becomes the only source of common identity. Third, the 
Ottoman past proves that Islam can lead to the resistance to modernization efforts. 
The role of Islam and the ulama was considered by the early republican political elite 
as the primary cause of the collapse of the empire. Fourth, the ulama had widespread 
functions in different fields such as law, education, and public policy. This illustrated 
for the republican elite “to what extent Islam could assume influences on social and 
political power.” Finally, the very beginning of the Republic showed how Islam 
could play a dominant role in protest and revolt against the new regime. Several 
revolts against the new regime took place in the name of Islam. Actually, Islam was 
the only possible source of opposition. The Kemalist elite was, therefore, very 
sensitive on the issue of religion. 
 
In this framework, the year 1924 saw the abolition of the Caliphate. On 2 March the 
Grand National Assembly passed a law overthrowing the Caliph and his office, “the 
function of the Caliph being essentially included in the meaning and connotation of 
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the Government of the Republic”. All princes and princesses would have to leave 
Turkey within ten days. Other secularizing laws were also passed abolishing the 
office of the Şeyhülislam and the Ministry of Shari’ah and Religious Foundations, 
replacing it by a new Department of the Prime Ministers’ Office─the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs. Religious courts were abolished on 8 April, and on 20 April, the 
1924 constitution was accepted. (Salahi, 1989: 107)  
 
On April 10, 1928, amendments were made to the 1924 Turkish Constitution. These 
amendments constituted the clearest moves of that period toward the secularization of 
the Turkish state and society in legal terms. Through these amendments, which 
applied to Articles 2, 16, and 38, the provision stating that the official religion of 
Turkey was Islam was removed, and reference to Allah in the official oath was 
eliminated. Article 75 of the Constitution providing for freedom of religious 
convictions and philosophical beliefs and for the right to belong to different sects was 
amended in February 1937, by removing the word sect. Previously, in 1925, all 
religious articles of importance, such as the mantle of the Prophet Mohammed, were 
passed on to the Turkish museum of antiquities. The palaces of the Ottoman Sultans 
came under governmental control and were opened to the public. In 1935, 
ecclesiastical clothing worn by all men of religion was forbidden except in actual 
places of worship. (Kili, 1969: 47-48) 
 
In general, beyond these constitutional amendments, under Atatürk’s guidance the 
parliament passed, in rapid succession, a number of important laws. Among these, 
probably the most revolutionary were those concerning education and the legal 
system. The educational reforms erased the religious element from all schools, 
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making secularized instruction compulsory; and, the legal reforms abolished all 
religious courts (Islamic, Christian and Jewish), setting up instead secular courts with 
new laws based largely on Swiss models. (Kadıoğlu, 1996: 186) The significance of 
these revolutions can be seen in the fact that “in some of the other successor states of 
the Ottoman Empire, religious courts were abolished only much later - in Egypt, in 
1956 - while in others they are still active, as in Israel and Lebanon.” (see Kadıoğlu, 
1996) 
 
According to Toprak (1981: 9), the program of secularization was initiated in three 
phases. These phases were “symbolic secularization”, “institutional secularization” 
and “functional secularization”. Symbolic secularization launched transformations in 
many facets of national culture that had a symbolic identification with Islam. The 
most important secularization reform in this sphere, the changing of the alphabet 
from Arabic to Latin script, took place in 1928. Since the new regime regarded 
language as a connection with history, culture and sacred scripture, changing the 
alphabet was an “effective step towards breaking old religious traditions” and 
weakening the link with the past. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 33-35 in Toprak, 1981: 36) 
The acceptance of the Western hat and Western styles of clothing, the introduction of 
Western music in schools, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, and the change of 
the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday were other manifestations of symbolic 
secularization in Turkey. (Toprak, 1981: 36-37) 
 
The aim of institutional secularization, on the other hand, was to eradicate the 
institutional strength of Islam and prevent its possible interference in the political 
affairs of the new regime. The basic goal of the Kemalist elite was “to completely 
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free the polity from religious considerations. Islam was not supposed to have even 
the function of a ‘civil religion’ for the Turkish polity; Islam was not going to 
provide a transcendent goal for political life”. (Heper, 1981: 350) Therefore, 
institutional secularization was initiated through the abolition of the caliphate on 
March 3, 1924. In the same year, the state also abolished the office of Şeyhülislam 
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations. By doing this, it tried 
to transform the umma into a secular national entity in order to erase religion as a 
common bond of solidarity. Finally, the Sufi movements and their activities were 
outlawed in 1925. With the abolition of the caliphate and other religious institutions, 
the principles of political legitimacy were changed to replace Islam with loyalty to 
the state as the source of political legitimacy. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 534) 
 
The third phase of secularization in Turkey was functional secularization. It consists 
of two stages: legal and educational. (Toprak, 1981: 48) To accomplish legal 
secularization, the court system was secularized through the adoption of Western 
codes. It was an urgent step, because the Shari’ah Law was regarded as an obstacle to 
the westernization program. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 385) By eliminating this law, 
the pro-westernization elite intended to reduce the functions of Islam in the 
community. 
 
The second stage of functional secularization was implemented in the educational 
system. Under the Law for the Unification of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat), enacted 
in 1924, all educational establishments were unified under the close control of the 
state. Finally, during the one-party period of Turkey’s early history Atatürk’s 
successors also implemented reforms that “introduced a certain mobility” into the 
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political domains of “institutional and cultural life, but (they came) at the cost of a 
serious break with Islamic heritage.”  (Küçükcan, 2003: 489) 
 
The case of religious education is worth attention. All the Islamic educational systems 
were closed in 1924, and the new education system was unified under the direction of 
the Ministry of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu). Accordingly, religious 
education was also put under the guidance of this ministry. A new Faculty of 
Theology was founded at the Darülfünun (the University of Istanbul) in 1924. 
Moreover, special schools were opened in Istanbul and twenty other places to train a 
new generation of imams and hatips. In 1933, the Faculty of Theology was closed 
down and turned into an Institute for Islamic Research. Similarly, in 1926 there were 
twenty schools for imams and hatips, but in 1932 only two were left (in Istanbul and 
Konya). Likewise, the number of students in these schools, which had reached 2,258 
in 1924, declined to ten in 1932. (Özdalga, 1998: 19) 
 
In public schools, religion had been taught at the primary and secondary levels, but 
after the third congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1931, when the principle 
of secularism was introduced into the party program, the government declared that 
religious education was the responsibility of the family, not the state. Accordingly, 
religion was taken away from the primary and secondary school curricula in 1935, and 
was not introduced again until 1948. (Özdalga, 1998: 19-20) 
 
This situation can be explained best by Mardin’s (1971: 208-209) point: 
The most important function of “official religion” was that it provided a 
legitimating framework for the religion of the lower classes. By 
replacing the official religion with the principle of laicisme, Atatürk 
erased the possibilities of legitimation offered by the framework. The 
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little man’s religion was thus placed in an ambiguous situation: tolerated 
but not secure. It was this tension which Atatürk hoped would work in 
favor of secularization in the long run. 
 
In other words, religion, which was used especially to legitimize the War of 
Independence against the wishes of the Caliph and which was benefited during the 
early stages of the nation-building process, became subject to gradual decline by 
having limits placed on its opportunities to grow. This was because it was considered 
an obstacle to the development of a modern and secular nation-state.  
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4.2 The Goal of Secularization Reforms:  
Freedom of Religion or Freedom from Religion? 
 
The secularization reforms should be considered according to their relations to the 
fundamental goal of Atatürk and his future expectations. This positioning is crucial 
to understand the secularizing reforms of Atatürk. As Mardin (1971: 202) states well 
in his often quoted passage, the Kemalist revolution was not due to a discontented 
bourgeoisie, or peasant dissatisfaction. The taking away of feudal privileges was not 
a motivating factor, either. The target was the values of the Ottoman past. Despite its 
radical nature, however, the revolution did not aim to eradicate Islam in Turkey. It 
rather aimed at individualization and privatization of religion. (Özbudun and 
Kazancıgil, 1997: 5) It also eventually succeeded in that by mid-century “Islam 
…had indeed become a matter for the private consciences of Turks.” (Mardin, 1997: 
211) 
 
Atatürk envisaged his ultimate goal for the nation as reaching to the level of 
contemporary civilization. (Timur, 1968: 96) The Kemalist reforms connected to 
secularism were, principally, aimed at bringing Turkey to the status of the advanced 
states of the world, and justified on the basis of the “requirements of contemporary 
civilization”. (Mardin, 1997: 210) In order to achieve the level of contemporary 
civilization, it was necessary to create a modern national state based on a national 
sovereignty. Western civilization was the sole address for the new regime, and what 
was considered an obstacle to this goal had to be eliminated. The institutional part of 
the reforms were instituted both to get rid of the old functionaries of the state who 
were preventing its secular development, and to create the new institutions required 
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for a modern state. The cultural (symbolic) side of the reforms, on the other hand 
aimed to create the socio-cultural ground for a modern national state, that is, to 
redefine the nation as a new political community. 
 
The target of the social and cultural reforms was the creation of a new individual 
compatible with the modern national state and society. The public representation of 
the republican citizen was imagined centrally in such a way that he would resemble 
his western counterparts. From this perspective, the Westernization process was 
considered not only a simple search for modernization, but also a search for a totally 
new civilization. Therefore, the republican reforms took as their targets deeply rooted 
components of society such as religion, traditions, manners, style, values, and the 
like. This was a distinctive feature of republican reformism. As Mardin (1971: 202) 
aptly noted: 
“The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented 
bourgeoisie, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the 
social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal 
privileges, but it did take as a target the values of the Ottoman ancién 
regime. In this sense it was a revolutionary movement.”  
 
Lewis (1968: 406) states that “The basis of Kemalist religious policy was laicism, 
not irreligion; its purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it --- to end the 
power of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit 
it to matters of belief and worship.” The Kemalist principle of secularism did not 
advocate atheism. There was no destruction of religion in Kemalist Turkey, but 
religion and religious men were removed from areas, which they had traditionally 
controlled and asked to confine themselves to their own field. In short, it can be 
stated that the Kemalist principle of secularism did not involve abolition but de-
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emphasis of Islam. The aim was to eradicate Islam’s influence on public realms. 
However, the reforms were still so radical that, as Lewis (1968: 410) notes that 
 Although the regime never adopted an avowedly anti-Islamic policy, its 
desire to end the power of organized Islam and break its hold on the 
minds and hearts of the Turkish people was clear. The prohibition of 
religious education, the transfer of mosques to secular purposes, 
reinforced the lesson of the legal and social reforms. In the rapidly 
growing new capital, no new mosques were built. 
 
Atatürk’s main aim in the process of modernization was to change the basic structure 
of Turkish society and “redefine the political community”. (Toprak, 1989: 39) He 
tried to remove society from an Islamic framework and introduce into it a sense of 
belonging to a newly defined “Turkish nation”. (Eisenstadt, 1984: 9) To achieve this 
goal, Atatürk launched a movement of cultural westernization to provide the Turkish 
nation with a new world view that would replace its religious culture. (Mardin, 1997: 
191-212) He viewed the separation of religion and politics as a prerequisite to open 
the doors to Western values. Therefore, secularism became one of the central tenets 
of Atatürk’s program to accomplish modernization. As a part of this secularization 
policy, Atatürk initiated a major operation against the Islamic institutional and 
cultural influences in society. It was followed by the introduction of secularism into 
the Turkish Constitution during the single-party period of Republican People’s Party 
rule. (Turan, 1991: 31-34) Secularization reforms undertaken during the first decade 
of the new republic aimed at minimizing the role of religion in every aspect of 
Turkish society. The motive behind this was to reduce the societal significance of 
religious values and to eventually disestablish cultural and political institutions 
shaped by Islam. (Mardin, 1983: 142) 
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In Kemalist Turkey, as was supposed to be due to the requirements of modernization, 
religion and religious institutions were removed from areas which did not fall within 
the “proper” sphere of their activity, such as education and law, and secular concepts 
and institutions were substituted. Historical experience with the religious faction’s 
opposition to modernization had a profound impact on the formulation of the 
Kemalist principle of secularism as well. The application of Kemalist secularism 
involved not only separation of state and religion and the severing of traditional ties 
between religion and education and law. In addition, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs was attached to the office of the Prime Minister, and the Kemalist 
government assumed the right of interference, whenever necessary, for the purpose 
of controlling religion and in order to prevent the religious-conservative faction from 
attempting to play its traditional role in Turkish society. (Kili, 1969: 104-105) In this 
sense, Atatürk unrelentingly stood against any conservatives who might aim to link 
between Islam and politics: “The government of the Turkish National Assembly is 
national and materialistic: it worships reality. It is not a government willing to 
commit murder or drag the nation into the swamps in search of useless ideologies.” 
(Karal, 1997: 22) 
 
“Under the Republican regime, secularism became a positivist ideology designed to 
liberate the Turks’ minds from the hold of Islam so as to allow them to acquire those 
rudiments of contemporary civilization considered to be desirable.” (Karpat, 1985: 
407) In fact, excluding Islam’s universalistic claims for the state was the most 
important aspect of Atatürk’s secularism, because in doing so the scope of secularism 
was extended beyond the simple separation of the state and religion. Unsurprisingly, 
alternative sources for the formation of a new identity and a new ethic were then 
 80 
 
needed. What was substituted for Islam was a Turkish nationalism made up of 
“positivistic” and “solidaristic” tenets. (Karpat, 1959: 254) Atatürk, as well, explains 
his aim in the Nutuk, his well-known speech, as the replacement of religion by 
Turkish nationalism,:  
“What is the Turkish Revolution? This Turkish Revolution, a word that 
includes the reversal of the system of Government, means a fundamental 
transformation. Our present Constitution has become the most perfect, 
abolishing those old forms, which have lasted for centuries. The common 
bond that the nation has now found between individuals and communities 
for its general welfare and existence has changed the old forms and 
nature, which for centuries had existed. This means that the nation has 
united as individuals instead of being united by religion and as adherents 
of sects; now they are held together only by the bond of Turkish 
nationality. The nation has accepted as a principle an irrefutable fact that 
science and means are the source of life and strength in the field of 
international competition and only in modern civilization can these be 
found.” (Kili, 1969: 108) 
 
In short, secularism in Turkey, unlike its Western counterparts, did not target 
bringing peace and stability to fighting religious groups; instead, it tried to modernize 
the state and homogenize society. The Kemalist principles of nationalism (i.e., the 
attempt to create a homogeneous nation) and secularism (i.e., the attempt to form a 
modern society based on rationalism) destroyed the multiethnic character of Turkish 
society by getting rid of Greeks and other Christian communities and by denying 
some ethnic groups their cultural rights. The source of Turkish political morality 
became nationalism, rather than religion, in service to the state. (Yavuz and Esposito, 
2003: xviii) 
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4.3 Secularization From Above 
 
In simple terms, revolution is commonly defined as a totally drastic change either in 
the political and economic institutions, or in the culture or economy of a country. In 
Barrington Moore’s reckoning, Kemalism was a “revolution from above”, not a 
social revolution. (Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 1997: 5) The basic difference between 
“modernization from above” and “modernization as a self-generating societal 
process” is that in the former case the modernizers exert state power and are agents 
of the modernization process with their own interests. (Keyder, 1997: 37-38) In this 
sense, the “Turkish revolution was not a social revolution; rather, it combined 
features of a war of liberation and a political liberation.” (Özbudun, 1997: 83)  
 
The Kemalist project was launched by the modernizing elite who aimed to impose 
institutions and culture on the people of Turkey according to their own understanding 
of modernity. In Keyder’s (1997) framing, this situation is very much tied to a 
fundamental feature in the continuity between the Ottoman modernizers and the 
founders of the Turkish state: the absence of large landlords and, therefore, the 
relative independence of the bureaucracy.  The Ottoman capital eliminated all 
possible forces alternative to the strong center. Because of this absence, the 
guardians of the ancien régime were merely the nonreformist wing of the 
bureaucracy; the nationalist intelligentsia did not have to confront any serious 
opposition, either. Without a strong landlord class demanding economic liberalism 
and civil and political rights and the like, no group in society could challenge the 
absolutism of the state. In this respect, Turkish nationalism is an extreme example, in 
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which the masses remained silent and the modernizing elite did not attempt to 
accommodate popular resentment.  
 
From another perspective, the main structural feature of the relationship between the 
state and society or religion has been the elitist political culture, which has been the 
ongoing characteristic of the Ottoman-Turkish polity. The bureaucratic elite has been 
the constitutive agent of this political culture; thus, neither the character of Turkish 
secularism nor the changes in the state-Islam relationship can be understood without 
looking at the role of and the changes in the attitude of the civil and military elites. 
The Turkish bureaucratic elite identified itself with the state and acted as the 
guardian of the state. This elitism appears as a consequence of the Turkish strong 
state tradition, in which it is the state (the state elite) that is responsible for social 
development, as the shepherd-flock metaphor represents.  
 
Accordingly, the agents of Turkish modernization in Atatürk’s view were the 
military-bureaucratic elites, who were in a position to show the true path to the 
people so that they would achieve rationality through education. Heper (1984: 86) 
argues that Atatürk believed in the capacity of the people to reach the level of 
contemporary civilization, but felt they should be helped by the educated elite. In a 
sense, the educated elite was given a temporary task, i.e., the education of the people 
until such time as they gained an adequate rationality. Therefore, he believed that 
reforms had to be imposed “from above.” According to Atatürk, reforms needed to 
be imposed from above because when people are not educated they can be easily 
deceived for undesirable ends. (Heper, 1985: 50-51) “The people were passing 
through the necessary stages of progress towards a more civilized pattern of life.” 
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The leaders should find the paths to those stages and direct society. (Heper, 1985: 
62) Therefore, Atatürk initiated many reforms to break the ties with the past, which 
he considered to be obstacles to revealing the potential of the people. The elitist 
tradition of the Ottoman-Turkish politics constituted a center of significance in terms 
of this issue. 
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4.4 Atatürk’s Conceptions of Science and Religion  
 
Atatürk, as “an admirer of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment,” said, "For 
everything in the world ─for civilization, for life, for success─ the truest guide is 
knowledge and science." (Cherry, 2002: 22) Believing that Turkey must catch up 
with the Western world, he declared that Enlightenment values were those of 
"universal civilization," and that the nation's supreme goal must be to reach them. 
Andrew Mango (2000 in Cherry, 2002: 21) writes in Atatürk: "Atatürk’s message is 
that East and West can meet on the ground of universal secular values and mutual 
respect, that nationalism is compatible with peace, that human reason is the only true 
guide in life." In line with this understanding, in the speech which Atatürk delivered 
in Bursa on October 27, 1922, to a group of teachers from Istanbul, he gave his views 
on the identity of the new Turkish nation, as well as what he thought should be 
among the principal objectives of this Turkish nation: 
Yes, in social and political life, in educating the minds of the Turkish 
nation our guide will be knowledge and science. Only, through 
knowledge and science, as provided by the schools can the Turkish 
nation, Turkish art, the Turkish economy, Turkish poetry, literature and 
fine arts fully develop… 
 
Wherever knowledge and science is, we as a nation are going to be there, 
and implant these in the minds of individuals… 
 
The basic goal of our educational policy and our educational program 
will be the destruction of ignorance, if this cannot be achieved we shall 
stay as we are, and anything that stays as it means that it is going 
backward… 
 
We must admit that up until three and a half years ago we were living as 
religious community. They ruled over us as they wished. The world 
knew us according to those who represented us. For the past three and a 
half years we have lived as a nation. The concrete and explicit evidence 
of this is the form and nature of our government named by the law as the 
Grand National Assembly. (Kili, 1969: 36-37) 
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Such a deep belief in science is due to the fact that the Young Turks and Mustafa 
Kemal were guided very much by positivism. The republican elite adopted the 
Comtian idea of “progress within order.” Positivism framed their ideas regarding the 
domains of politics, economics, and society. Positivism became the guiding principle 
of the Turkish education system as well. Accordingly, Kemalist laicism should not 
be understood as the separation of politics and religion, but rather as being about 
restructuring society in accordance with positivist philosophy. In practice, this 
restructuring meant eradicating religious impacts in the domains of education, 
economics, family, dress, and politics. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xxi) 
 
The official understanding regarding the issue is well summarized in the Program of 
the People’s Party of the Republic (adopted by the Fourth Grand Congress of the 
Party May 1935, official translation published by the Party, Ankara, 1935). It was 
stated in Part II- The Essential Characteristics of the Republican People’s Party 
[articles 5(e) and 5(f)] that 
The party considers it a principle to have the laws, regulations, and 
methods in the administration of the State prepared and applied in 
conformity with the needs of the world and on the basis of the 
fundamentals and methods provided for modern civilization by Science 
and Technique. 
 
As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers 
it to be one of the chief factors of the success of our nation in 
contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and 
from the affairs of the world and of the State. 
 
The Party does not consider itself bound by progressive and evolutionary 
principles in finding measures in the State administration. The Party holds 
it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions, which 
our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles 
which have since been elaborated. (Kili, 1969: 79) 
 
The R.P.P. Program in 1935 clearly indicated that the Turkish state was to be 
directed by the requirements and the principles of modern civilization and in 
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particular by modern science and technology. Religion was to be separated from 
politics and from temporal affairs. Secularism was considered the sine qua non of 
Turkish progress and development. 
 
Looking at the principle of secularism from the point of view of the RPP’s definition 
as well as from the broader perspective of Atatürk’s secularist reforms and speeches, 
an underlying Kemalist conviction emerges: spiritual matters are other-worldly 
matters, and any matters accessible to reason are secular. Hence, for instance, 
through the complete secularization of the Turkish legal system, the spiritual 
authorities were also deprived of their right to judge on temporal matters. (Kili, 1969: 
104) 
 
Beside such positivistic convictions, Atatürk and his followers were inspired by the 
ideals of the French Revolution. Many of the Young Turks that supported Atatürk’s 
creation of a Republic had spent years in exile in France. The enthusiasm with which 
the Republican reformers approached their project of refashioning society often has 
been compared to that of the Jacobins who dominated the French state between 1793 
and 1794. Like the French revolutionaries, Atatürk believed that modernity, law and 
order were best imposed from a strong center. (White, 2003: 148-149) The reformers 
devoted themselves to moving society, in their terms, from the “old” to the “new” 
and from the “traditional” to the “western.” Reason and science were the 
cornerstones of this drive toward civilization. The assumption was that if the state 
changed the institutions and the physical environment to match that of Europe, 
people’s behavior and attitudes would then change accordingly. The over-emphasis 
placed on such public symbols as clothing, architecture, and the visibility of women 
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in the public sphere can be attributed to this perception. By the late nineteenth 
century, universalistic and liberal ideals of the Enlightenment were appearing in 
some European nationalist projects that defined progress and modernity by allowing 
for no ambiguities and excluding certain “generally ethnically defined cultures as 
unsuitable for progress in their present state.” (Kasaba, 1997: 26-27) In Turkey, as 
well, unity and collectivist purpose, rather than universally applicable civil rights, 
were utilized in the formulation of the new republican citizenship. (Keyder, 1997: 
37-51) 
 
Based as it was on these positivistic and Jacobin influences, the Kemalist conception 
of secularism can be summarized in this way: “Modernity and democracy require 
secularism. Islam, he [Atatürk] believed, was neither secularizable nor privatizable. 
Thus, in order to bring modernity, Islam had to be either kept under strict control or 
confined to personal conscience.” (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xiii) Atatürk (1962: 
722 in Kili, 1969:46) explains this in one of his most quoted passages in the Nutuk: 
Could a civilized nation tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be 
led by the nose by a herd of Sheikhs, Dedes, Seids, Tshelebis, Babas and 
Emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, 
magicians, dice-throwers and amulet sellers? Ought one to conserve in 
the Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such 
as those which had for centuries given to the nation the appearance of 
being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have committed 
the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and 
reawakening? (1925) 
 
As Timur (1968: 121) puts well from a broader perspective, Atatürk showed different 
attitudes towards the high Islam of the official religious scholars, ulama, and the folk 
Islam of the religious brotherhoods. With the former, he aimed to rationalize and 
redefine the religion. In Atatürk’s conception, Islam is the most rational among all 
the religions. Consequently, whatever illogical was also supposed to be contrary to 
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Islam. In this sense, Atatürk believed that The Turkish nation must be more religious. 
On the other hand, Atatürk found the religious brotherhoods detrimental to the 
revolution and tried to erase them totally since they could generate alternative 
sources of political power. As Timur (1971: 148) suggests somewhere else, the 
Kemalist positivism aimed at reformulating the official Islam in a secular way, while 
abolishing all the brotherhoods operating throughout the country.  
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4.5 Atatürk’s Conception of the State 
 
The creation and maintenance of an independent, sovereign state is an important 
aspect of Kemalist ideology, as indicated in Atatürk’s speech to Turkish youth 
(Atatürk’ün Gençliğe Hitabesi):  
Turkish Youth! Your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the 
national Independence, the Turkish Republic.  
 
That is the only basis of your existence and your future. This basis 
contains your most precious treasure…. (Kili, 1969: 61-62) 
 
The ultimate aim of the Ottoman modernization, maintaining a strong state, was one 
shared by Mustafa Kemal. This is not a coincidence when we consider that Atatürk 
and his friends, the founders of the new republic, were previously Ottoman pashas.  
 
In the early years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal attempted to unite all powers in 
his personality. The proclamation of the republic is not separate from this 
understanding because he strictly supported the unification of powers as opposed to 
their separation. Along the same lines, the opposition of the Progressive Republican 
Party and the press were regarded as almost illegitimate; after some religious revolts 
occur, they were harshly suppressed through the enactment of the law for the 
Restoration of Order (Takrir-i Sükun). 
 
Heper (1985: 56) states that “Atatürk opted for a Hegelian state -one that would 
safeguard the general interest without overwhelming civil society”. Vatandaş İçin 
Medeni Bilgiler (Citizen’s Handbook), written by Afet İnan in 1931 but dictated 
mostly by Atatürk, provides rich material to explore this kind of conception of the 
state. As the title indicates, the book is intended to help raise a republican generation 
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as citizens of the new, modern nation-state. It includes such themes as state, republic, 
rights and duties, solidarism, division of labor, vocations and work, military service 
and taxation.  
 
Afet İnan’s book (1998: 18, 26) gives the definitions of the Turkish nation by 
Atatürk: “The Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic is called as the 
Turkish nation.” “The Turkish nation is a state governed by the republican regime 
upon the people’s sovereignty.” Similarly, in a conference organized by the 
Republican People’s Party in 1938, state was defined as the nation who comes 
together around Atatürk. (Köker, 2004: 161) As these definitions imply, state and 
nation are fused in the Kemalist understanding, and being a member of the Turkish 
nation is related to the participation in the establishment and development of the new 
republic. 
 
In the same book, Mustafa Kemal argues that citizens’ service is required for the 
government to achieve its goals. Hence, citizens who are charged with giving this 
assistance should be healthy; maintenance of their health is a duty of the government, 
as well. In this regard, state and citizens change places; citizens are conceived of as if 
they were instruments of state. This understanding indicates that Mustafa Kemal is 
talking about the state’s citizens rather than a citizen state. He further declares that  
The state demands healthy, sturdy citizens who have a high level of 
comprehension, national sentiment and affection for the homeland in 
order to maintain order and defend the country. The state is in need of 
highly qualified citizens to do the nation’s business done at home and 
abroad. The state attaches importance to all citizens comprehending the 
state’s laws and appreciating the requirement of obeying them in terms of 
order and the defense of the country. (Afetinan, 1998: 45-46) 
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 Mustafa Kemal does not argue that the state should be strong enough to serve the 
citizens, but rather asserts that the citizens must be strong enough to preserve the 
existence of the state. 
 
In Atatürk’s reckoning, the question of freedom should be considered together with 
the interests of other individuals and the survival of the state and nation. Freedoms 
are not absolute and can be restricted by the rights and freedoms of other individuals 
and by the common interests of the nation.  In this respect, he says that “restriction of 
the rights of individuals is the essence and duty of the state”, and that “freedom 
should not jeopardize state activities”. (Afetinan, 1998: 47-53) 
 
According to Atatürk, sovereignty was to “belong to the people without any 
qualifications and conditions”. In practice, however, this meant that the state elite, 
which was supposed to understand the interests of the people better than the people 
themselves did, would exercise sovereignty in the name of the people. The 
“transcendental” nature of the Republic, as a legacy of the Ottoman state, required 
that community and the state take precedence over their members, whose interest is 
identified with the common rather than the individual good. (Heper, 1985: 7-8) 
Along similar lines, the Ottoman tradition of the father state (devlet baba) created a 
political culture that viewed the interventionist state as legitimate. (Özbudun, 2000: 
147-148) As Mardin (1980: 23-53) pointed out: 
It is conceded in the abstract that the state and its leaders have a right and 
obligation to set a course for society and to use public resources to pursue 
that course…. The emphasis is on the ends of state intervention, and 
checks and balances are not seen as preventing abuse of power but rather 
as impeding the state’s course toward its goal. Therefore, to some extent, 
there has been an acceptance of a high concentration of power –
economic, administrative and military. 
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The dominance of state interests over fundamental human rights, the model of the 
passive citizen, the lack of tolerance for religious influences and ethnic diversity, and 
the role of the military and bureaucratic elite as the guardian of the Western (secular) 
character of the Turkish state have all been longtime features of mainstream Turkish 
political culture.  
 
The superiority of state interests can be observed in regard to religion, as well. 
Atatürk inherited from the Ottomans a state tradition in which religion played a 
marginal role in shaping politically important decisions. Unsurprisingly, Ankara, like 
Istanbul, maintained a monopoly over Islamic functions and there was no change in 
the tradition of incorporating religious personnel into the state bureaucracy. 
Understandably, the “secularist” republic wanted to control Islam even more 
effectively than had the “Islamic” Ottoman Empire. 
 
This continuity can be explained in more pragmatic terms. The Kemalist founding 
elites were fully aware that any kind of opposition to their secularist reforms in the 
cultural and social sphere could be mobilized only by religion. They therefore feared 
that the caliphate could become a counter-revolutionary force. This explains why, 
after the abolition of the sultanate-caliphate and all other Islamic institutions of the 
Ottoman Empire, Atatürk established a governmental agency for religion. The 
Republicans decided to replace the Ottoman Ministry of Shari’ah and Religious 
Foundations with the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which has given responsibility 
for teaching and maintaining the Republican interpretation of Islam. (Shankland, 
2002: 86) In later years, on the basis of the same reasoning, Muftis and imams 
(prayer leaders) were appointed by the government, and religious instruction was 
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taken over by the Ministry of National Education. “The establishment of these 
directorates clearly shows that the Kemalist perception of secularism meant not so 
much separation of state and religion as control of the state over religion.” (Zürcher, 
1993: 195) What Atatürk was doing was actually the establishment of state control 
over religion and the religious classes. This included controlling and limiting 
religious education, outlawing religious brotherhoods, and severely limiting forms of 
dress associated with Islam. These were questions of power and control. (Keddie, 
1997 : 32) 
 
This pragmatic concern can also be seen in the abolition of the Islamic brotherhoods. 
Reaction to the revolution was most likely to come from militant Islamic 
brotherhoods (tarikats), the ex-Unionist leaders, and the Communists. It is interesting 
to note that the religious reaction came more from the brotherhoods than from the 
ulama, because the ulama were already a part of the state. According to Özbudun 
(1997: 96), this explains why the Kemalist regime tended to ban all the activities of 
the brotherhoods, while incorporating the official ulama under the new Directorate of 
Religious Affairs with weaker functions. 
 
Bureaucratized Islam in the Republic, then, having submitted to the requirements 
taken on the task of unitary state-building, was pressed into service for constructing a 
“regime-friendly Turkish-Islamic identity,” just as its predecessor in the Ottoman 
Empire had attempting to justify the Kanuns in religious terms. (see Kili, 1969) 
Secularism, in this sense, was not a process that de-politicized Islam. Rather, it 
removed it from its political role in the old system and eliminated those empowered 
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by this role, while using Islam in new ways to program the project of the new 
regime. 
 
In general, in order to accurately understand the state’s centrality in Atatürk’s 
reckoning, one should remember that the “Atatürkist state… is not the state that 
existed during Atatürk’s life time, but the state as it was espoused by him.” (Heper, 
1985: 48) Atatürk’s basic aim was the creation of a “transient moderate 
transcendental state”. Moderate transcendentalism means that a consensus is imposed 
upon society through static norms, around which the state is institutionalized. (Heper, 
1985: 8) Those who do not understand this goal “have not been able to distinguish 
Atatürk’s strategy from his tactics. Thus, even his opponents could pose as ‘genuine 
Atatürkists’, because, when necessary, they could find a quotation from Atatürk, 
which apparently supported their point of view.” (Heper, 1985: 11) Atatürk’s 
authoritarian politics should be evaluated accordingly. 
 
In the view of some scholars, in 1920s Turkey, democracy would have been as much a 
top-down imposition as the rest of Atatürk's modernization program. When he came to 
power, most Turks were illiterate farmers used to living under the absolute power of 
the imperial sultan. Many liberal historians have argued that benevolent dictatorship 
was necessary to prepare Turkey for constitutional democracy. In one of the first 
biographies of Atatürk, British historian H. C. Armstrong concluded, "His dictatorship 
-a benevolent, educating, guiding dictatorship─ was the only form of government 
possible at the moment." (Cherry, 2002: 21) In fact, the modernist elite in the early 
Republican period feared that democracy could pave the way to the public 
representation of religious symbols. State authoritarianism, “enlightened despotism,” 
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and single-party regimes often became the only possible options for the secular 
Westernist elites. (Göle, 1996b: 19) The authoritarian period was considered to be 
tutelary. Consequently, the single party period prepared its end itself. Köker (2004: 
228) criticizes at this point that although the undemocratic regime was not seen to be 
permanent, it was still the Kemalist ruling elite who would decide when the right time 
was to switch to full democracy. 
 
After Atatürk’s death in 1938, the regime deteriorated. As Bernard Lewis (1961: 297-
298 in Barkey, 2000: 93) argues, “in the hands of lesser men than himself, his 
authoritarian and paternalist mode of government degenerated into something nearer 
to dictatorship as the word is commonly understood.” His successor, İnönü, sought to 
build the regime’s legitimacy on a strict interpretation of Kemalism, rather than the 
founder’s pragmatism and vision. Politics was relegated to the boundaries of the 
single party, which gave the bureaucratic-military elite-dominated state an almost 
“sacred” status. The rationale behind Inönü’s policies was that he understood the state 
as a realm above politics, and aimed at guarding the long-term interests of the 
community by preserving national unity. At this point, Inönü, like Atatürk, argued that 
religion was a sensitive issue that could be abused for political purposes and disrupt 
national unity embodied by the state. (Heper, 1998: 98-103) 
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4.6 Pragmatism in the Kemalist Revolution 
 
 
As many scholars observe, Atatürk’s “resourcefulness, careful exploration of 
alternatives, and keen sense of timing” contributed to his ultimate success. (Atabaki, 
2004: 61) When analyzing Atatürk’s style in introducing and implementing his 
reforms, one can recognize that a tactical component of the revolution dominated the 
process: pragmatism. The revolution was pragmatic since, it appeared as a response 
to the needs of modernization. To achieve his goals, Atatürk sometimes made use of 
opposing views and different groups whose ideals he did not share. Pragmatism, 
beside being a practical necessity as a result of the sensitive balance of power at that 
time, was the mentality of the Ottoman secular officialdom to which Atatürk and his 
friends had once belonged.  
 
As a reflection of his pragmatism, Atatürk built the new state step by step, although in 
a short period of time. He was patient about waiting to declare views for which the 
political environment was not yet ripe. One example of Atatürk’s political astuteness 
in this area is his dress reforms. Çakmak (2002: 66) argues that Atatürk tried to 
develop his country men and women in terms of the way they dressed, because he 
wanted his people look like Europeans. He wore a Panama hat in Kastamonu and 
became a model for them. In 1925, the “Hat Law” was enacted. Officials had to wear 
hats instead of the fez, the Ottoman version of a hat. The reform was not easy, because 
a man’s headgear indicated his religion, and even his social status and job. When a 
man died, his headgear was put on his coffin, and his gravestone was usually shaped 
like this headgear, showing his status. A hat was a non-Muslim style. The acceptance 
of the hat, representing the West, instead of the fez, “the symbol of Ottomanhood and 
 97 
 
eradicator of all national differences” provided the basis for a more difficult reform, 
the abandonment of veiling. (Göle, 1996a: 61) The effort to ban the veil took concrete 
form on January 15, 1924, in a declaration that teachers with a veil on were not 
allowed to enter the classroom. On April 3, 1924, a legal regulation was enacted 
concerning the official attire of judges and members of judiciary. Henceforth, local 
administrations made some attempts in parallel lines. In the 1930s, the number of 
women, who were educated and had a professional career increased. Accordingly, the 
young generations of women gave up wearing veils. (Yakut, 2002, 26-31) Geoffrey 
Lewis (1982: 18-19) notes that Atatürk did not abolish the veil: “Good soldier that he 
was, he knew that you should never give an order which you know won’t be obeyed.” 
Amanullah, the king of Afghanistan, tried to imitate Atatürk’s secularization policies 
after his visit to Turkey. It was reported that Amanullah’s men forcibly tore women’s 
veils off. Perhaps at least in part as a result of this, in May 1929 he was deposed. 
 
In the very same way, the pragmatic understanding sometimes moved Atatürk to 
express some opinions which he did not in fact share. In his book Nutuk, he gives his 
declaration about the opening of the Grand National Assembly as an example: “I find 
it appropriate to present you the declaration I made on April, 21, 1920 to indicate my 
situation in which I was obliged to get parallel with the feelings and understanding of 
that time.” (Nutuk, 1996: 430-432) Elsewhere, Atatürk (1981: 8) describes this 
situation as follows: 
Here, I should confess something important. The army and the nation, 
while not having been aware of the dishonesty of the Sultan and the 
Caliph, were also sincerely loyal to the palace with religious and 
traditional ties strengthened through centuries. The army and the nation 
… could not imagine independence without the Caliph and the Sultan. 
What a pity for those who express their opinions in contradiction with 
this belief.  They will be immediately called as irreligious, traitor, 
homeless, unwanted. 
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As Kinross (1990: 180) reports, Atatürk emphasized this at the Erzurum Congress 
(1919), too: 
To a trusted friend who inquired privately of Kemal at the [Erzurum] 
Congress, ‘Are we going towards the Republic?’ he replied, ‘Is there any 
doubt of it?’ But this could not yet be divulged. He was careful at this 
stage to make it clear that the movement was not aimed against the 
monarchy and the Caliphate, but was united behind them against the 
threats of the foreigner. 
 
For this reason, he sometimes spoke as if he were supporting the Caliphate: 
From now on, the future will show exactly how abundant the Caliphate 
will be for the Turkish State and the Muslim world. The State of Turkey, 
which is both Turkish and Muslim, will be the happiest state of the world 
as being the cause for two times happiness. (Nutuk III, 1996: 1251) 
 
 
We observe the same attitude in Atatürk’s relation to the ulama. After the abolition 
of the Sultanate and all the other institutions of the old order and of foreigners, the 
ulama remained as the only power in Turkish society that could challenge the 
leadership of the new regime. Atatürk was aware of their potential threat and, hence, 
at the beginning, he took care not to offend the ulama ─ a number of whom were 
also deputies in the Assembly─ in order to preserve national unity. In fact, fifteen 
percent of the first Assembly was made up of religious men, imams, muftis, and 
medrese teachers, while another fifteen percent consisted of soldiers. In line with his 
policy of making gestures toward religion in order not to lose the support of the 
traditional segments of society, the Assembly, for instance, passed a law prohibiting 
the sale or use of alcoholic drinks on September 14, 1921. (Lewis G., 1982: 12-16) 
 
In another instance, Mustafa Kemal allowed the article regarding the official religion 
to remain in the Constitution, although this did not confirm to his real opinion. 
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Atatürk (1981: 523-524) explains this situation in his Nutuk. While traveling to 
İzmit, he was asked by a journalist whether the new government would have a 
religion: 
“I did not want to be posed such a question. I also did not want to express 
the answer which was indeed very short….I could not say that a 
government could not have a religion. I said the reverse. It has, I said, it is 
the religion of Islam. However, I immediately needed to add that Islam 
provides great freedom of thought. In order not to give an opportunity to 
those who wanted to benefit from this and tended to understand atheism 
from the term ‘laic government’, it is ignored to add a term which makes 
meaningless the second article of the constitution.” (Nutuk, II, 1981: 523-
524) 
 
 
Taner Timur (1968: 92-93) underlines this attitude when arguing that the ideologies 
of the National Struggle (Milli Mücadele) and the Turkish Revolution were different. 
During the whole period of the War of Independence, Atatürk kept his ideas about 
the coming revolution as a secret. The motive behind the National Struggle was 
nationalism. Nevertheless, it coincided with the aim of protecting the sultanate and 
caliphate, as well. In the first Assembly, Atatürk signed many drafts framing this 
aim. Considering the secular character of the Turkish Revolution, we should consider 
this duality as a necessity under the conditions of that time. 
 
Pragmatism was the key feature of the revolution in terms of its methods. 
“According to Reşat Kaynar, ‘Kemalism is not doctrinaire, but pragmatic.’” (Karal, 
1997: 11) For instance, although étatism was taken as one of the six arrows in the 
Kemalist ideology, “Atatürk never wished to give étatism ideological substance”. 
(Özbudun& Kazancıgil, 1997: x) In practice, statism in early Republican Turkey 
consisted of various pragmatic measures necessary for developing industrialization.  
As Özbudun (1997: 87-88) states, scholars usually point out that Kemalist thought 
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was established in response to immediate needs, rather than based upon “pre-
determined thoughts”. “Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, an author close to Atatürk, 
quotes the following exchange with him: ‘My general, this party has no doctrine… 
Of course it doesn’t, my child; if we had a doctrine, we would freeze the 
movement.’” Due to its pragmatic character, Atatürkist thought is not considered to 
be an ideology; it is at most “a ‘soft’ ideology”. Heper (1985: 64-65, 71) thinks that 
it can be better described as a Weltanschauung. Özbudun (1997: 90), however, 
believes that this instrumental character of the revolution makes it “vulnerable to 
rational criticism”. 
 
Recep Peker, one of Mustafa Kemal’s close friends, explained this pragmatic view in 
a speech delivered in 1935: 
We are not among those who scribble on paper before getting down to 
action. We prefer to achieve results first. Superficial people reproach us 
with working without a plan or a program, but they lose sight of the fact 
that the best plans and programs are not always written down; the cardinal 
plan, the source and the starting point of all our programs are the energy 
and the insight concentrated in the brain and in the soul of our spiritual 
leaders. (Dumont, 1984: 25) 
 
Sartori classifies the Kemalist regime as ‘one-party pragmatic’. (Heper, 1985: 65) 
Clement Moore, in the same vein, categorizes one-party ideologies under four 
headings: totalitarian, chiliastic, tutelary, and administrative; and he puts Atatürk’s 
Turkey into the tutelary category, by which he refers to an ideology which 
“combines an instrumental function with the goal of a partial social transformation.” 
(Özbudun, 1997: 90) Kemalist ideology was formulated in response to the emerging 
needs of the modernization process and should be evaluated on the basis of the extent 
to which it fulfilled its stated goals. It did not start from an analysis of the structure 
of Turkish society. Modernization in Turkey was imposed forcibly by the conditions 
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of the War of Independence; the principles of Kemalism arose largely from the 
practical requirements of that process.   
 
Atatürk attempted to use religion whenever he found it useful for his purposes. 
Atatürk was “a great tactician” having used Islam for its revolutionary purposes. 
(Timur, 1971: 38) For example, as of 1919, the Sultan had taken a stand against the 
Nationalist Movement. The Şeyhülislam, the head of the religious hierarchy, in a 
fetva of April 1920, labeled the Nationalists as rebels and ordered all good Moslems 
to kill these rebels whenever they had an opportunity to do so. (Kili, 1969: 18) 
Atatürk replied to this attack in the same kind: “As soon as the Assembly gathered, 
we initiated counter-attacks by getting fetvas (religious confirmation and decisions) 
from high religious scholars.” (Nutuk II, 1981: 327) Since a substantial number of 
the First Assembly’s members consisted of religious scholars and sheikhs. Atatürk 
was able to benefit from their religious approval. For instance, regarding the 
constitutional amendment of October 29, 1923, which proclaimed the republic, the 
representative of Antalya, Rasih Hodja approved from a  religious viewpoint that the 
most appropriate regime is the republic. This prevented others from resisting the 
amendment. (Aydemir, III, 1995: 154) 
 
Mustafa Kemal used the integrative function of the religion while switching from the 
millet system to the unitary state during the nation-building process. Islam as a 
culture was an implicit part of the new Turkish identity:  
“This boundary is not drawn for military purposes, but it is rather a 
national boundary. It is indicated as to be the national boundary. However, 
one should not assume that within this boundary there is only one ethnic 
group. Within this boundary, there are Turks, Circassians, and other 
Muslim groups. Now this boundary is a national boundary within which 
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sister nations live integrated to each other with the same goals…” (Öztürk, 
1992: 29-30) 
 
Moreover, Mustafa Kemal, just like the Young Turks during the wars in the Balkans 
and World War I, never hesitated to utilize Islam to mobilize the population against 
the invading European armies and always treated Islam as the bond to integrate and 
blend all Anatolian Muslims into the Turkish nation. “Islam was used to mobilize the 
masses against ‘the infidel.’” National struggle against the will of the sultan was 
legitimized upon Islamic grounds. (Heper, 1981: 350)  “In the formation of the 
Turkish nation, the republic assumed that Muslimness was a sine qua non for 
becoming a Turk.” After achieving national independence, however, the republic 
implemented a rigid program project by denying any role for Islam in the formation of 
the new polity. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xx) 
 
“Atatürk was careful to keep his options open. He cooperated with various religious 
leaders as he was organizing for the war against Greece, and he accepted the title 
‘Gazi’ that was given to him by the National Assembly in 1921.” The title “Gazi” had 
religious connotations, but “Atatürk used this title throughout the rest of his life.” 
(Kasaba, 1997: 22) In fact, this pragmatism should be seen as a mark of Mustafa 
Kemal’s political talent, which should not be overlooked when examining his policies 
of secularization. For instance, Mardin (1997: 209) explores his use of the (Grand) 
National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi) as the source of political legitimation for 
the resistance. Article I of the 1920 Constitution stated that sovereignty belonged 
without reservation to the millet. Theoretically, the Sultan-Caliph was considered, 
when, in power leader of the Muslim community. However, he was now a prisoner of 
the Allied forces. The term millet, which originally denoted religious sub-divisions, in 
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this context was used to imply that the Muslim community would re-establish its 
sovereignty. In fact, the term had been used from the end of nineteenth century on to 
translate the word ‘nation’. The ambiguity of the term is the main reason that the 
article was passed without any objections.  
 
Combining all these findings together, we observe a pragmatic attitude towards 
religion. Islam was not supposed to legitimize the regime or to be an appropriate base 
for political action; yet, one’s claim to membership in the political community was 
validated by the possession of Islamic credentials. In later years, the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs would send out “model sermons” to imams (preachers) who might 
then encourage the citizens to, for example, pay their taxes, or contribute to 
foundations established to assist the armed forces; in this way, “secular acts are 
identified as religiously desirable”. (Turan, 1991: 40-42) 
 
As Turan (1991: 42) argues, the Turkish state, while not viewing religion as giving 
direction to its policies and actions, continues to treat it as a resource which may be 
mobilized for ‘purposes of state’ whenever this is found useful or necessary. Some 
people have described the above-mentioned application of secularism in Kemalist 
Turkey as the “one-sided character of Turkish secularism”. Writing about Turkey in 
the mid-thirties, Henry Elisha Allen (1935: 175 in Kili, 1969: 104-105) stated that 
the Kemalist attitude “is favorable to whatever in Islam is consistent with the 
Republican ideas, relentlessly opposed to anything which might endanger Kemalist 
success, and, for the rest, more or less neutral”. In the Kemalist perception it was, on 
the one hand, impossible to keep Islam as it was; on the other hand, it was impossible 
to violently eradicate Islam. The government took the sole option: removing Islam 
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from the legal and educational system, removing all the religious leaders, and 
directing religion into channels that would contribute to the governmental program, 
insofar as possible. 
 
According to Ayata (1996: 41), the founders of the new Republic recognized Islam 
in its both positive and negative aspects. They were aware that Islam was important 
for unifying and mobilizing the nation, as well as for its contribution to social and 
moral welfare. However, they also saw Islam as the root cause of backwardness in 
the country and an obstacle toward reaching their goals. “The attitude of the 
Republican leaders was supportive when Islam was consistent with Republican 
reforms, but extremely hostile when it was at cross-purposes with the main 
objectives of modernization.” In a sense, Mustafa Kemal and his friends perceived 
Islam as a mixed legacy, especially during the very early stages of the Republic’s 
foundation. In pragmatic terms, they recognized the dominant role of religion in 
Turkish society and its importance in promoting social cohesion across ethnic and 
linguistic cleavages. On the other hand, they understood the strength of religion as a 
competing source of legitimacy. They aimed to remove the legitimacy of existing 
traditional religious institutions. 
 
Especially in the early years of the new Republic, the ruling cadre did not try to 
completely remove the authority of religion totally in the moral sphere. What they 
aimed at was eradicating the public visibility of Islam through certain acts and 
reforms. Previously, there had been some initiatives to use religion toward the 
modernization of the country. The Gökalpian type of modernization, which took 
religion to be a relatively important factor in the nation-building process, was not 
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totally discarded by the Kemalist ruling elite, especially at the very beginning of the 
new regime. They rather aspired to control and further restructure religion in 
conformity with the general objectives of the Revolution. “Islam was accorded a 
relatively influential role only insofar as it endorsed the principles of the new 
regime.” (Aydın, 2003: 244) 
 
Göle (1997: 1) states that state identity with regard to secularism has become a 
contested arena, usually modifying the bounds of religion and politics in the Turkish 
context. She (1997: 48) points out that the new nation-state’s attempt to reconcile 
“the disparity” of the masses and state involved a process of “social engineering”. 
Indeed, “secularization itself became part of that process of social engineering rather 
than an outcome of the process of modernization and societal development.” In other 
words, secularization became both a means and an end in the creation of the new 
Turkish state. Secularization was used as a means to destroy the legitimacy and 
identity of the Ottoman system and to build the new state, while it also became a part 
of the Turkish identity with the modern state.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
FROM DEVLET-İ ALİYE-İ OSMANİYE 
TO KUTSAL TÜRK DEVLETİ 
 
 
 
One of the students of Turkish politics, Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu (1993: 352) claims 
in his article “Modernity, State, and Religion: Theoretical Notes towards a 
Comparative Study” that “the peculiarities of modern-state building in Turkey 
emerged largely in response to the economic conditions of the time, particularly 
those domestic and international conditions that prevailed during the 1920s and the 
1930s.” In his reckoning, the lack of a civil society in the 1930s cannot be explained 
simply on the basis of the Turkish state tradition. It must instead be considered as a 
consequence of the exigencies of the conjectural and structural conditions that 
shaped the period. 
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In analyzing the state-led modernization process in Republican Turkey, this thesis 
does not ignore the specific internal and external conditions of the 1920s and 30s, 
which compelled the political elites to build a stronger center and act in a more 
authoritarian manner. The global economic depression in early 1930s and, 
consequently, the decreasing credibility in the world of liberalism and liberal 
economic principles, along with the emergence of a number of totalitarian regimes in 
Europe and Asia; the Sheikh Said Rebellion; the Menemen incident; and, the failed 
experience of the multi-party system (the closures of the Progressive Republican 
Party and the Free Party) are the most apparent of those contextual patterns. As 
Nalbantoğlu’s  (1993: 352) argument implies, it is quite logical to link étatism to the 
political context that allowed the Kemalist elite to observe the Soviet system of state 
planning in the economic field. 
 
I think where Nalbantoğlu and other scholars with similar views differs from the 
arguments supported in this thesis is primarily in the area of what we understand by 
the Turkish state tradition. The reflection of Turkish state tradition in the Republic is 
not merely the authoritarian administration, which could be regarded as a 
continuation of the so-called “Oriental despotism” in the Ottoman past. The basic 
assumption behind this state tradition is, instead, the superiority of statehood over all 
other social values. This perspective let the rulers approach other social determinants 
(religion, culture etc.) pragmatically. If we deliniate the concept in this way, then 
even the étatism of 1930s can be taken as a manifestation of that state tradition: if it 
is étatism which would be most beneficial for the empowerment of the state, then it 
should be (pragmatically) adopted. Along similar lines, as Göle (1997: 48) argues, 
even secularization becomes both a means and an end for the Republican elite: 
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secularism, which was incorporated into the principles of Kemalist ideology and 
adopted in the Constitution in 1937, was also, in fact, an urgent necessity if the new, 
small nation-state was to survive and develop out of the ashes of the old Ottoman 
political structures. In this study, secularization is taken as a reflection of the strong 
state tradition in Turkey. 
 
This thesis follows Dyson’s (1980: 51) argument that the form of secularization 
depends upon the political culture in terms of state autonomy. The weaker the state, 
the more liberal a form of secularization develops. For example, in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, state-church separation took place in a relatively peaceful manner. 
Conversely, an extreme secularity is observed in strong states, e.g. France, with deep 
conflicts in the secularization process. The French state “whose construction 
occupied all of French history may be taken as the ideal type of the state” (Badie and 
Birnbaum, 1983: 107) and, consequently, as the best example of extreme secularity, 
in which the state dominates religion, rather than just separating it from the polity.  
 
When describing the strong state, Heper (1987: 3-4) says, “… in some polities public 
interest means more than the sum of private or groups’ interests. From this particular 
perspective we can talk about the phenomenon of the state… which reflects a notion 
of public interest with little affinity to sectional interests”. The agents of the public 
interest are the state elites. In this regard, Turkey, like France, is one of the best 
examples of the strong state model. (Barkey, 2000: 87) Similarly to French 
secularization process, the Kemalist elite did not seek to separate religion from 
politics; it rather aimed to dominate religion, making its thinking and institutions 
obedient to the state. A comparable situation can be observed in Egypt, as well, 
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where in comparison to other Arab countries a state tradition exists. For example, the 
Nasserist regime imposed reforms on the Al-Azhar Islamic educational institution, 
and this had the effect of bureaucratizing the religious scholars as a prelude to 
making them subservient to the state. Resembling the Kemalist configuration of a 
state-Islam link, in Nasserist Egypt it was the ruling elite who appointed the head of 
Al-Azhar. (Nasr, 2001: 20) 
  
To grasp the impact of the strong state tradition on the Early Republican 
secularization reforms, this thesis has analyzed the Ottoman past. The Ottoman 
Empire managed to maintain its existence for six centuries due to its strong center. 
There were several determinants sustaining this centrality of the state. For instance, 
the local authorities, eşraf and ayans, could not form alternative sources of authority, 
since the ultimate ownership of the lands and other properties belonged to the Sultan. 
Tımar, the Ottoman land system, was based on the same principle. In addition, the 
bureaucratic circle had adopted the adab tradition, a secular pragmatic conception of 
the state, which valued statecraft in itself and separated it from the persona of the 
Sultan. These bureaucrats came mostly from the Ottoman recruitment system 
(devşirme), according to which a certain number of male children of Christian 
subjects were taken away and raised as slaves of the Ottoman state to eventually 
serve in its bureaucracy and army. This system empowered the center by eliminating 
the possibility of the formation of alternative interest groups. Moreover, the only 
remaining possible opposing force, the ulama, were suppressed, having been 
incorporated into the state apparatus. When religion clashed with the secular interests 
of the state, the religious concerns were superseded by the secular ones. Although the 
Ottoman state had a strong religious character, the role of Islam was often moderated 
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by the state’s pragmatic concerns. (Gerber, 1994: 76) Beside this superiority of the 
state in Turkish political culture, the state has been perceived as the sole agent 
responsible for social change. Accordingly, modernization in the Ottoman Empire 
was launched by the state and considered a state matter only.  
The Turkish Republic inherited this strong state tradition. In this respect, firstly, the 
state adopted a pragmatic attitude toward Islam. Atatürk utilized Islam to mobilize 
the masses against the invasion of the European armies and always saw Islam as the 
link to integrate and merge all Anatolian Muslims into the Turkish nation. National 
struggle against the will of the sultan was legitimized upon Islamic grounds, too. On 
the other hand, Atatürk saw religion as the main cause of backwardness of the 
country and so secularized the country in all facets of social and political life. This 
dual attitude, implemented as Turkish secularism, appears to have been “a successful 
project” on the whole. People have remained “sincere Muslims”, while having a 
secular approach on political matters. (see Heper and Toktaş, 2003) 
We can observe the implications of the strong state tradition in the Turkish process 
modernization from above as well. Due to the elimination of power formation in the 
periphery, e.g., by the fiefholders or local notables, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed the 
situation of having a strong center versus a weak periphery. As a consequence, the 
main structural feature of the relations between the state and society or religion has 
been the relative independence of the state bureaucracy and the elitist political 
culture. Modernization was, at this point, seen as a matter for the state. It was the 
responsibility of the center to save/modernize the country. Influenced by this 
tradition, as well as by the specific circumstances of the inter-war period, the 
Kemalist elite maintained the same mentality. One should not forget that the 
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founders of the new nation-state were once Ottoman pashas. The Republican state 
elite acted as the “self-appointed guardians” of secularism and Turkish nationalism. 
They took on the duty of “elevating the country to the level of the contemporary 
civilization” on behalf of the people.  
 
In line with the Turkish state tradition, Atatürk maintained the high value placed on 
the state. He opted for a Hegelian state. (Heper, 1985: 56) The Ottoman modernizers’ 
ultimate goal of maintaining a strong state was shared by Mustafa Kemal. In the 
Kemalist conception of the state, citizens’ service is required in order for the 
government to achieve its targets. Citizens are looked at as if they were instruments 
of the state. In Atatürk’s reckoning, freedoms are not absolute and can be restricted 
by the rights and freedoms of other individuals and by the common interests of the 
nation.  In theory, sovereignty was supposed to “belong to the people without any 
qualifications and conditions”. In practice, however, this meant that the state elite, 
which was assumed to understand the interests of the people better than did the 
people themselves, would exercise sovereignty in the name of the people. Atatürk’s 
conception of state reflects the Turkish state tradition, by which I primarily refer to 
the supremacy of the state and the view of the state as the agent of social change. 
 
The 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey constantly uses the phrase “Kutsal 
Türk Devleti” (Sublime Turkish State). This very much resembles the Ottoman 
conception of “Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye” (The High/Sublime Ottoman State). This 
little comparison illustrates very well the fact that despite the transformation from a 
religious multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multi-linguistic empire to a modern secular 
nation-state, the sublimity of the state has always remained its most salient feature. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
STATE MATTERS! 
 
For many observers of Turkish politics, secularism is the essence of the Turkish 
Revolution. (Timur, 1968: 117) Although a straightforward reading of Atatürk’s 
Turkey would indicate a strong commitment to positivist secularism, the Kemalist 
political and intellectual elites have rather a dual understanding of religion and 
secularism: While they have seen Islam as the source of backwardness and tried to 
erase it from all public visibility, they have at the same time incorporated religion 
into some aspects of the polity. In their conception of religion, for instance, a non-
Muslim person is usually considered as a minority person or as a Turkish citizen, but 
not a Turk. ‘Turk’ implies an ethno-religious characteristic of the political 
community. Moreover, the politicians often talk about “our religion,” although the 
secular system is not assumed to have such an element. “Our religion” refers to all 
citizens with Islamic credentials regardless of the various sects. In addition, 
 2 
 
missionary activities and cases of conversion are commonly considered as almost 
“subversive” acts. Islam was not supposed to legitimize the regime or to be an 
appropriate base for political action, “yet one’s claim to membership in the political 
community, in behavioural terms, was validated by the possession of Islamic 
credentials.” (Turan, 1991: 38-40) As reflections of the Kemalist mixed conception 
of religion, these examples illustrate that there must be something else that dominates 
Turkish politics. 
Despite the centrality of the issue, it is commonly observed that students of Islam 
and Turkey have not sufficiently conceptualized the position of Islam in Turkey and 
its interaction with the “evolution of regimes of power and knowledge.” The 
contextual patterns of power holding in both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic still need much clarification, when the concern is the peculiar interactive 
relationship between state and religion. (see Silverstein, 2003) In fact, “Islam is not 
a phenomenon of today or yesterday in Turkey.” It has been an intrinsic part of 
Turkey’s sociological reality. Islam has played an important role in Turkish politics 
since the very early days of the Republic. (Mango, 1993: 740-742) 
The Turkish political literature about Islam and religious fundamentalism in Turkey 
has usually been influenced by Orientalist examinations pioneered by Bernard Lewis 
(Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xv) and by other foreign observers’ Middle Eastern 
studies. Therefore, it can, to a great extent, miss the peculiarity of the Turkish path to 
modernity due to some generalized assumptions about state-Islam interactions. In 
fact, every revolution has its own peculiar national characteristics. According to 
Taner Timur (1968: 2), despite their international targets, the French Revolution was 
primarily French, and the Russian Revolution Russian in character. The Turkish case 
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is distinctive because of its long state tradition, in which the state has always had 
primacy vis-à-vis religion. This study tries to examine the mixed understanding of 
religion of the Kemalist elite in the light of the concept of Turkish state tradition, by 
which I primarily refer to the superiority of the state as the sole agent responsible for 
all social and political changes. 
Unlike previous studies on this subject, which have primarily examined the 
influence of religion on politics, this thesis aims to analyze how the state has shaped 
and utilized religion in Turkey. Rather than focusing only on the institutional 
developments, it tries to shed light on the influence of Turkish political culture, 
which would consequently configure the institutional and political developments of 
the Turkish modernization process.  This thesis is a modest attempt to explore the 
impact of strong state tradition on the Early Republican secularization reforms as 
part of a continuum with the Ottoman past. Such a short analysis could never do 
justice to this broad subject. However, as this study shows, despite ongoing heated 
debates regarding the so-called growing threat of Islam in Turkey, the nature of 
Early Republican secularization reforms indicates that the state has traditionally had 
primacy over religion in Turkish practice.  
The secularization reforms have been taken as the objects of this thesis because they 
are the most prevalent examples for exploring the influence of Turkish state tradition 
on the Turkish Republic. In the Turkish context, religion, as a very sensitive issue, 
can be considered as the only social force to mobilize the masses. As this study 
reveals, in Turkish political history we observe a pragmatic attitude toward even 
Islam, i.e., the state has benefited from religion whenever it was useful for state 
matters, and suppressed it whenever it was seen as an obstacle. As a consequence of 
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this pragmatic attitude of the state, Islam has never been able to pose a threat to the 
superiority of the state. It is the state that supersedes all other factors in Turkish 
practice. 
Since “variation in early state-building experiences” has some “implications for the 
subsequent form and substance of political activity” (Heper, 1985: 7), my study is 
centered on the examination of the Early Republican period, which is taken here to 
comprise the period of the presidency of the founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of the 
Turkish Republic, from 1923 to 1938. Although the Early Republican period is 
commonly considered as to have continued from 1923 to 1940 or 1945, namely from 
the foundation of the Republic to the beginning of multi-party system, I chose to 
omit the İnönü period (1938-1945). This is because Kemalism, the official ideology 
of the Turkish Republic, was basically formulated in Mustafa Kemal’s time, and the 
political developments in İnönü’s period display a strong continuity with those of his 
predecessor’s era in terms of ideology and raison détat. 
Kemalist ideology, which developed as an immediate response to the needs of the 
modernization process, was not based on a detailed examination of Turkish political 
and social patterns. Modernization in the Republican period was shaped inevitably 
by the difficult conditions of the War of Independence and inter-war periods; the 
principles of Kemalism arose largely from the practical requirements of this process. 
Accordingly, the Republican elite formulated their guidelines in a pragmatic way. 
As these principles, especially nationalism and secularism, emerged and developed 
according to some historical conditions and specific events, a mere conceptual 
analysis of secularism in terms of the meaning of its Western counterpart cannot 
 5 
 
adequately explain the political developments in Turkey. Therefore, secularism in 
Turkey should be studied through historical analysis. 
Having analyzed recent studies of Turkish politics, Özbudun and Kazancıgil (1997: 
2) give two reasons as to why a historical perspective is necessary in the study of 
Kemalism. First, “certain doctrinaire Kemalists” in Turkey and some foreign 
observers consider the foundation of the new republic as a sudden and total 
transformation from the so-called theocratic Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-
state. Second, Islamists and third-world critics of Kemalism see it as an alien and 
forcible imposition of secularization upon a Muslim society through isolation from 
its cultural and political past. In fact, both are “historical over-simplifications.” 
This study, hence, employs a historical approach to elaborate its thesis on the 
peculiarity of Turkish state tradition and its relation to Turkish secularism. In line 
with Heper’s (1985: iv) recommendations, a more historical approach that would 
also compare Turkey with both the Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries 
will be used. Such a position, instead of a solely conceptual analysis, will be used to 
explore the roots of Turkish secular developments in its Ottoman past, as well as to 
identify the continuum that existed in the state tradition and the modernization 
process between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. 
Besides having a historical point of view, this thesis follows a state-centered 
formulation. As Migdal (1994: 8) observes, “recently, a more state-oriented 
approach has attracted much attention.” It is, in fact, rather than a mere 
methodological preference, a practical necessity for students of Turkish politics to 
put the state at the core of their studies. This is because Turkey experienced a state-
led modernization in which society remained passive in keeping with the Turkish 
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state-centered political culture. According to Barkey (2000: 87), “Turkey has always 
been regarded as one of the best examples of modernizing strong states.” 
Following this first introductory chapter, Chapter II aims to outline the theoretical 
framework upon which the thesis will be structured. Starting with the definitions of 
religion and state as political concepts, this chapter mainly deals with the paths taken 
by secularization as a consequence of modernization, which differentiate according 
to diverse state traditions. Modern science, having equated the secular with the 
modern and progressive, has designated the traditional as “backward.” The secularist 
approach has “created the Oriental ‘other’: Islam.” According to Yavuz and Esposito 
(2003: xv), such scholars of Islam, who defend the idea of there being a unity of 
religion and polity in Islam, are exemplified by Bernard Lewis (1994: 135-136), 
who claims that “Islam was … associated with the excessive use of power from the 
very beginning… This association between religion and politics, between 
community and polity, can … be seen in … the religious texts in which Muslims 
base their beliefs”. Unfortunately, this superficiality, which appears due to a lack of 
historical analysis, has prevailed in much of the Turkish studies (for instance Berkes, 
1995). This chapter draws attention to the danger of such Orientalist assumptions. In 
practice, “the boundary between the religious and the political is not fixed and text 
centered, but rather fluctuating and depends on the specific context.” (Yavuz and 
Esposito, 2003: xv) Therefore, religion, Islam in particular, is taken here in its 
relation to the specific historical contexts. 
The same charge of superficiality is valid in the case of the secularization thesis, too. 
The basic assumption of the secularization thesis is that the development of 
modernity gradually decreases or even erases the influence of religion. Actually, as 
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Brown (1992: 38) says, empirical evidence as opposed to merely a conceptual 
analysis proves that “religion can and has retained its social significance across the 
change from preindustrial to industrial society.” Moreover, very much like Islam, 
which has been perceived and experienced differently in diverse settings for varying 
purposes, the secularization process is not a unique path of modernization, but 
differs according to varying levels of state autonomy, by which we refer to “the 
insulation of the state from societal pressures and to its freedom to make important 
decisions.” (Özbudun, 1996: 134) 
 
Chapter III examines the Ottoman state tradition, the basic patterns of which are: the 
patrimonial and bureaucratic configuration of the state, with a strong center versus a 
weak periphery; elitism; the state predominance over religion; and, state-led 
modernization. Kemalist historiography from the 1920s onwards has tended to 
emphasize the novelty of the new Turkish republic and a clean break with the 
Ottoman past. Feroz Ahmad’s Making of Modern Turkey is a recent example of 
scholarship that points up the contrast between the backward past and the progressive 
new nation-state. From the 1950s, however, pioneering scholars such as Tarık Zafer 
Tunaya, Şerif Mardin and Niyazi Berkes in Turkey and Bernard Lewis and Stanford 
Shaw in the West have presented a different approach, which has dominated Turkish 
studies. They have observed a link between the former and the latter and 
acknowledged “the debt of the republic to its immediate predecessors”. (Zürcher, 
2004: 99-100) 
 
Understanding the Ottoman legacy is important for grasping the foundation of 
Republic because the members of Republican elite were once Ottoman pashas. 
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Despite the dramatic change from a multiethnic, multi-religious empire to a 
“monolithic” nation-state, the same political culture remained salient in determining 
state policies. Within this framework, the state was the major, in fact, the sole force 
for political and social change in the Ottoman Empire, in which there existed a strong 
center and a weak periphery. (İnalcık, 1964: 3-5) The elimination of the alternative 
political and economic forces strengthened the center and erased any possibility of an 
opposing periphery balancing the imperial capital, Istanbul. Even when such an 
alternative force arose from religion, the state elite did not hesitate in suppressing 
religious scholars and institutions, as it did other individuals and institutions. Despite 
the religious character of the Empire, they were able to consider it legitimate to make 
secular decisions about a state matter even if religion assumed the contrary. The 
Turkish Republic was born on the basis of such a political inheritance. The secular 
reforms in the Republic cannot be understood without having insight into the 
Ottoman state tradition and modernization reforms, especially in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The modern secular Turkish nation-state was an eventual 
consequence of the earlier developments, and it was a dream that many Westernist 
Ottoman reformers had envisaged for a long time. 
 
Chapter IV aims to investigate the secularization reforms launched in the Early 
Republican period. The Turkish case of modernization has been quite distinctive 
among its counterparts. Regarding the types of modernity, Ernest Gellner proposes 
an analogy of bride (culture) and groom (state). According to him, the way to 
modernity can be divided into four time and space zones. The first three are 
European: a) The West –the Atlantic coast and Britain– had the happiest marriage of 
all; bride and groom were ready at the same time. b) The center –Italy and Germany– 
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had a difficult marriage at the beginning; the bride was ready, but it took some time 
for the groom to be found. c) The East –Eastern Europe– had a painful union; neither 
bride nor groom was ready, necessitating both cultural and political engineering. The 
fourth zone is unique to Turkey. According to Gellner, none of the above typology is 
valid for the Muslim world, since nationalism has always been rejected by Islam, but 
the Turkish case is peculiar within the Muslim world. The groom (state) was ready 
and chose a bride. (Çataltepe, 1994) For the wedding, however, Turkey needed many 
reforms. 
 
These reforms were initiated accross a broad spectrum varying from the acceptance 
of the Western hat and the adoption of the Gregorian calendar to the abolition of the 
Caliphate. Scholars of Turkish politics agree that secularization reforms in Turkey 
had a strong impact on different facets of politics and social life. (Heper, 1981: 355) 
The secular developments in the Early Republican period manifested a strong desire 
to modernize the new country. However, despite the strong commitment of the 
founding elite to positivist secularism, we observe a dual attitude toward religion. In 
a continuum with the Ottoman pragmatism about religion, the new political elite 
readily benefited from Islam whenever they found it useful, and eliminated the old 
religious authorities and institutions whenever they saw Islam as an obstacle to 
modernization. The continuity appears clearly in the establishment of the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs. Here, the Republican elite did not separate religion from the 
state, but incorporated it into the state apparatus, just as it had been in the Ottoman 
Empire. Rather than separating state and religion, in the Turkish version of 
secularism, the state could manipulate and control religion through its own apparatus 
without allowing it to form alternative civil sources of power. The continuity of the 
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state tradition between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic appears in the 
case of the state-led modernization, as well. The state has been the sole agent for 
modernization. This elitist approach had its reflections in the early state-building 
process of the new nation-state. 
 
As has been indicated above, political developments in Turkey cannot be evaluated 
without taking the peculiar historical and cultural context into consideration. In this 
respect, the relationship between Islam and state in Turkey displays the same 
peculiarity as an example that best reflects the Turkish state tradition.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
Nations come and go, empires rise and fall. But Islam persists and continues 
to include the nomads and the settlers, the builders of civilizations within Islam 
and those who destroy them. What then are the factors that keep together 
as one ummah those many people that consciously or not inclined 
to maintain their individuality while cultivating their tie 
with universal Islam as their most precious spiritual possession? 
Von Grünebaum 
(1962:52-53 in Davutoğlu, 1994: 63) 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Defining the Concepts 
 
 
It is necessary at the beginning to define the two concepts of greatest importance for 
this study: religion and state. The social sciences, for a long time, promoted the 
assumption that religion is more or less irrelevant to the domains of modern life. 
(Robertson, 1987: 5) Religion, which, in fact, remains one of the most ambiguous 
objects of social study, has recently regained considerable interest among political 
scientists. (Brown, 2000:1) Similarly, we observe the return of scholarly concern 
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with the state. (Hall and Ikenberry, 1989: 1) The “state” has been issue for heated 
debate between different theoretical and ideological views for quite some time now. 
(Nalbantoğlu, 1993: 346) 
 
Defining the concept of religion is crucial for this study, because whether one sees 
modern society as secularized or as undergoing a process of secularization depends 
very much on what one means by religion. Discussions about secularization stem 
from the conflict among the radically different conceptions of what religion is. 
Functional definitions approach religion in terms of “what it does,” whereas 
substantive definitions say “what it is.” (for the discussion see Bruce and Wallis, 
1992: 9-11) As a result, those who use “functionalist definitions” tend to reject the 
secularization thesis while those using “substantive definitions” are more likely to 
support it. (Hamilton, 1995: 166) 
 
Substantive (theological) definitions largely emphasize the spiritual or “irrational” 
component of religious belief and practice. Such definitions of religion include, for 
instance, Schleiermacher’s conception of the “feeling of absolute dependence”, 
Rudolf Otto’s emphasis on “awe, a unique blend of fear and fascination before the 
divine” or Mircea Eliade’s view of religion as “embodied in sacred space and time”. 
(King, 1987: 283-285)  Unfortunately, these definitions prove of limited use from the 
perspective of the social sciences.  
 
Durkheim, whose work is perhaps the cornerstone of the sociology of religion, 
defines religion as "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, 
that is to say, things set apart and forbidden –beliefs and practices which unite in one 
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single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them". (Coser, 
1977: 136) Clifford Geertz (1973: 90) gives a more functional definition, describing 
what religion does, by defining it as 
a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and 
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions 
of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such 
an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic. 
 
Geertz points out that religion is a set of symbols which may either stand for 
something, represent or express something or act as a sort of instruction for what to 
do. Religion does these things through formulating concepts of general order. People 
need these concepts because they need to see the world as meaningful and ordered. 
Moreover, Geertz sees religious beliefs as attempts to bring abnormal events and 
experiences “within the sphere of the explicable.” (Hamilton, 1995: 158) 
 
Scholars, thus, have not been able to develop a widely accepted definition of 
religion. In general, what all of these approaches, both substantial and functional, 
share in common is the idea that there is a distinct and universal social phenomenon 
called “religion” that can be clearly distinguished from other aspects of social reality. 
The current definitions usually link the concept to belief and behavior transcending 
the empirical reality. The belief in a deity is taken as the absolute truth about human 
existence. Most religions have some ethical norms. As a consequence, religious 
beliefs have influences on the thinking and behavior of human beings in ordinary 
life. Religion influences the world view of its believers. (Nielsen, 1992: 8) Bruce and 
Wallis (1992: 10-11) combine both substantial and functional aspects well and define 
religion as consisting of 
actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the 
existence of either supernatural entities with powers of agency, or 
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impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral purpose, which have 
the capacity to set the conditions of, or to intervene in, human affairs. 
 
The other concept we are dealing with is the “state.” The term “state”, which is 
derived from the Roman law concept “status rei Romanae”, the public law, refers to 
an independent political community ruling a specific territory. (Nielsen, 1992: 8) The 
state is a relatively modern institution, dating back to the sixteenth century when the 
nation-state emerged from the feudal system and the central power gained control 
over the military forces and powers of legislation and taxation for the entire territory 
under its domination. Hall and Ikenberry (1989: 1-2) give a composite definition of 
state including three elements. The state is, firstly, a set of institutions (especially 
those of violence and coercion). Secondly, these institutions function within a 
geographically-bounded territory. Thirdly, the state has a monopoly on rule-making 
in that territory. 
 
As centers of power, states regulate collection and distribution of resources, control 
policy making, and deeply affect many aspects of their citizens’ lives. (for instance, 
see Trimberger, 1978) They are the most important determinants of sociopolitical 
change in modern times. It is therefore not possible to satisfactorily explain social 
changes without considering the state. How much states can get done, and how much 
of the lives of their citizenry they control, are functions of their strength. Thus, what 
constitutes strength and weakness in a state, and how that influences politics, 
economics, and social change, is very important (for a detailed analysis, see Migdal, 
1988). 
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Another way of looking at the state is based on an intellectual tradition that is built 
around an abstract theory of the state. This tradition dates back to Plato, and is the 
“cumulative contribution” of numerous philosophers and thinkers, among whom 
Machiavelli, Locke, Jefferson, Rousseau, Mill and Weber are only some of the more 
notable names. (Ozay, 1990: 56) According to it, good government, being the 
implementing arm of the state, is one which succeeds in improving living standards 
by means of public policy in education, housing, employment and social services, 
and in establishing appropriate economic, legal, cultural and national institutions. 
 
Initially, the issue of applying all these religious and political ideas to the non-
Western world appears as an epistemological problem: an attempt to use Western 
phenomena to understand the non-Western world. Thus, a fundamental problem 
arises when one tries to apply social categories such as religion and state to non-
Western contexts. For example, Jeff Haynes (1998: 8) suggests that the universal 
application of western social categories is problematic because it tends to force one 
to perceive social reality, not in terms of the society itself, but in terms of the West: 
When we think of Church-state relations we tend to assume a single 
relationship between two clearly distinct, unitary and solidly but 
separately institutionalized entities. In this implicit model built into 
conceptualization of the religio-political nexus there is one State and one 
Church; both entities’ jurisdictional boundaries need to be carefully 
delineated.[…] In sum, the conventional concept of State-Church 
relations is rooted in prevailing Western conceptions of the power of the 
state of necessity being constrained by forces in society, including those 
of religion. 
 
In this way, Haynes argues that the study of state-church relations is biased in 
content, possessing some assumptions about the nature of religion and politics in 
society. Haynes (1998: 9) concludes that 
In their specific cultural setting and social significance, the tension and 
the debate over Church-state relations are uniquely Western 
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phenomena… overloaded with western cultural history; these two 
concepts cannot easily be translated into non-Christian terminologies. 
 
 
On the other hand, one should also notice another danger in this understanding; i.e., 
the deep-rooted Western tendency to “obscure” Islam and Muslims through “veils of 
esoterica” and –in extreme forms– even to suggest that entirely different rules of 
logic and evidence are required to take the measure of Islam and Muslims. “This is 
nonsense. Muslims can be understood, just like other people.” (Brown, 2000: 19) 
Although there are problems in “translating” religion and politics into a different 
context, this does not mean that states and societies will not try to reformulate 
themselves. 
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2.2 The Functions of Religion 
 
There are different opinions regarding the essential functions of religion. 
Nevertheless, for most members of advanced societies, religion performs certain 
individual and social functions at least to some extent, as it does for traditional 
societies. Essentially, religion, Islam in particular, as identified by Heper (1981: 346), 
is a “multi-functional institution” because it has been taken advantage of different 
groups for different purposes. When analyzing the functions of religion, it is almost 
essential to start with Emile Durkheim. 
 
Durkheim [1995 (1915): 489] identifies three basic functions of religion. One of the 
functions of religion, according to Durkheim, is social cohesion. Religion brings 
people together through shared symbols, values, and norms. Religions can be 
powerful forces in society.  By reinforcing group norms, they facilitate the formation 
of social homogeneity. They can provide a basis for common purposes and values 
that maintain social solidarity. Religion, in this way, integrates and unifies. 
According to Collinson (1999: 53), religion creates a bond, not only legitimizing and 
strengthening existing social constructions like churches, sects, and nations, but also 
inventing, “imagining” them. The Jewish nation is an obvious example, as is the 
Armenian. 
 
Another function of religion is social control. Societies may use religious doctrine to 
promote conformity.  In most societies, religions play an important role in social 
control by defining what is right and wrong behavior.  Thus, religion has a vital role 
in social maintenance. It also gives sanctity, more than human legitimacy and 
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transcendent importance to some values; for example, regarding marriage as a 
sacrament, much law breaking as sinful, and occasionally, the state as a divine 
instrument. 
 
Providing meaning and purpose is the third function of religion. "Religious beliefs 
offer the sense that the vulnerable human serves a greater purpose. [Thus] people are 
less likely to collapse in despair when confronted by life's calamities". [Durkheim, 
1995(1915): 489] The sacred texts of religions usually set forth examples for proper 
behavior in common situations. The religious system provides a body of ultimate 
ends for a society.  
 
O’Dea (1966 in Hamilton, 1995: 120-121), one of the best-known functionalists, 
gives six functions of religion for the individual and society: 
1. It provides support for established values and goals. 
2. It ensures stability of the social order and often helps maintain the status quo. 
Through cult and ceremony, it provides emotional security and identity and a 
fixed point of reference among a variety of conflicting ideas.  
3. It “sacralizes” norms and promotes group goals above individual goals. 
4. It can be a basis for criticisms of existing social patterns. It can form a basis 
for social protest. 
5. It helps the individual in understanding him- or herself and provides a sense 
of identity. 
6. It is important in aiding the individual during life crises and in transition from 
one status to another and is, consequently, part of the educational process. 
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O’Dea does not think that these functions are always fulfilled by religion, but notes 
that they have been practically universal in known social systems. (Hamilton, 1995: 
121) He also admits that religion may have actual dysfunctions and again lists six of 
these, which correspond to its positive functions: 
1. It may hinder protest against injustice by reconciling the oppressed. 
2. Sacralizing norms and values may hinder progress in knowledge. 
3. It may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances through its 
conservativism. 
4. It can lead to utopianism and unrealistic hopes for change and, consequently, 
inhibit practical action to this end. 
5. It can attach individuals to groups to the point where conflict with other 
groups is promoted and adjustment prevented. 
6. It can create dependence on religious institutions and leaders, and in this way, 
it may prevent maturity. 
 
Especially notable for purposes of this thesis is what functions religion provides in its 
relation with the state. The state can be based on either coercion or legitimate 
authority through popular support. Because the use of force tends in the long run to 
be costly and inefficient, government will seek to establish a basis of ideological 
legitimacy for its rule. Religion can provide perhaps the strongest basis for the 
legitimation of the government. Thus, government may need the support of religious 
authorities, or at least seek to avoid open conflict with them. (Nielsen, 1992: 20) 
 
According to Weber, officials and bureaucrats are, in fact, little inclined towards 
religion. (Hamilton, 1995: 140-141) Nevertheless, they are greatly interested in the 
 20 
 
maintenance of order, discipline and security, and they regard religion as a useful 
instrument for achieving these goals.  
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2.3 State in Islam: Dawlah 
 
 
Know that you can have three sorts of relations with princes, governors, 
and oppressors. The first and worst is that you visit them, 
the second and the better is that they visit you, and 
the third and surest that you stay away from them,  
so that neither you see them nor they see you. 
Ghazzali, Muslim theologian of the twelfth century  
(Robbins and Robertson, 1987: 183) 
 
 
 
Before analyzing the relation between Islam and state, it would be beneficial to take 
notice of Khalidi’s (1992: 28) caution that one should always be somewhat 
suspicious of sentences in which Islam appears as the subject, such as “Islam is x, y 
and z”, or “Islam teaches a, b, c”, “Islam demonstrates that”, “Islam has shown that”, 
and so forth. It should be perfectly obvious that the Islam of one time and one place 
is quite different from the Islam of another time and another place. On the other 
hand, as Esposito claims, a “selective presentation and analysis of Islam” also 
distorts its image. (Göle, 1996b: 21) Both the theological and historical aspects of the 
subject should be reckoned together. 
 
The Islamic tradition of the state, as it evolved after the death of Muhammad, differs 
radically from the western secularist state. The idea of a secular state is “the by-
product of European positivism.” In the positivist tradition, the raison d’etre of the 
state is the collective good, i.e., national progress or development. The nation is a 
culturally and geographically distinct entity, and this sustains social cohesion and 
political consensus. The strength and survival of the nation is secured through 
legislation, which articulates the political consensus, implementing it through public 
policy for the sake of improving the human condition. (Ozay, 1990: 56) Such a 
 22 
 
concept of state, with its modern connotations, did not form a part of Islamic political 
thought in the classical period, and the modern conceptualization of state is surely a 
Western one, which evolved in relation to the phenomena of the Renaissance and 
capitalism. For this reason, ‘state’ will be used here only as a monopoly of political 
power or authority. For the same reason again, it is natural not to find such a concept 
in Islamic thought prior to the modern era, either. The term dawlah, which is used 
today to connote state in European sense, existed in the Qur’an. However, according 
to Lewis (1988), the first time that the term dawlah (devlet in Turkish) appears in its 
modern meaning of state, as distinct from dynasty and government, is in a Turkish 
memorandum in 1837.  
 
The state has, theoretically, no independent basis in Islam. An independent basis was 
accorded only to the umma, the community of believers, which was supposed to live 
not by the commands of the ruler but by the Shari’ah, the holy law. This law was to 
be known through the Qur’an and the hadiths, the sayings of the Prophet as reported 
by his companions. The ruler had no role in this theoretical framework, although the 
situation was complicated by the fact that the first four rulers, or caliphs, were also 
companions, who certainly made an effort to gain a say in fixing the form of the 
community. (Gerber, 2002: 66)  Abu Bakr and Umar, the first two “rightly guided 
caliphs”, emphasized the aspect of legitimacy by applying to as great an extent as 
possible the principles of shura (inner consultation), aqd (ruler-ruled contract), and 
bay’ah (oath of allegiance). (Shahrough, 1995: 319) These principles were used in 
the appointment of their successor, Uthman. Gradually, however, shura was 
overlooked, and then aqd and bay’ah were also dropped with the establishment of 
the Umayyad family.  
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One should also note that, given the limited nature of political provisions in the 
Qur’an and the hadiths, Muslims had to borrow and improvise in developing their 
political systems. The Islamic systems have been inspired by Shari’ah, as represented 
in the Qur’an and the hadiths, by Arabian tribal traditions and by the political heritage 
of the lands Muslims conquered, especially the Persian and Byzantine traditions. 
Further evidence for the argument that the form of the state and the nature of 
government cannot be deduced directly and only from the Qur’an and the hadiths is 
provided by the fact that the few polities both in the past and present that have called 
themselves Islamic states are very different from each other in their most important 
political aspects. (Shahrough, 1995: 318) 
 
After the holy Migration (Hicret), Muslims were not only a religious community, but 
also a political one, whereas Christianity could not form a political entity until three 
centuries after its emergence. This fact alone leads many readers to think 
simplistically that Islam envisages a theocracy. (Watt, 1995: 76) Accordingly, it is 
commonly argued in Islam, unlike Christianity, that there is no tradition of a 
separation of church and state. At least, this is “the oft-repeated statement” contrasting 
the two religions. One simple reason for this difference between Islam and 
Christianity is that Islam knows no “church” in the sense of a corporate body whose 
leadership is clearly defined, hierarchical, and distinct from the state. The 
organizational arrangement of ulama, Muslim religious scholars, makes an 
institutional confrontation between Muslim church and Muslim state virtually 
impossible. A Muslim scholar may speak out against a ruler, but there is “no 
canonical way” he can summon a Muslim “church council.” (Brown, 2000: 31) 
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In fact, the understanding of the unity of religion and politics in Islam has resulted in 
the subjugation of the former by the latter because it does not allow religion to build a 
corporate body for itself. Throughout Islamic history, the state has always had great 
power to influence the ulama. The state has always assumed the right to appoint and 
dismiss qadis (religious judges and local administrators) and teachers in Muslim 
seminaries, has exercised control over financial aspects of Muslim religious properties 
such as mosques and medreses (religious schools), and has used state police power to 
punish, imprison, and exile unruly Muslim religious leaders. In certain cases, state 
control over the Muslim religious establishment became so pervasive that the ulama 
virtually became an arm of government. The best example was the Ottoman Empire, 
in which the ulama were largely integrated into the state apparatus. (Brown, 2000: 35) 
From a broader view, some cleavages and conflicts among religious schools and 
religiously oriented parties have occurred occasionally in the Islamic communities, 
but there has been no conflict between Islam and state. (Dursun, 1993:78) 
 
Brown (2000: 54) cites appropriate examples when explaining that this passive 
attitude of the Sunni religious authorities toward the state was justified substantially 
by the primary resources, where obedience to the rulers is very much emphasized: 
“O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in 
authority.” (Qur’an, 4:59) This Qur’anic advice became “the scriptural foundation” 
for a submissive attitude toward political authority that reached its zenith in the oft-
cited maxim “Better sixty years of tyranny than one hour of anarchy.” The Islamic 
tradition asserts, in effect, that mankind’s need for government is so overwhelming 
that it makes the quality of that government decidedly secondary. For instance, 
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Suhrawardi, a highly regarded twelfth-century Sufi scholar wrote that “Prayer is 
permitted behind any imam, pious or impious … Revolt is prohibited even if the 
ruler is unjust.” 
 
The uniformity that hinders opposition and revolt similarly is underlined in the 
hadiths: “He who separates himself even a single span from the community, removes 
the noose of Islam from his neck.” “The hand of Allah is with the community. He 
who stands alone stands alone in hell.” “He who seeks to divide your community, 
slay him.” (Brown, 2000: 58) Although there are some other hadiths encouraging 
revolt against cruelty (e.g., “If men see evil and do not change it, God will swiftly 
blind them with His punishment”), yet, on balance, the weight of Muslim historical 
tradition was on the side of political submission. (Brown, 2000:55) 
 
Based on the lack of prescriptive information in the primary sources of Islam and on 
the submissive positioning of religious authorities in practice, Islamic political 
thought actually provides enough material for both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes, depending on the nature of the specific political culture and the attitudes of 
the political elite. The particular historical development (for instance, economic basis 
and class structure) of Muslim lands and the international network of economic 
relations should be taken into account in the analysis of Islamic political ideas. 
Therefore, we cannot make a clear-cut statement regarding Islam’s relation to the 
modern idea of statehood. 
 
According to Duran (2001: 43-44), the discussion of the interplay between Islam and 
modern nation-state can best be summarized by two views. The first view, which 
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sees the emergence of the nation-state in the West as a result of the process of 
secularization (limiting religion to one’s private life), is best represented by P.J. 
Vatikiotis. Referring to the unity of religion and politics in Shari’ah and the 
nonterritorial/universal aspect of the Islamic community, Vatikiotis (1987: 36) 
claims that Islam is not compatible with nationalism, which is a constructive loyalty 
to a territorially defined national group. This approach also emphasizes that the 
concept of the nation-state has no equivalent in classical Islamic writings. On the 
contrary, classical Islam stresses a division of the world into two hostile realms: dar 
al-Islam (the realm of Islam or peace) and dar-al harb (the realm of war). With its 
insistence on holy war, Islam has the aim of conquering the non-Islamic world at the 
expense of other beliefs. 
 
The second view, which stresses compatibility between Islam and the nation-state, is 
best articulated by James P. Piscatori (1986: 144), who observes some indications of 
“territorial pluralism” in classical Islamic theory. A significant indication of the 
acceptance of territorial pluralism is found in the verse of the Qur’an that states that 
God divided mankind into nations and tribes for the purpose of their better knowing 
one another. After discussing the Islamic historical experience as the record of 
pragmatic adaptation to diversity under different states and empires such as the 
Ottoman, Persian and so forth, Piscatori (1986: 77) underlines the important effect of 
Islamist sentiments on the establishment of the some nationalist movements and in 
validating the idea of a territorial separation between “them” and “us”. 
 
Stemming from the fact that the original Islamic sources, the Qur’an and the Hadith, 
do not set forth a specific type of government, Islamic political thought, especially in 
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the last centuries has given rise to some differing opinions on the issue of the 
connection between Islam and democracy.  
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2.4 The State as an Agent of Social Change and 
Modernization 
 
Recently, in the field of political science, a more state-oriented approach to the 
question of social transformation has attracted much attention. (Migdal, 1994: 8) In 
this approach, the state is not just a legal entity having a monopoly over violence as 
argued by Weber, but a political entity shaping the course of policy making and the 
content of the polity. (Skocpol, 1985) In this formulation, the state is not a simple 
reflection or sum of sectional interests, but rather a concept based on the public 
interest developed independently of classes and sections of society. (Heper, 1987: 3) 
In the same vein, Pierre Birnbaum (1996: 203) argued that “the state is seen as an 
independent variable around which the entire system in all its aspects recognizes 
itself.” The state is considered to be independent of society and social groups, an 
autonomous agent shaping social groups and imposing policies on society.  
 
As stated by Özbudun (1996: 134), “state autonomy refers to the insulation of the 
state from societal pressures and to its freedom to make important decisions.” In 
other words, the state as formulated here is taken vis-à-vis civil society, and, as 
Metin Heper (1987: 3) noted, to the extent that there is a state highly differentiated 
from society, we can talk of the phenomenon of the state and the levels of stateness 
corresponding to the different institutionalization patterns of various polities. Since 
the institutionalization patterns show significant differences among countries, the 
level of “stateness” also differs regarding the polities of these countries. We can 
claim that “in empirical reality there are states not the state.” (Heper, 1987: 5) 
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The state autonomy or “stateness” is not a fixed phenomenon. It shows major 
differences among polities and within the same polity at different periods. (Heper, 
1987: 4) It can be said that a society having an autonomous state tradition has a state 
high in capacity, whereas a stateless society is expected to have a state with low 
capacity. Kenneth Dyson (1980: 51-52) summarizes the overall characteristics of the 
state societies and stateless societies as follows: 
State societies exemplify strongly non-economic, non-utilitarian attitudes 
towards political relations, which attitudes deny that the public interest is 
simply the sum of private interests; a rationalistic spirit of inquiry; a 
stress on the distinctiveness of state and society, whether in terms of the 
special function of the state or in terms of the peculiar character of its 
authority; a consciousness of institutions which reflects the strength of 
legalism and codification within the political culture and reveals itself in 
the ubiquity of formal organizations and their detailed constitutions; a 
concern for formalization and depersonalization which lend a 
“republican” character to the political system....  
 
By contrast, the “stateless” societies are characterized by the lack of a notion of 
autonomous public interests, an instrumental conception of government and a 
pragmatic view of politics, a tradition of pluralism and debate, mutual respect and 
tolerance among citizens and a high level of civility. (Dyson, 1980: 52) It is the 
existence of this intellectual heritage in Britain and the United States that leads 
Dyson to characterize them as “stateless” societies. Britain, in his view, “lacks a 
historical and legal tradition of the state as an institution that ‘acts’ in the name of 
public authority..., as well as a tradition of continuous intellectual preoccupation with 
the idea of the state right across the political spectrum.” (Dyson, 1980: viii) 
 
There are also some historical, intellectual and cultural factors central to the 
existence of an autonomous state. (Yılmaz, 2002: 58) Accordingly, if there is a 
historical tradition of an isolated sovereign state in a society, there emerges a strong 
state. Intellectual factors operate insofar as that if the political ideas and the norms of 
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policy making in any society incorporate a sovereign state, the possibility of the 
emergence of a strong state is high. There is also a cultural element in terms of the 
ideas held by individuals in a country about a generalized concept and cognition of 
the state. If this concept of the state is active in the perceptions and actions of 
individuals, the probability of existence of a strong state is high. (Nettle, 1988: 312 in 
Yılmaz, 2002: 58) In shaping the modern institutional dynamics of societies, 
specifically, in the direction of either strong or weak institutionalization patterns, 
antecedent cultural traditions have special importance. 
As indicated, different “levels of stateness” are very much attached to the different 
state traditions by which it is referred to “clusters of institutions and cultural 
practices that constitute a set of expectations about behavior” (Perez-Diaz 1993:7 in 
Peters, 2000). Peters (2000) identifies four distinctive state traditions in the West: 
1) Anglo-Saxon (minimal state)  
2) Continental European: Germanic (organicist)  
3) Continental European: French (Napoleonic)  
4) Scandinavian (mixture of Anglo-Saxon and Germanic)  
The basic difference is between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European 
traditions. In the former, the state does not exist as a legal entity but rather one 
speaks of "government" or "government departments". In the latter, by contrast, the 
state is a separate entity “capable of entering into legal contracts with other moral 
persons (such as regions, communes, universities, etc.)”.  
In the Germanic tradition, including much of continental Europe, and perhaps Japan, 
(Dyson 1980) the state is a transcendent entity. In spite of the inevitable division of 
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government into departments and agencies, the authority of the state is not 
considered divisible or bargainable. In this tradition the servants of the state are to 
some degree “the personifications of the power and centrality of the State”. In short, 
because the state is so central to political life, servants of the state must have a firm 
moral and legal foundation. (Peters, 2000) 
The Anglo-Saxon tradition is evident in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
“Whereas in the Germanic tradition state and society are conceptualized as a part of 
one organic entity, within the Anglo-American tradition the state commonly is 
conceptualized as arising from a contract among members of society”. (Peters, 2000) 
The boundaries between state and society are therefore more distinct, and perhaps 
more flexible. The separation of politics and administration is important in a good 
deal of thinking about governance in the Anglo-American tradition. Possible 
bureaucratic dominance of public policy has been most salient in the Anglo-
American democracies, too. (Peters, 1992) 
The Napoleonic State is conceived as unitary and indivisible, much like the 
Germanic State (Hayward,1983 in Peters, 2000). Indeed, this state form evolved as 
part of a nation-building project aiming at overcoming deep divisions in civil society. 
In the French case, nation building was largely, if not completely, successful. In 
other countries, such as Spain and Belgium, the process was far less victorious. The 
Napoleonic conceptualization of government naturally has been associated with “a 
highly centralized state structure to ensure the uniformity of policy throughout the 
political system”. The most obvious difference between the Napoleonic and the 
Germanic traditions is that the later relies more fully on the legal framework of the 
state to guide action by policy makers. The Germanic tradition therefore permits, or 
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even encourages, federal solutions, whereas the Napoleonic tradition relies more on 
the direct imposition of central state authority over its citizens. (Peters, 2000) The 
Turkish state tradition resembles the French one most. 
The Scandinavian state tradition is in-between the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic 
traditions. The characteristic that most distinguishes this tradition is, that of the 
welfare state. If the state has any kind of existence that extends beyond a simple 
contract with its population, it also has extensive rights as well as extensive rights in 
dealing with those population. (Peters, 2000) 
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2.5 Secularization as a Consequence of Modernization 
 
Secularization is the process whereby the domains of social activity and human 
experience previously organized around religious norms are “desacralized” by their 
reinterpretation and reorganization in terms of ideals of a less sacral nature. (Berger, 
1967: 106-108) The societal aspect of secularization manifests itself in the 
institutions as the significant decline of the influence of religion. In Western history, 
this process was experienced as the separation of church and state, expropriation of 
church lands, and secularization of education. The cultural aspect of secularization 
implies a gradual decline of the religious content in art, philosophy, literature and 
science. Moreover, science becomes the most important secular perspective on the 
world. So, an analytical distinction can be made between the “objective” side of 
secularization as the secularization at the socio-structural level, and the “subjective” 
side, or secularization at the level of consciousness. (Berger, 1967: 107-108)  
 
Donald Smith (1974: 7-8) conceptualizes “secularization” by dividing the term into 
five analytical categories: 
1- Polity-separation secularization: the institutional separation of religion and 
politics, removal of religious influence in a polity, non-recognition of a state 
religion (e.g., the Peace of Westphalia in 1648). 
2- Polity-expansion secularization: the growing extension of the political system 
into areas of social life previously dominated by religion such as education, 
law, and the economy (e.g., Nepal, Burma, Turkey, Latin America). 
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3- Political-culture secularization: transformation of values; secular notions of 
political community replacing traditional ways of thinking (e.g., the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment in the West). 
4- Political-process secularization: the decreasing significance of both religious 
issues and leaders or interest groups in political matters (e.g., Latin America 
in the twentieth century). 
5- Polity-dominance secularization: revolutionary efforts to push religion out of 
politics or modify it according to official ideologies (e.g., the French, 
Mexican, Russian and Soviet, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions).1 
 
The orthodox model of the secularization thesis claims that modernization leads to a 
decrease in the social significance of religion. Three patterns of modernization are 
crucial in this process: social differentiation, societalization and rationalization. 
Social differentiation refers to the process in which specialist institutions are 
developed to handle specific functions previously carried out by one institution 
(religion). “The differentiation of lifeworlds encourages a differentiation of 
metaphysical and salvational systems along lines more suited to each class or social 
fragment.” Secondly, societalization, by which life is organized more societally (in 
society), rather than locally (in the community), allows religion to become privatized. 
Religion is no more a matter of necessity, but “a matter of preference”. The third 
                                                 
1 In Turkey, polity-separation secularization did not occur, since religion maintained its position 
within the state apparatus after the foundation of the new Republic. The secularization reforms in 
Turkey are, however, good examples of polity-expansion secularization whereby the Republican elite 
removed religion from all social and economic domains of life. The third category, political-culture 
secularization, is difficult to apply to countries such as Turkey and Russia, which did not experience 
the Renaissance and Enlightenment processes. Political culture in Turkey was secularized in a top-
down manner. This condition is a consequence of polity-dominance secularization in Turkey, where 
secularization had not appeared as a social force at the periphery, but rather in the top-down policies 
of the Republican elite at the center. The Kemalist revolution was also successful in terms of political-
process secularization to a great extent. Despite some fluctuations in political orientation, religion has 
in general remained relatively marginal to political matters. 
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important process, rationalization, involves changes in the way people think and act 
and entails “the pursuit of technically efficient means of securing this-worldly ends.” 
Consequently, the growth in technical rationality and technology displaced 
supernatural considerations. (Bruce and Wallis, 1992: 11-14) 
 
The revisionist model of the secularization thesis criticizes the orthodox model 
basically upon empirical evidence. (see Brown, 1992) Instead of a unilinear classical 
understanding, the revisionists claim that the social significance of religion can rise 
and fall according to the social and economic context. Moreover, religion does not 
necessarily have a negative correlation with the growth of human knowledge and 
rationality, and with urbanization and industrialization. In fact, religion can suffer as 
a result of dramatic social and economic changes, but it can eventually adapt itself to 
the new setting. (Brown, 1992: 55-56) In short, they claim that secularization, rather 
than diminishing the significance of religion, encourages it to take different forms. 
 
It will also be useful to evaluate secularization in terms of its position among 
different theoretical approaches to the church-state relationship. According to Vergin 
(1994: 5-23), with regard to the relationship between the state and religion, four main 
groups of theoretical views can be identified. The first group sees the state as 
subordinate to religion. The state has no existence independent from religion and is 
based on norms derived religion. Thinkers who were also the members of clergy, 
such as Calvin and Luther, developed this view. The second group gives primacy to 
the state and sees religion as subordinate to the state. Influential political 
philosophers including Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu and Rousseau adhered to 
this view. They sometimes speak of religion serving the state, and sometimes claim 
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that the state should determine religion. The third group demands the full divorce of 
state and religion. Locke and de Tocqueville, in particular, exemplifies this more 
liberal outlook, which sees state and religion as different and independent domains.  
De Tocqueville says the state has no competence in religion, and religion should be 
free and should have an autonomous area in society. This tradition of secularization 
developed particularly in Anglo-American traditions. The last view, offered by 
August Comte, not only claims the primacy of state over religion, but also offers a 
new religion for society. For him, humanity had replaced God although his functions 
were still valid. What Comte offered was nothing other than a secularized religion 
based on atheistic-humanistic tenets. This form of secularization differs from the 
previous three views. For example, it allows for the interference of the state in 
religious matters, and strongly indicates that the state has the right to make 
judgments on religious issues and to impose these upon society. This is what has 
been called “laicism” and has developed primarily on the basis of the French political 
experience. The instances in which the state develops an alternative ideology and 
imposes it on society fall into this category.  
 
The form of secularization in a given place and time depends upon the political 
culture in question, particularly the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis civil society. The 
weaker the state is, the more liberal a form of secularization develops, and in such 
“stateless societies,” the state-church separation takes place in a relatively peaceful 
manner in the course of the secularization process. (Dyson, 1980: 51) This form of 
secularization characterizes the Anglo-American traditions. Conversely, it is highly 
possible to find an extreme secularity in state-dominated societies, along with deep 
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conflicts and confrontations in the secularization process. This is the case in France 
and to some extent in Turkey. 
 
Within this framework, Martin E. Marty’s classification of the different experiences 
of secularization provides useful categories for understanding these traditions of 
secularization in different contexts. Marty (1969: 10) differentiates continental 
secularity from the Anglo-American tradition of secularity on the basis of the state’s 
attitude towards religion. In continental Europe, particularly in France, we observe 
“maximal secularity,” which “involved a formal and unrelenting attack on gods and 
churches and a studied striving to replace them.” In the Anglo-American historical 
experience, there was a gradual and increasing disregard of gods and churches 
without attempts to replace them. He calls this type of secularism “mere secularity.” 
In England and the United States, a smooth reconciliation between the state and 
religion has occurred in the process of the formation of modernity.  
 
As an ideal example of a weak state tradition, the English form of secularization did 
not produce a radical secularist attitude towards religion. Unlike the case of France, 
“the Protestantism of England has prevented any massive confrontation of religion 
with secular radicalism.”(Martin, 1978: 123) The English secularists were not against 
religion; rather, their goal was the separation of the state and the “church.” They 
demanded to establish a national church, not to destroy the religious establishment.  
As the best example of the strong state tradition in the West, the French state has 
always been suspicious of religion. Secularism can be seen as the primary indicator 
of progress in the state-building process in France, marking the step-by-step 
separation of the state from all other social systems. (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 
 38 
 
110) It was not surprising that the Revolution took harsh measures against 
established religion and instituted legal secularization in a decisive manner. The 
numbers of the clergy were reduced, the religious orders were banished, and the 
church lands were taken under state control. Education was removed away from the 
control of the church. (Marty, 1969: 23) 
 
In short, two modes of secularism evolved from two different contexts and state 
traditions. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xv) The French model of secularism is 
antireligious and seeks to eliminate or control religion. The second model of 
secularism, evolved from the Anglo-American experience, seeks to protect religions 
from state intervention and encourages “faith-based social networking” to 
consolidate civil society. The first model sees the state as the agent of social change 
and the source of the “good” life, whereas the second treats the state with suspicion 
and sees civil society as the source of change and of the “good” life. 
 
In Turkey, then, the experience of secularism, is apparently not that which occured in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, where the state simply claimed no say on the issue of 
religion, which was increasingly being transferred to the realm of the “private.” The 
Turkish model is much closer to French “laicism,” in which religion is not separated 
from something called public life, but rather dominated by a state that considers itself 
to be founded on principles not grounded in a “religious” regime of power and 
knowledge. (Silverstein, 2003) It is not an accident that the picture in Turkey 
resembles to that of France, since both societies have similar state traditions. Because 
of the lack of peripheral feudal forces in its past, the state in Turkey is even stronger 
 39 
 
than that of France; thus, one comes across a more extreme form of secularism, 
which is all but absent in Western countries. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
OTTOMAN LEGACY 
 
 
 
 
There is a considerable literature about the Turkish nation-state’s link with its 
Ottoman past. (for instance, see Zürcher, 1993; Shaw and Shaw, 1977; Özbudun, 
1996) The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state 
tradition and a weak civil society, and the bureaucratic elite continued to conceive of 
the state as vital for holding together the community. (Heper, 1985: 16)  The creation 
of the new republic was involved addressing the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. 
The founders of the nation-state aimed to break away from the influence of its 
predecessor in many terms. Nevertheless, the early Turkish Republic can be better 
understood as a re-construction of existing religious and political legitimacy 
structures through the creation of a new nation-state. Thus, it is important for this 
study to elaborate what we should understand about the Turkish state tradition 
inherited from the Ottomans. 
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Devlet, the Turkish equivalent of the term “state,” linguistically refers to bliss, 
felicity and luck. Therefore, it is an old usage of the same word that people used in 
greeting others, saying “devletle, ikbal ile” (with bliss and fortune). It means God-
sent blessing (nimet), as well. (Banarlı, 1985: 9) The word devlet is used in the well-
known couplet of the Suleyman the Magnificient with two different meanings: 
Halk içinde muteber bir nesne yok devlet gibi 
Olmaya devlet cihanda bir nefes sıhhat gibi 2 
As Özbudun’s study clearly shows, the state has been considered as a sublime entity 
in both popular and official usage: 
The state is valued in its own right, is relatively autonomous from 
society, and plays a tutelary and paternalistic role. This paternalistic 
image is reflected in the popular expression devlet baba (father state). 
Another popular saying is Allah Devlete, Millete zeval vermesin (may 
God preserve the State and the Nation). Ottoman writings on politics and 
government are replete with such terms as Devlet-i Aliye (Sublime State), 
hikmet-i hükümet (raison d’etat), and Devletin ali menfaatleri (sublime 
interests of the State). Such notions readily found their place in the 
political discourse of the Turkish republic. Indeed, the preamble of the 
1982 Turkish constitution described the State (always with a capital S) as 
kutsal Türk Devleti (sacred), adding that no thoughts or opinions could 
find protection against “Turkish national interests”– presumably meaning 
state interests as defined by the state apparatus. (Özbudun, 2000: 128) 
 
Some scholars of Turkish history argue that the Turkish state tradition resembles the 
shepherd-flock metaphor. One of them, İsmet Bozdağ, explains that in the Turkish 
state tradition, the rulers have been considered as shepherds, and the ruled society as 
their flock. This understanding has to do with the responsibilities of the state, rather a 
humiliation of society. Without the flock, the existence of the shepherd is 
meaningless. The shepherd is responsible for the flock’s survival and maintenance. If 
something bad happens to the flock, the shepherd will be considered guilty and 
                                                 
2 Nothing is as worthy among people as the state 
   No blessing can be like a breath of health 
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removed from his position. If, on the other hand, the shepherd can protect his flock 
from possible dangers and provide the conditions the flock needs, he can continue in 
his position. (Taşar, ny) This metaphor is actually a good illustration of the state-
centered political culture of the Turkish society, where society is the submissive 
recipient and the state is the sole agent for development. 
 
“Within the Islamic community of peoples Turks have had a special State tradition 
from the time they entered and controlled the Islamic world in the eleventh century.” 
This tradition can be defined as “recognition of the state’s absolute right to legislate 
on public matters.” (İnalcık, 1980: 7) Although the Turks have adopted the Arabic 
word for the “state”, in practice, the Turkish devlet is different from the Arabic 
dawlah. Count Ostrorog (1927: 42 in Ozay, 1990: 69-70), the legal advisor to the last 
Ottoman Sultan, outlined the Arabic and Turkish understandings of the state some 
eighty years ago: 
The Arab mind remained inviolably faithful to the following 
fundamental conception [of legislation]: Legislative power belongs to the 
Calife; the Doctors of the Law, who interpret the Law, are the 
indispensable intermediaries between God and the Calife. The 
consequence of that conception was that no such thing as a Statue, an 
Edict, drafted in systematic legal shape and promulgated as binding, is to 
be found in the whole of Arab Mohammedan history. 
 
Not so with the Turks. The Turkish Hans professed to be, and certainly 
were, very good Moslems, but from the outset they asserted their right to 
enact regulations that were to be obeyed because they so willed, because 
at the top of the document they deigned to write in their purple Imperial 
ink: Mujebinje’amel oluna! Which I think may be adequately translated 
by, ‘Be it acted as enacted’ – or because they caused their sign-manual 
Tughra, figuring the impression of their open hand, to head the document 
as a mark of its Imperial origin. 
 
In a similar vein, the Ottoman state tradition is very different from the classical 
Islamic state tradition. According to Gerber (2002: 67-68), the Ottoman Empire 
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presents a new political reality, one that can be summarized as follows: First, the 
historical caliphate disappears, and the Ottoman sultan becomes the successor of the 
caliph. Second, the division between the actual and nominal ruler ceases to exist. The 
sultan is the real and nominal ruler, even at the nadir of the empire in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Third, political stability is sustained as never before in 
Islam, particularly since the late fifteenth century. There is not even a change of 
dynasty, no instance of power usurped by force, not one real break in the orderly 
succession of rulers. All this is “unprecedented in Islam”, and extremely unusual in 
world history. Fourth, with the division between ulama and ruler completely gone, 
the Ottoman state is, on the whole, highly legitimate. There are no known ideological 
attacks on its validity, whether by ulama or by other intellectuals; no governor of any 
province is known to have ever attempted formal separation from the empire. In fact, 
“as remarkable as the low level of legitimation of the late classical Islamic state is the 
high level of legitimacy of the Ottoman state, even in its latter days.” Lastly, the 
Ottoman Empire never saw itself, or depicted itself to others, as just another state, 
certainly not as just another Turkish state (dawla turkiyya). (Haarman, 1988, in 
Gerber, 2002) On the contrary, it was to a certain extent a rebuilding of the polity of 
the rightly guided caliphs, inasmuch as Islam never again geographically spread its 
message at such high speed as under the Ottomans. Even in relative decline, the 
Ottoman Empire stood as the only safeguard against the infidels. In other words, the 
Ottoman Empire was unique in Islam in being throughout its history “the cutting 
edge” between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb. This role was naturally an 
extremely potent factor in its legitimation. Gerber describes the Ottoman state as a 
novel model: “the non-caliphal, religiously relevant state.” 
 44 
 
3.1 The Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Character of the 
Ottoman State 
 
According to Kazancıgil (1991: 349), the strong and centralized Ottoman state 
tradition was relatively unique among Islamic societies. Although the Ottoman state 
had a strong religious dimension, the legal role of Islam was often moderated by the 
state’s pragmatic concerns. (Gerber, 1994: 76) Notions of the political and the 
religious were both ultimately derived from and closely connected to the state.  
 
The Ottoman state, as one of the most enduring multi-religious and multi-ethnic 
empires, survived for half a millennium. The Ottomans tried to establish an immortal 
state which they called Devlet-i Aliye-i Ebed-Müddet (Eternal Sublime State). The 
state was the center of the polity and the source of justice as the famous Ottoman 
maxim (circle of justice) expressed by Naima: a ruler could have “no power without 
soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, 
and no popular well-being without justice.” (İnalcık, 1964: 43)  
 
According to Tursun Beg, a well-known Ottoman statesmen and historian of the late 
fifteenth century, “harmony among men living in a society” could be achieved only 
by statecraft. Every society should have one ruler with absolute power, and the 
authority to issue non-religious laws. The ruler should, at the same time, preserve the 
social order and ensure justice. These ideas constituted the political philosophy of the 
Ottoman state. The Ottomans maintained the traditional view that everyone should 
be kept in his appropriate place. (İnalcık, 1964: 3-4) Thus, there existed clear 
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boundaries between the center and the periphery. According to Halil İnalcık (1964: 
5) Ottoman society was divided into two groups: 1) the askeriya, such as officers of 
the court, army, civil servants and ulama, to whom the Sultan delegated the religious 
and executive power, 2) the reaya, consisting of all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects 
who paid taxes but were excluded from administrative positions. 
 
Again according to İnalcık (2000: 65-76), the Ottoman state tradition had two roots: 
the Central Asian and the Sassanid. Summarizing his findings, we may say that the 
Ottomans derived from their Central Asian roots the belief that the state existed 
through the maintenance of törü or yasa – a code of laws laid down directly by the 
ruler. In doing so, the Sultans from very early on unified political with legislative 
power. Similarly, the Ottomans and the Seljuks inherited from the Sassanids a 
political understanding that equated the state with the absolute authority of the 
sovereign and his maintenance of justice. The fairness of the government therefore 
ultimately depended on the sovereign’s ethical qualities. 
 
These Central Asian and Sassanid legacies, İnalcık argues, played an important role 
in the development of an Ottoman tradition of absolutism based on sultanic order, 
which often went beyond what Islamic law allowed. Accordingly, in the classical 
institutional structure of the Empire, the absolute nature of Ottoman political power 
was evidenced by the extent to which all civilian, military and religious officials 
depended directly on the Sultan. The state’s ownership of the land and the presence 
of a centralized system of taxation were additional dimensions of Ottoman 
absolutism. Such a political and economic framework of centralist absolutism was 
designed essentially to hinder the development of peripheral feudal structures. 
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The Ottomans eliminated any potential alternative economic or political center of 
power. The accumulation of wealth could not pave the way to democracy, as it did in 
the West. As Özbudun (2000: 126) aptly states, the relationship between the 
economic and political powers in the Ottoman Empire was the opposite of that in 
western Europe: i.e., rather than economic power leading to political power, political 
power provided access to wealth. The accumulated wealth could not be transformed 
into private property, and it remained liable to be taken away by the state. The 
Ottomans never favored the development of a powerful merchant class. Sipahis (the 
fiefholders) and ayans were the nominal landowners, but ultimate ownership of the 
lands was still in the hands of the state. The sipahis were not land-based aristocracy, 
and their titles could be removed by the state. The ayans, on the other hand, lacked 
the political legitimacy of an aristocracy, in the sense of the feudal aristocracy in 
Western Europe. The local notables, who emerged during the later centuries, on the 
other hand, remained “local” in the real sense. In addition, because the Ottomans 
were constantly threatened by powerful Turcoman ghazis (warriors), they also 
pushed those warriors to the periphery so as to keep everyone in their place. (Heper, 
1985: 15) In short, no important threat to the power of the state elites existed. The 
Kemalist elite would later benefit from this situation.  
 
Keyder (1997) underlines the fact that because of “the absence of large landlords” 
and “the relative independence of the bureaucracy”, the Republican revolutionists did 
not face strong opposition in the early Republican period. In the absence of a strong 
landlord class that might have demanded economic liberalism and civil and political 
rights for its narrow constituency, no group in society found it possible to challenge 
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the absolutism of the state. In terms of political functioning, the polity of the 
Ottomans was “patrimonialism,” while the case in England was “centralized 
feudalism” in its past, and the French one, “decentralized feudalism”. “Whereas in 
both centralized and decentralized feudalism central authority is effectively checked 
by countervailing powers, in patrimonialism the periphery is almost totally subdued 
by the centre.” (Heper, 1985: 14) 
 
Sunar (1974: 4) portrays the patrimonial character of the Ottoman Empire by a 
quotation from Machievelli’s The Prince (1950: 15-16): 
Examples of these kinds of government in our time are those of the Turk 
and the King of France. All the Turkish monarchy is governed by one 
ruler, the others are his servants, dividing his kingdom into 
“sangiacates”, he sends to them various administrators, and changes 
them or recalls them at his pleasure. But the King of France is 
surrounded by a large number of nobles, recognized as such by their 
subjects, and loved by them; they have their prerogatives, of which the 
king cannot deprive them without danger to himself. 
 
Machiavelli admired the Ottoman paradigm of order particularly for its strength and 
durability. Political authority so penetrated the social sphere of life so that society 
was considered as being under the state, and the ruler closely controlled economic 
life. (Sunar, 1974: 5-6) The quoted passage points out that the sultan ruled through a 
body of officials having the legal status of household slaves. Taken from the 
adolescent children of Christian families and trained either by some Muslim families 
or within the sultan's palace, they had no substatially independent social identities or 
loyalties. The ministers of the Ottoman sultan, "being all slaves and bondsmen," 
were loyal and obedient servants of their master, but lacking any connection to the 
subject population, they could not "carry the people with them." The actual Ottoman 
slave official (kul), a product of specific measures of recruitment and training, took 
his place in a centralized bureaucracy. (For a detailed analysis see Meeker, 2002.) 
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These slave officials (kul) were unchallenged by any system of estates. There was no 
aristocracy ruling its own people and territory, and no bourgeoisie granted the 
privilege of governing its own cities. The sultan possessed a sovereign power, which 
any other monarch in early modern Europe never had.  
 
Regarding the Oriental empires, Weber saw one line of political/bureaucratic 
development as theoretically moving toward patrimonial bureaucracy, which might, 
in turn, reach an extreme form in “sultanism”: “With the development of a purely 
personal administrative staff, especially a military force under the control of the 
chief, traditional authority tends to develop into patrimonialism”. Where absolute 
authority is maximized, it may be called “sultanism.” (Brown, 2000: 65) Although 
this part of the thesis tries to depict the patrimonial character of the Empire, one 
should also realize that the issue is not as simple as Weber’s concept of “sultanism”. 
An article by Halil İnalcık (1993: 16) states that while official Ottoman discourse 
depicted the sultan as above any law and authority, the reality was much more 
complicated. The masses possessed means to influence the sultan ─for example, by 
deserting villages─ and the government could not ignore such possibilities. In 
contrast to the theory that nothing restricted the sultan stands the claim that the sultan 
was in fact severely restricted by the concept of adalet, justice. In addition, the 
Islamic concept of hisba functioned as a social contract between the ruler and the 
ruled in order to assure the welfare of society. (İnalcık, 1993: 9-18) 3 
 
In addition to its centralized nature, the Ottoman Empire was a truly bureaucratic 
state as well. This characteristic is especially important in terms of the secularization 
                                                 
3 Vienna Şikayet Defteri, a book containing some 2500 complaints, all relating to the year 1675, sent 
by citizens from all over the empire to the sultan about wrongs committed primarily by officials, is a 
good example of the extension of the phenomenon of justice. (see Gerber, 2002: 79) 
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reforms during the Turkish Republic. For instance, Mardin (1997: 192) claims that 
Atatürk’s secularization reforms had two antecedents in the Ottoman experience, 
which influenced his opinions as to the functions of religion in society and the 
methods, which he used to implement his ideas into policy. The first was the 
“empiricism of Ottoman secular officialdom”, and the latter was legislation as the 
sole means of secularizing the country. In order to understand the former, one should 
look at the adab tradition.  
 
On the basis of principles like ‘necessity’ and ‘reason’, as well as the norms of 
rationality, the Ottoman centre created a new viewpoint for the ruling elite. It was 
called adab; this was “a secular and state-oriented tradition” which “developed as a 
consequence of efforts ‘to identify the state with established values’.” (Heper, 1985: 
25) The adab tradition was a kind of “organizational socialization” based upon a 
formulation of “a particular outlook that provided ideals and values for the ruling 
strata” and “developed as a consequence of efforts to identify the state with 
established values”. It was so pervasive that from the seventeenth century on, the 
sultans lost their primacy, which was now attributed to the state itself. “The sultans 
could be now deposed in the name of the state.” (Heper, 1981: 347) Heper (1985: 25) 
further argues that this institutionalization of the state around certain norms (adab) 
resembles the state institutionalization of France in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century around such values as order, hierarchy, secularism and solidarism. 
 
Mardin (1997: 194-197) describes the “bureaucratic style” of the Ottoman 
government as “hard-headed, empirically minded and pragmatic” as a result of their 
training, which was different from that of the ulama. The ulama were trained in a 
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specific curriculum in schools known as medrese, the graduates of which were 
expected to be scholars in one of the religious fields. They were very adept at finding 
religious justification for many activities, like the charging of interest, that were 
literally prohibited in the Koran. However, they still had some idealism in their 
thinking. The bureaucrats, on the other hand, were sent to government bureaus after 
their elementary education. Consequently, their perspective was shaped by the power 
struggles of the real world. All of the Westernizing developments of the later 
Ottoman period were the result of typical mentality of this secular Ottoman 
bureaucracy: their desire to restore the state’s power and pragmatism, in the sense 
that if western institutions could strengthen the empire, they should be adopted. 
These bureaucrats, having usually come from the Ottoman recruitment system 
(devşirme), had no ties with any interest group. As slaves of the state, they struggled 
for the existence and supremacy of the state. This motivation caused them to 
approach other values in a pragmatic way. The next chapter will show that the 
founders of the new republic were of the same mentality. 
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3.2 State vs. Religion  
 
Religion was not an alternative force to the empire’s strong central administration. A 
considerable number of scholars think that it is difficult to consider the Ottoman state 
to have been a theocratic system because the laws of secular authorities, rather than 
religious instructions, dominated the system in the political and social contexts. 
(Ortaylı, 1986: 162) The Ottoman state was sovereign vis-à-vis Islam. One cannot 
deny that the aim of the state was to realize the ideals of Islam. In addition, religion in 
the Ottoman Empire linked the popular structures with the ruling institution, assuring 
the state’s legitimacy. It was also as the sole source of social control the core of the 
socialization process. (Mardin, 1971: 205-206) However, while Islam was definitive 
in private matters, it was inadequate in terms of public policies. (Heper, 1985: 27) 
Islamic rule does not recognize corporate identities. The Ottoman religious class was 
not a corporate body, but dependent on the state for its appointments, promotions, and 
salaries. (Özbudun, 2000: 127) The members of the religious institutions were 
appointed and removed by the Sultan. “The Şeyhülislam had no right to interfere 
directly in the government or in legal administration.”  (Heper, 1985: 27)  In addition, 
the Ottomans, following the earlier Turkic-Iranian tradition, could take measures that 
conflicted with the sacred law, if the public interest required it. Heper argues that the 
Ottomans incorporated “the early Turkic idea of a supreme law (yasa/yasak) that the 
ruler had to enforce with justice regardless of his personal wishes”. As a derivative of 
yasa, the Sultans developed örf-i sultani, which refers to the will and command of the 
sultan as a secular ruler. (Heper, 1985: 24-25)  
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In this respect, the Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a long-
standing tradition of raison d’etat, which often emphasized state hegemony over 
religion. In the Ottoman context, such political supremacy over the religious realm 
was achieved through the incorporation of the Islamic establishment into the 
administrative apparatus of the empire. In apparent continuity with Ottoman patterns, 
secularism in modern Turkey did not attempt to separate state and religion. Instead, 
the Republican regime maintained tight control over the religious establishment by 
monopolizing Islamic functions and incorporating the religious personnel into the 
state bureaucracy. Analyzing this historical continuity will therefore greatly improve 
our understanding of Turkish laicism, as well. 
 
Throughout Islamic history, state control over the Muslim religious establishment 
became so pervasive that the ulama virtually became an arm of government. (Brown, 
2000: 35) In comparison to other Muslim states, ulama were more clearly integrated 
into the state apparatus in the Ottoman Empire. Considering their control over the 
educational, judicial and administrative network, one can conclude that they acted as 
agents of the state and ensured the state’s control of social life. “Ottoman 
government was therefore both ‘Islamic' and ‘bureaucratic’.” (Mardin, 1997: 194)  
 
While the Ottomans may have sought to give a religious appearance to their policies 
and actions, in reality they exercised their power over different ethnicities and 
religions in rather secular ways. Their policies and actions, in short, largely 
responded to political, economic, and social necessities. “Here perhaps lies the secret 
of the longevity of an empire that privileged the political over the religious factor in 
its pre-modern forms.” (Nalbantoğlu, 1993: 355) Mardin (1983: 138-140) describes 
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this attitude by saying that the raison d’etat in the empire was the foundation of 
political practice, and that the Ottoman state always had primacy in the well-known 
formula of din-u devlet (din wa dawlah). 
 
Religion, in the centralized political and economic context of the Ottoman Empire 
served to legitimize state power. Indeed, starting with its backing by the majority of 
the Turkic tribes in Central Asia, Islam came to play an important role in the 
consolidation of central authority. Most importantly, the new religion brought with it 
means of sociopolitical control and a belief system that proved more appropriate than 
the mystical and “esoteric” world of shamanism for the functioning of patrimonial 
kingdoms. As a result, Turkish states like the Seljuk strongly encouraged conversion 
to Islam throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries and began to defend its core 
values. (Taşpınar, 2002: 11) 
 
In addition, the new religion’s devotion to gaza – the ideology of holy war in the 
name of Islam─ well suited the “nomadic” and “combative” culture of Turkic 
principalities bordering the Byzantine Empire. During the centuries that followed the 
Seljuk defeat of the Byzantine army in 1071, the religious motivation of gaza 
motivated Turkmen tribes, including the Ottomans, to conquer the Christian lands of 
Asia Minor. It is therefore important to note that conversion to Islam ─beyond the 
undeniable religious convictions involved─ had a functional dimension aimed at 
territorial expansion and stabilization of political authority. (Taşpınar, 2002: 11-12) 
 
Since Islamic values took root in Ottoman society, the Shari’ah emerged as a sort of 
“social contract” between the state and its Muslim population. In that sense, an 
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Islamic moral and legal framework came to play an important role in supporting the 
patriarchal machinery of the state. Yet, the founding dynasty remained reluctant to 
let Islam determine the political and legal limits of state power. Given the mobilizing 
power of religion, even the ulama ─the guardians of Islamic law─ could become 
suspect in the eyes of Ottoman rulers. With such a cautious frame of mind, the 
Ottoman answer to all potential threats coming from Anatolian society was to 
establish bureaucratic control over the religious establishment. In that sense, the 
Ottoman sultans considered their patrimonial authority over the guardians of Islamic 
orthodoxy as a natural extension of state supremacy. In this framework, the members 
of the religious institutions were appointed and removed by the Sultan. (Heper, 1985: 
27)  
 
The characteristic features of the mutually beneficial relationship between the ulama 
and the state involved integration and subordination. “High” and “proper” Islam, 
represented by the Şeyhülislam at the top of the ulama hierarchy, was incorporated 
into the state apparatus. The livelihood and office of the Şeyhülislam, like those of 
the rest of the religious class, were granted by the state, and the Sultan determined 
the path he traveled in his career. The Şeyhülislam, as the supreme religious official 
and head of judicial system, sat on the Imperial Council. However, despite his high 
position within the state hierarchy, he could, like all government officials, be easily 
dismissed during any serious conflict with the Sultan. For instance, Özek (1962: 42 
in Taşpınar, 2002: 15) gives the case of a Şeyhülislam, who in 1702 tried to obtain 
for himself the position of Grand Vizier and paid for his presumption with his life. 
Another example comes from İnalcık (1964: 43-44), telling how “once, when 
Şeyhülislam Ali Cemali Efendi came over the seat of the government to protest a 
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decision of Sultan Selim I, which he thought contrary to the Shari’ah, the Sultan 
denounced him as interfering in state affairs.” The Şeyhülislam, hence, had no right 
to interfere directly in the governmental affairs. 
 
In the eyes of the religious establishment, the legitimacy of the state came from its 
ability to protect the Islamic realm. Therefore, endangering the state, by definition, 
made a movement heretical. In this political framework, the religious class could 
very rarely object to the secular laws related to the administrative functions of the 
state. Ultimate authority and sovereignty rested with Ottoman palace officials and 
with the Sultan himself. As Mardin (1991: 116) argues, 
Trained in the religious seminary (the medrese), the ulama had to endure 
a period of practical apprenticeship to assuage their shock as they 
discovered that the rule of Muslim law did not discover all cases brought 
before them, and that there existed an Ottoman reason of state which 
operated independently of Islamic values. 
 
 
The Ottoman raison d’etat was in historical continuity with the previously mentioned 
Central Asian-Turkic precepts of Yasa. Accordingly, the Sultan could make 
regulations and enact laws entirely on his own initiative. These laws, independent of 
the Shari’ah and known as Kanun or Örf-i Sultani, as mentioned previously, were 
based on rational rather than religious principles and were enacted primarily in the 
spheres of public, administrative and criminal law as well as state finance. (Berkes, 
1998: 185) Secular lawmaking by the rulers was based on the Islamic conception of 
Urf. “This theory stated that where the Shari’ah did not provide a solution to existing 
problems, the measuring rods of ‘necessity’ and ‘reason’ could be used to enact 
regulations with force of law”. (Mardin, 1962: 102) Moreover, in practice, one can 
observe some Kanuns contrary to the Shari’ah. For instance, while in Islamic law, 
punishment of adultery for a married person was death by stoning (recm), in the 
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Ottoman Kanuns, adulterers were charged to pay “according to their means─ three 
hundred akces [Ottoman lira] for the middle-income group, and one hundred akces 
for the poor. For illegal sexual relations, unmarried persons were fired one hundred, 
fifty, forty, or thirty akces, according to their means.” (İnalcık, 1973: 74) 
 
Given the supremacy of the state over the religious realm, it is not hard to imagine 
the Ottoman Şeyhulislam and other members of ulama being involved in the 
intellectual exercise of fitting the Kanun within the proper Islamic framework. 
Türköne (2003: 182) exemplifies this with a case from Ottoman history that 
concerned putting a stamp on promissory notes. When the Spanish ambassador 
somehow saw a contradiction in terms of religious concerns, the Reisül-küttab of 
Selim III, Ebubekir Ratıp Efendi, replied to this objection by stating that every 
benefit can be justified in religious terms. (Her maslahatın vech-i şer’isi bittaharri 
bulunabilir) As another example, in summarizing the position of Ebu Suud Efendi, 
an Ottoman Şeyhulislam, Mandaville (1979: 298 in Gerber,2002: 73) says: “What 
appears is an appeal to continued popular usage (ta’amul and ta’aruf), to the welfare 
of the people (istihsan), and to both throughout with a tone of ‘Let’s be practical,’ an 
appeal to commonsense.” What these words meant in real terms is made clearer in 
the detailed letter of a Sufi sheikh to the sultan: “God’s legislation has no other 
purpose than to ease the way of His servants through the exigencies of the time… 
One uses inadmissibility at times because it is better for the people of that time, at 
other times one does the opposite.” He further cites an opinion that says: “Be guided 
by whatever is more harmonious with how the people are living, what is kinder, 
better for them.” (Mandaville, 1979: 302-303 in Gerber, 2002:73) 
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What partly facilitated the Ottomans’ being able to maintain the state’s supremacy 
and open a secular space in which to legislate, was the nature of the religion they 
adopted. Ottomans were Sunni, a sect within Islam that allows enough room for new 
judgments in accordance with new necessities. Moreover, in the Sunni tradition, 
administration is not a primary (aslî) issue, but rather a secondary (talî) concern. The 
Shia tradition, on the other hand, takes the issue of imamet as being of primary 
importance. (Türköne, 2003: 253) Additionally, in the Sunni understanding, the 
existence of the state is more important rather than its quality. For instance, 
Mawardi, a distinguished Islamic scholar of the eleventh century, claimed that if 
someone takes political power through coercion and violence, one should evaluate 
his subsequent behavior. If he acts within the scope of religious rules and of justice, 
his acts can be approved for the sake of preventing divisions and chaos within the 
umma. (Türköne, 2003: 256) This approach enabled Muslim rulers to act according 
to their own will.  
 
In this framework, orthodox Islam had only narrow opportunities to develop into a 
source of opposition. As a result, in contrast to what was going on in western Europe, 
there was no Ottoman equivalent of the confrontational relations between state and 
church. The Ottomans succeeded in creating a strong state where power was 
centralized in the hands of the Sultan and a group of officials entirely loyal to him. 
 
On the basis of these findings, as Heper (1981: 348) states, in the Ottoman Empire 
“there was little need for `institutional secularization as disengagement’, or change 
from ecclesiastical control to public administration, because the state as a distinct 
entity, with ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’, and supporting resources, always existed.” 
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Even in the sixteenth century, at the height of Islamic influence, the Empire was not a 
real theocracy.  
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3.3 The Impact of Modernization 
 
The Westernization reforms are the most lingering example of the Ottoman legacy 
because Kemalism was “an intensification of this earlier modernization trend.” It was 
not “an alien model imported from the West”, but a result of historical processes that 
occurred through the Empire’s interactions with Europe. (Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 
1997: 3) Obviously, the Kemalist Republic is much different from the Ottoman 
Empire. However, Atatürk and his friends did not directly import their ideas from the 
West; rather, they used the intellectual treasury accumulated by Ottoman reformers 
up to that time. Furthermore, “Kemalism constituted a continuum with the Tanzimat, 
Young Ottomans and Young Turks, insofar as its major concern was the state, 
considered as the unique mediating mechanism and source of legitimacy in the 
society, prevailing over market relations.” (Kazancıgil, 1997: 37, 48) In the Turkish 
Republic, the bureaucratic elite continued to conceive of the state as being vital to 
hold the community together. (Heper, 1985: 16) 
 
When analyzing the impact of the Westernization process during the Ottoman period 
on political developments in the Republic, one should keep in mind the specific 
features pointed out below. Differently from other countries of the so-called third 
world, Turkey initiated the modernization process under its own state apparatus. The 
Turkish modernization process is different in some ways from its precursors.  One of 
its distinct features is that the administrative elite took “the survival of the state” as 
its primary concern throughout the modernization process. In the interaction between 
the public and the ruling elite, the priority of the state has remained a common space, 
as in the old traditions. The second point appears a logical consequence of the first 
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one. Modernization efforts occurred in order to strengthen the state and making it 
compatible with the West, or at least to enable it to survive. The sovereignty of the 
state would be preserved through the modernization of society; therefore, 
modernization has been perceived as the concern of the state. Such a perception 
explains why modernization projects have been planned by the state and 
implemented in a top-down manner. Throughout Ottoman history, each initiative was 
handled by the state. Moreover, contrary to developments in the Western Europe, 
there were no classes that would be able to resist on the basis of their interests. 
(Ahmad, 1986: 34) The reforms were discussed and implemented only by the 
military-bureaucratic elite, who did not feel the need to expand their ideas into the 
broader society. In addition, modernization was perceived by Ottoman intellectuals 
as Westernization. Beyond that, throughout the nineteenth century, what they meant 
when talking about the West was in fact only France. This is one reason of why 
Turkish secularization resembles the French case so much. They were so eager to 
imitate France that, as Türköne (2003: 23) relates, after “civilization” entered into 
“Dictionaire de I’Academie Française” in its present meaning, the Ottoman elite 
invented the equivalent “medeniyet” only two years later.  
 
The realization that the West was superior to the Ottomans dawned first during wars, 
and gradually this opinion was applied beyond the military matters to the social life. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans were well aware that they had 
begun to lose battles, mainly against the Austrians and Russians, which they used to 
win. The situation as it presented itself to the Ottomans was essentially this: "Given 
that it is a fact that we are in possession of the true faith, why are we losing wars to 
infidels?” (Silverstein, 2003) The question was considered to be essentially a 
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technical one involving expertise and equipment, and the eventual strategy was the 
well-known reorganization of the military beginning with Selim III's Nizam-i Jedid 
in the late eigtheenth century. Selim III (1789-1807) has been regarded as initiator of 
Westernization in the Empire; however, his reforms aimed only to restore military 
power. “Despite his personal conservatism, Selim III created in Ottoman society a 
trend toward Westernization and a sense of the necessity for rapid and progressive 
change.” (İnalcık, 1964: 10-11) The reforms continued under the Tanzimat after 
Mahmud II's destruction of the Janissary corps in 1826. (For a classical treatment, 
see Berkes, 1964) The importance of the reforms initiated by Mahmud II should not 
be underemphasized. Under his rule, there came about 
the emergence of the idea of an Ottoman state, composed of peoples of 
diverse nationalities and religions, based on secular principles of 
sovereignty as contrasted with the medieval concept of an Islamic empire. 
The real beginning of modernization and secularization was in this 
charge. (Berkes, 1964: 90)  
 
Mahmud II (1808-1839) increased the pace of the Westernization reforms, and 
removed the Janissary corps and put a modern army in its place. During his reign, the 
Sened-i İttifak (Covenant of Union) was signed in 1808 to settle the conflict between 
the center and the ayans, the local notables. Like Magna Carta, it limited the Sultan’s 
power to some extent, but to be sure, it was not a preparation for a liberal democracy.  
The ayans were later suppressed brutally. It should be, however, noted that the state 
but not the sultan himself was regarded as party to the agreement. He soon restored 
the state’s power. (İnalcık, 1964: 12-14) 
 
It is important to recognize that the incorporation of modern techniques into the 
Ottoman administration did not take place as a result of colonialism, but rather as 
sovereign state reform on the part of a Muslim polity. Moreover, this process did not 
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appear to have been experienced by the Ottomans as a capitulation to the enemy's 
“cultural imperialism” even in later periods, as Keyder (1993:22) has pointed out: 
"Unlike other nationalists of the Third World, the Ottomans did not feel particularly 
resentful toward the West." Nevertheless, one should note that all of the 
developments were the efforts around the typical goal of the secular Ottoman 
bureaucracy: the restoration of the state’s power.  (Mardin, 1997: 197) If Western 
institutions could strengthen the empire, they would be adopted. What was new in 
this adoption of the techniques  of modern disciplines was the relative authority and 
prestige accorded to this knowledge. Silverstein (2003) argues that this is the origin 
of the arrangements that later was called secularism in Turkey,  and which in the 
Turkish context does not so much represent the separation of religion from 
something called public life, but refers in practice primarily to institutional issues of 
“how much power is to be accorded to those whose authority derives from their 
knowledge of the Islamic tradition”. The question, as it posed itself to the Ottomans 
and to the early Republican generations who had just fought three wars over the 
course of little more than a decade for their own survival, was not a philosophical 
one, nor was it an identity issue.  (For a detailed discussion see Silverstein, 2003 and 
Türköne, 2003.) 
 
In a similar vein, the conditions, which moved the Ottoman ruling elite to enact the 
Tanzimat Decree, represented as the main turning point for Westernization, were, in 
general, security concerns. The Ottoman statesmen believed that in order to stop the 
Egyptian armies, which had come as far as Kütahya, they had to modernize the 
country. Modernization was for them, first of all, a security issue. (Türköne, 2003: 
72) Accordingly, after the defeat of the armies of Mahmud II by Ali Pasha of Egypt 
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in 1838 and 1839, a new generation of reformers emerged “to save the state from 
total destruction”. (Heper, 1985: 25) The reformers were mostly from the 
bureaucracy whose members were trained within the kul system. The Tanzimat 
reform period (1839-1876), which was based on Sultan Mahmud II’s (1808-1839) 
reforms, was initiated with the Gülhane Imperial Edict of 1839 through the efforts of 
those bureaucrats. Some important changes were launched within the administrative, 
military, legal and education systems. (Özdalga, 1998: 7) “Equality before the law 
and the securing of life, honor, and property for all subjects were the revolutionary 
ideas in the rescript.” (İnalcık, 1964: 19) In fact, Tanzimat reformers wanted to 
westernize the administration, while preserving the traditional institutions like 
Shari’ah. Later, radical Westernists would blame the reformers of the Tanzimat 
period for this “dualism.” (İnalcık, 1964: 224) 
 
The last century of the Empire witnessed the rise of, basically, three ideological 
orientations that influenced the political framework of the Empire during some 
periods of this time: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism. In order not 
to overstep the framework of the subject at hand, only one aspect will be highlighted; 
which is that although these three appear as totally different ideologies, they 
coincided in their target: they all aimed to save the state. The destruction of the old 
state was never an option. The primacy of the state remained even during this shaky 
era. (see Türköne, 2003) 
 
The modernization process was going on in the hands of the changing elites in power 
who ascribed these different ideologies. The First Constitutional Period (1876- 1878) 
was important but only a “short-lived exception.” Following the Young Turk 
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Revolution in 1908, the Second Constitutional Period was initiated. In 1913, the 
Committee of Union and Progress (the Young Turks) staged another coup d’état one 
year after being removed from power. (Özdalga, 1998: 8) Not surprisingly, the 
administrative elites who were instrumental in the establishment of this Republic had 
been born and launched their careers in the late Ottoman environment, i.e. during the 
reign of Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) and, especially, the subsequent Young Turk 
regimes of the Committee of Union and Progress (1908-1918). (Silverstein, 2003) The 
Young Turks deserve special attention, since they were the precedents of the 
Republican elite in terms of ideology. 
 
The major characteristics of the nationalist Young Turks, who were trained in secular 
schools, were: a) absolute faith in positivism as a guide to polity and society; b) 
determination to create a modern society to consolidate the power of the state; and c) a 
passion for elite rule. Owing to these three characteristics- positivism, statism, and 
elitism- the Young Turks were neither liberal nor democratic. They were indeed 
strong Westernists. According to Abdullah Cevdet, one of the pioneering intellectuals 
of the Young Turks, “there is no second civilization; civilization means European 
civilization, and it must be imported with both its roses and its thorns”. (Lewis, 1968: 
236 in Özdalga, 1998: 9)  
 
In addition, like the former ones, the political elites of the Young Turks saw 
themselves as the basic force to change the Empire, and the Ottoman-Turkish society 
as a project. The people could be only the objects of this project. (Kasaba, 1997: 24) 
Although they stressed the significance of the parliamentary system and 
constitutionalism as a way of coping with ethnic challenges in the Balkans, their first 
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and foremost goal was to protect and consolidate the power of the Ottoman state. 
Even the attempts to create “Ottoman citizenship” were aimed at expanding the 
social basis of the Ottoman state. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xx) The oft-quoted 
dictum “How can the state be saved?” belongs to the Young Turks. “It is no 
exaggeration to say that for them, constitution and parliament were a means to 
further the modernization process by making the subjects into stakeholding citizens, 
rather than an end in themselves.” (Atabaki and Zürcher, 2004: 3) Their commitment 
to the parliamentarism is not for the sake of freedom, but it represents their aim to 
strengthen the state. (Köker, 2004: 130) “As a result, the legacies of an authoritarian 
state structure and a new administrative military-civilian bureaucratic style 
punctuated the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.” (Yavuz and Esposito, 
2003: xx) 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE TURKISH NATION  
UNDER “CONSTRUCTION” 
TOWARD A SECULAR COUNTRY 
 
 
 
“The irony of history is that for centuries the Turks, who symbolized  
Muslim and barbarian -the ‘other’ for Europeans-  
now tried to enter the circle of the ‘civilized.’  
And, even more ironically, they have had to reinvent their own ‘barbarians,’ 
 those who are considered an obstacle to civilization 
who were first the Muslims and today the Kurds.” 
 (Göle, 1996b: 23) 
 
 
Kemalist reforms were a consequence of the Westernization process that started early 
in the Tanzimat period, and they did not envisage a totally “alien model imported 
from the West.” (Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 1997: 3) As Kazancıgil (1997: 48) also 
points out, Kemalism displays strong continuity with the modernization process after 
the Tanzimat period since it too was centered around the state, which was considered 
as the sole agent of political activity and the only source of legitimacy.  
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In terms of illustrating the continuity in the concept of modernization between the 
Ottoman past and the new Republic, Abdullah Cevdet’s article entitled “A Very 
Wakeful Sleep”, written in 1911, is a remarkable example. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-
1932), one of the forerunners of Westernism and of the founders of the Committee of 
Union and Progress, and an Ottoman medical doctor of Kurdish origin, envisaged a 
“dreamland” which would later be realized by Atatürk and his followers: 
… the fez would be abolished, and a new head-gear adopted; existing 
cloth factories would be expanded, and new ones opened,  and the 
Sultan, princes, senators, deputies, officers, officials, and soldiers made 
to wear their products; women would dress as they pleased, though not 
extravagantly, and would be free from dictation of interference in this 
matter by ulema, policemen, or street riff-raff; they would be at liberty to 
choose their husbands, and the practice of match-making would be 
abolished; convents and tekkes [dervish lodges] would be closed, and 
their revenues added to the education budget, all medreses would be 
closed, and new modern literary and technical institutes established; the 
turban, cloak &c., would be limited to certificated professional men of 
religion, and forbidden to others; vows and offerings to the saints would 
be prohibited, and the money saved devoted to national defence; 
exorcists, witch-doctors, and the like would be suppressed, and medical 
treatment for malaria made compulsory; popular misconceptions of Islam 
would be corrected; practical adult education schools would be opened; a 
consolidation and purified Ottoman Turkish dictionary and grammar 
would be established by a committee of philosophers and men of letters; 
the Ottomans, without awaiting anything from their government or from 
foreigners would, by their own efforts and initiative, build roads, bridges, 
ports, railways, canals, steamships, and factories; starting with the land 
and Evkaf [religious foundations] laws, the whole legal system would be 
reformed. (Lewis, 1968: 236 in Özdalga, 1998: 5-6) 
 
His dream would become real less than fifteen years later. This example 
demonstrates that we cannot assume a Kemalist revolution putting the Ottoman past 
aside. The new regime was established upon the Ottoman intellectual heritage. 
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4.1 Secularization: A Sine Qua Non for the Republic 
 
Having left the War of Independence (1919-1922) successfully behind, the 
Westernist elite put into motion the steps to transform Turkey into a modern and 
secular nation-state. Unsurprisingly, the Kemalist principle of nationalism was 
contrary to Islam’s universalistic conception of umma, the Muslim community. 
Atatürk wanted to establish a new state upon the ruins of the collapsed empire and a 
new culture in place of the old one that could not renew itself. (Timur, 1968: 9) 
Following the foundation of the new Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal initiated a 
series of reforms to build a homogeneous nation-state through eliminating ethnic and 
religious identities under the guidance of a state-determined Turkish nationalism. 
These reforms, known as Kemalism, sought to control religion, as well, to create a 
new order. 
 
The Kemalist republic was born under peculiar historical circumstances.  It was 
established over a “multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire”. 
Therefore, the new elite assumed that national consciousness could be achieved by 
erasing the Ottoman past. The revolution, which drew much inspiration from the 
French model of secularization, adopted a strict secularism and the concept of a 
centralized nation-state in which citizenship is based on the rights of the individual 
rather than on any ethnic or religious identity. (Rouleau, 1996: 70) Secular 
citizenship was intended to create a homogenous nation committed to modernity. For 
this purpose, it was necessary to meld the various ethnic and religious differences 
into a national identity, through violence and suppression if need be. The Kemalist 
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republic tried to establish national unity by imposing a Latinized Turkish alphabet 
and promoting a new culture cut off from the Ottoman past.  
 
In the Fourth Congress of the People’s Republican Party in 1935, Mustafa Kemal 
codified his ideas and goals as “Kemalism,” which consisted of six “eclectic” 
principles to guide the party and the state: nationalism, secularism, republicanism, 
statism, reformism, and populism. The Kemalist doctrine was informed by the 
dominant European authoritarian ideologies of the 1930s and perceived 
modernization as Westernization. In practice, Kemalism became the ideology and 
practice of eliminating class, ethnic, and religious sources of conflict by seeking to 
create a classless, national, and secular homogenized society. Thus, fear of 
differences became the guiding principle of the Kemalist state. (Yavuz and Esposito, 
2003: xx-xxi) Moreover, again owing to the impact of French positivism, the 
Kemalist project’s sole legitimate agent of change was the state itself. Change is was 
acceptable only when carried out by the state. Thus, in the process of building a 
Kemalist state, any form of bottom-up modernization of civil society became a 
source of worry and suspicion.  
 
 The Kemalist version of laicism is not obviously an Anglo-Saxon understanding of 
secularism. (Yavuz, 2000: 33) Instead of being neutral on the question of the 
religious practices and beliefs of its citizenry, the laicist state, with its origins in the 
Jacobin tradition of the French revolution, seeks to remove all appearances of 
religion from the public sphere and put it under the strict control of the state. 
Kemalist ideology has historically justified this position by placing its progressive 
and modernizing mission in opposition to Turkey’s Islamic heritage. This struggle 
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against the traditional “forces of darkness” uses a “militant laicism” to justify an 
authoritarian military-bureaucratic position. 
 
One of the distinctions of the Kemalist revolution in comparison to other 
modernization movements in the Islamic world is its greater emphasis on secularism. 
(Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 1997: 3) In the late 1920s, laicism became the basic 
principle of the Kemalist project. The overemphasis on secularism in the Kemalist 
revolution is not without a basis, Toprak (ny: 2-4) says, and lists five reasons for this. 
First, unlike Christianity Islam favors the unity of the political and religious realms. 
Second, it has a great potential for mass mobilization. Religion, especially in 
traditional societies, usually becomes the only source of common identity. Third, the 
Ottoman past proves that Islam can lead to the resistance to modernization efforts. 
The role of Islam and the ulama was considered by the early republican political elite 
as the primary cause of the collapse of the empire. Fourth, the ulama had widespread 
functions in different fields such as law, education, and public policy. This illustrated 
for the republican elite “to what extent Islam could assume influences on social and 
political power.” Finally, the very beginning of the Republic showed how Islam 
could play a dominant role in protest and revolt against the new regime. Several 
revolts against the new regime took place in the name of Islam. Actually, Islam was 
the only possible source of opposition. The Kemalist elite was, therefore, very 
sensitive on the issue of religion. 
 
In this framework, the year 1924 saw the abolition of the Caliphate. On 2 March the 
Grand National Assembly passed a law overthrowing the Caliph and his office, “the 
function of the Caliph being essentially included in the meaning and connotation of 
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the Government of the Republic”. All princes and princesses would have to leave 
Turkey within ten days. Other secularizing laws were also passed abolishing the 
office of the Şeyhülislam and the Ministry of Shari’ah and Religious Foundations, 
replacing it by a new Department of the Prime Ministers’ Office─the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs. Religious courts were abolished on 8 April, and on 20 April, the 
1924 constitution was accepted. (Salahi, 1989: 107)  
 
On April 10, 1928, amendments were made to the 1924 Turkish Constitution. These 
amendments constituted the clearest moves of that period toward the secularization of 
the Turkish state and society in legal terms. Through these amendments, which 
applied to Articles 2, 16, and 38, the provision stating that the official religion of 
Turkey was Islam was removed, and reference to Allah in the official oath was 
eliminated. Article 75 of the Constitution providing for freedom of religious 
convictions and philosophical beliefs and for the right to belong to different sects was 
amended in February 1937, by removing the word sect. Previously, in 1925, all 
religious articles of importance, such as the mantle of the Prophet Mohammed, were 
passed on to the Turkish museum of antiquities. The palaces of the Ottoman Sultans 
came under governmental control and were opened to the public. In 1935, 
ecclesiastical clothing worn by all men of religion was forbidden except in actual 
places of worship. (Kili, 1969: 47-48) 
 
In general, beyond these constitutional amendments, under Atatürk’s guidance the 
parliament passed, in rapid succession, a number of important laws. Among these, 
probably the most revolutionary were those concerning education and the legal 
system. The educational reforms erased the religious element from all schools, 
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making secularized instruction compulsory; and, the legal reforms abolished all 
religious courts (Islamic, Christian and Jewish), setting up instead secular courts with 
new laws based largely on Swiss models. (Kadıoğlu, 1996: 186) The significance of 
these revolutions can be seen in the fact that “in some of the other successor states of 
the Ottoman Empire, religious courts were abolished only much later - in Egypt, in 
1956 - while in others they are still active, as in Israel and Lebanon.” (see Kadıoğlu, 
1996) 
 
According to Toprak (1981: 9), the program of secularization was initiated in three 
phases. These phases were “symbolic secularization”, “institutional secularization” 
and “functional secularization”. Symbolic secularization launched transformations in 
many facets of national culture that had a symbolic identification with Islam. The 
most important secularization reform in this sphere, the changing of the alphabet 
from Arabic to Latin script, took place in 1928. Since the new regime regarded 
language as a connection with history, culture and sacred scripture, changing the 
alphabet was an “effective step towards breaking old religious traditions” and 
weakening the link with the past. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 33-35 in Toprak, 1981: 36) 
The acceptance of the Western hat and Western styles of clothing, the introduction of 
Western music in schools, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, and the change of 
the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday were other manifestations of symbolic 
secularization in Turkey. (Toprak, 1981: 36-37) 
 
The aim of institutional secularization, on the other hand, was to eradicate the 
institutional strength of Islam and prevent its possible interference in the political 
affairs of the new regime. The basic goal of the Kemalist elite was “to completely 
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free the polity from religious considerations. Islam was not supposed to have even 
the function of a ‘civil religion’ for the Turkish polity; Islam was not going to 
provide a transcendent goal for political life”. (Heper, 1981: 350) Therefore, 
institutional secularization was initiated through the abolition of the caliphate on 
March 3, 1924. In the same year, the state also abolished the office of Şeyhülislam 
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations. By doing this, it tried 
to transform the umma into a secular national entity in order to erase religion as a 
common bond of solidarity. Finally, the Sufi movements and their activities were 
outlawed in 1925. With the abolition of the caliphate and other religious institutions, 
the principles of political legitimacy were changed to replace Islam with loyalty to 
the state as the source of political legitimacy. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 534) 
 
The third phase of secularization in Turkey was functional secularization. It consists 
of two stages: legal and educational. (Toprak, 1981: 48) To accomplish legal 
secularization, the court system was secularized through the adoption of Western 
codes. It was an urgent step, because the Shari’ah Law was regarded as an obstacle to 
the westernization program. (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 385) By eliminating this law, 
the pro-westernization elite intended to reduce the functions of Islam in the 
community. 
 
The second stage of functional secularization was implemented in the educational 
system. Under the Law for the Unification of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat), enacted 
in 1924, all educational establishments were unified under the close control of the 
state. Finally, during the one-party period of Turkey’s early history Atatürk’s 
successors also implemented reforms that “introduced a certain mobility” into the 
 74 
 
political domains of “institutional and cultural life, but (they came) at the cost of a 
serious break with Islamic heritage.”  (Küçükcan, 2003: 489) 
 
The case of religious education is worth attention. All the Islamic educational systems 
were closed in 1924, and the new education system was unified under the direction of 
the Ministry of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu). Accordingly, religious 
education was also put under the guidance of this ministry. A new Faculty of 
Theology was founded at the Darülfünun (the University of Istanbul) in 1924. 
Moreover, special schools were opened in Istanbul and twenty other places to train a 
new generation of imams and hatips. In 1933, the Faculty of Theology was closed 
down and turned into an Institute for Islamic Research. Similarly, in 1926 there were 
twenty schools for imams and hatips, but in 1932 only two were left (in Istanbul and 
Konya). Likewise, the number of students in these schools, which had reached 2,258 
in 1924, declined to ten in 1932. (Özdalga, 1998: 19) 
 
In public schools, religion had been taught at the primary and secondary levels, but 
after the third congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1931, when the principle 
of secularism was introduced into the party program, the government declared that 
religious education was the responsibility of the family, not the state. Accordingly, 
religion was taken away from the primary and secondary school curricula in 1935, and 
was not introduced again until 1948. (Özdalga, 1998: 19-20) 
 
This situation can be explained best by Mardin’s (1971: 208-209) point: 
The most important function of “official religion” was that it provided a 
legitimating framework for the religion of the lower classes. By 
replacing the official religion with the principle of laicisme, Atatürk 
erased the possibilities of legitimation offered by the framework. The 
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little man’s religion was thus placed in an ambiguous situation: tolerated 
but not secure. It was this tension which Atatürk hoped would work in 
favor of secularization in the long run. 
 
In other words, religion, which was used especially to legitimize the War of 
Independence against the wishes of the Caliph and which was benefited during the 
early stages of the nation-building process, became subject to gradual decline by 
having limits placed on its opportunities to grow. This was because it was considered 
an obstacle to the development of a modern and secular nation-state.  
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4.2 The Goal of Secularization Reforms:  
Freedom of Religion or Freedom from Religion? 
 
The secularization reforms should be considered according to their relations to the 
fundamental goal of Atatürk and his future expectations. This positioning is crucial 
to understand the secularizing reforms of Atatürk. As Mardin (1971: 202) states well 
in his often quoted passage, the Kemalist revolution was not due to a discontented 
bourgeoisie, or peasant dissatisfaction. The taking away of feudal privileges was not 
a motivating factor, either. The target was the values of the Ottoman past. Despite its 
radical nature, however, the revolution did not aim to eradicate Islam in Turkey. It 
rather aimed at individualization and privatization of religion. (Özbudun and 
Kazancıgil, 1997: 5) It also eventually succeeded in that by mid-century “Islam 
…had indeed become a matter for the private consciences of Turks.” (Mardin, 1997: 
211) 
 
Atatürk envisaged his ultimate goal for the nation as reaching to the level of 
contemporary civilization. (Timur, 1968: 96) The Kemalist reforms connected to 
secularism were, principally, aimed at bringing Turkey to the status of the advanced 
states of the world, and justified on the basis of the “requirements of contemporary 
civilization”. (Mardin, 1997: 210) In order to achieve the level of contemporary 
civilization, it was necessary to create a modern national state based on a national 
sovereignty. Western civilization was the sole address for the new regime, and what 
was considered an obstacle to this goal had to be eliminated. The institutional part of 
the reforms were instituted both to get rid of the old functionaries of the state who 
were preventing its secular development, and to create the new institutions required 
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for a modern state. The cultural (symbolic) side of the reforms, on the other hand 
aimed to create the socio-cultural ground for a modern national state, that is, to 
redefine the nation as a new political community. 
 
The target of the social and cultural reforms was the creation of a new individual 
compatible with the modern national state and society. The public representation of 
the republican citizen was imagined centrally in such a way that he would resemble 
his western counterparts. From this perspective, the Westernization process was 
considered not only a simple search for modernization, but also a search for a totally 
new civilization. Therefore, the republican reforms took as their targets deeply rooted 
components of society such as religion, traditions, manners, style, values, and the 
like. This was a distinctive feature of republican reformism. As Mardin (1971: 202) 
aptly noted: 
“The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented 
bourgeoisie, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the 
social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal 
privileges, but it did take as a target the values of the Ottoman ancién 
regime. In this sense it was a revolutionary movement.”  
 
Lewis (1968: 406) states that “The basis of Kemalist religious policy was laicism, 
not irreligion; its purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it --- to end the 
power of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit 
it to matters of belief and worship.” The Kemalist principle of secularism did not 
advocate atheism. There was no destruction of religion in Kemalist Turkey, but 
religion and religious men were removed from areas, which they had traditionally 
controlled and asked to confine themselves to their own field. In short, it can be 
stated that the Kemalist principle of secularism did not involve abolition but de-
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emphasis of Islam. The aim was to eradicate Islam’s influence on public realms. 
However, the reforms were still so radical that, as Lewis (1968: 410) notes that 
 Although the regime never adopted an avowedly anti-Islamic policy, its 
desire to end the power of organized Islam and break its hold on the 
minds and hearts of the Turkish people was clear. The prohibition of 
religious education, the transfer of mosques to secular purposes, 
reinforced the lesson of the legal and social reforms. In the rapidly 
growing new capital, no new mosques were built. 
 
Atatürk’s main aim in the process of modernization was to change the basic structure 
of Turkish society and “redefine the political community”. (Toprak, 1989: 39) He 
tried to remove society from an Islamic framework and introduce into it a sense of 
belonging to a newly defined “Turkish nation”. (Eisenstadt, 1984: 9) To achieve this 
goal, Atatürk launched a movement of cultural westernization to provide the Turkish 
nation with a new world view that would replace its religious culture. (Mardin, 1997: 
191-212) He viewed the separation of religion and politics as a prerequisite to open 
the doors to Western values. Therefore, secularism became one of the central tenets 
of Atatürk’s program to accomplish modernization. As a part of this secularization 
policy, Atatürk initiated a major operation against the Islamic institutional and 
cultural influences in society. It was followed by the introduction of secularism into 
the Turkish Constitution during the single-party period of Republican People’s Party 
rule. (Turan, 1991: 31-34) Secularization reforms undertaken during the first decade 
of the new republic aimed at minimizing the role of religion in every aspect of 
Turkish society. The motive behind this was to reduce the societal significance of 
religious values and to eventually disestablish cultural and political institutions 
shaped by Islam. (Mardin, 1983: 142) 
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In Kemalist Turkey, as was supposed to be due to the requirements of modernization, 
religion and religious institutions were removed from areas which did not fall within 
the “proper” sphere of their activity, such as education and law, and secular concepts 
and institutions were substituted. Historical experience with the religious faction’s 
opposition to modernization had a profound impact on the formulation of the 
Kemalist principle of secularism as well. The application of Kemalist secularism 
involved not only separation of state and religion and the severing of traditional ties 
between religion and education and law. In addition, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs was attached to the office of the Prime Minister, and the Kemalist 
government assumed the right of interference, whenever necessary, for the purpose 
of controlling religion and in order to prevent the religious-conservative faction from 
attempting to play its traditional role in Turkish society. (Kili, 1969: 104-105) In this 
sense, Atatürk unrelentingly stood against any conservatives who might aim to link 
between Islam and politics: “The government of the Turkish National Assembly is 
national and materialistic: it worships reality. It is not a government willing to 
commit murder or drag the nation into the swamps in search of useless ideologies.” 
(Karal, 1997: 22) 
 
“Under the Republican regime, secularism became a positivist ideology designed to 
liberate the Turks’ minds from the hold of Islam so as to allow them to acquire those 
rudiments of contemporary civilization considered to be desirable.” (Karpat, 1985: 
407) In fact, excluding Islam’s universalistic claims for the state was the most 
important aspect of Atatürk’s secularism, because in doing so the scope of secularism 
was extended beyond the simple separation of the state and religion. Unsurprisingly, 
alternative sources for the formation of a new identity and a new ethic were then 
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needed. What was substituted for Islam was a Turkish nationalism made up of 
“positivistic” and “solidaristic” tenets. (Karpat, 1959: 254) Atatürk, as well, explains 
his aim in the Nutuk, his well-known speech, as the replacement of religion by 
Turkish nationalism,:  
“What is the Turkish Revolution? This Turkish Revolution, a word that 
includes the reversal of the system of Government, means a fundamental 
transformation. Our present Constitution has become the most perfect, 
abolishing those old forms, which have lasted for centuries. The common 
bond that the nation has now found between individuals and communities 
for its general welfare and existence has changed the old forms and 
nature, which for centuries had existed. This means that the nation has 
united as individuals instead of being united by religion and as adherents 
of sects; now they are held together only by the bond of Turkish 
nationality. The nation has accepted as a principle an irrefutable fact that 
science and means are the source of life and strength in the field of 
international competition and only in modern civilization can these be 
found.” (Kili, 1969: 108) 
 
In short, secularism in Turkey, unlike its Western counterparts, did not target 
bringing peace and stability to fighting religious groups; instead, it tried to modernize 
the state and homogenize society. The Kemalist principles of nationalism (i.e., the 
attempt to create a homogeneous nation) and secularism (i.e., the attempt to form a 
modern society based on rationalism) destroyed the multiethnic character of Turkish 
society by getting rid of Greeks and other Christian communities and by denying 
some ethnic groups their cultural rights. The source of Turkish political morality 
became nationalism, rather than religion, in service to the state. (Yavuz and Esposito, 
2003: xviii) 
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4.3 Secularization From Above 
 
In simple terms, revolution is commonly defined as a totally drastic change either in 
the political and economic institutions, or in the culture or economy of a country. In 
Barrington Moore’s reckoning, Kemalism was a “revolution from above”, not a 
social revolution. (Özbudun and Kazancıgil, 1997: 5) The basic difference between 
“modernization from above” and “modernization as a self-generating societal 
process” is that in the former case the modernizers exert state power and are agents 
of the modernization process with their own interests. (Keyder, 1997: 37-38) In this 
sense, the “Turkish revolution was not a social revolution; rather, it combined 
features of a war of liberation and a political liberation.” (Özbudun, 1997: 83)  
 
The Kemalist project was launched by the modernizing elite who aimed to impose 
institutions and culture on the people of Turkey according to their own understanding 
of modernity. In Keyder’s (1997) framing, this situation is very much tied to a 
fundamental feature in the continuity between the Ottoman modernizers and the 
founders of the Turkish state: the absence of large landlords and, therefore, the 
relative independence of the bureaucracy.  The Ottoman capital eliminated all 
possible forces alternative to the strong center. Because of this absence, the 
guardians of the ancien régime were merely the nonreformist wing of the 
bureaucracy; the nationalist intelligentsia did not have to confront any serious 
opposition, either. Without a strong landlord class demanding economic liberalism 
and civil and political rights and the like, no group in society could challenge the 
absolutism of the state. In this respect, Turkish nationalism is an extreme example, in 
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which the masses remained silent and the modernizing elite did not attempt to 
accommodate popular resentment.  
 
From another perspective, the main structural feature of the relationship between the 
state and society or religion has been the elitist political culture, which has been the 
ongoing characteristic of the Ottoman-Turkish polity. The bureaucratic elite has been 
the constitutive agent of this political culture; thus, neither the character of Turkish 
secularism nor the changes in the state-Islam relationship can be understood without 
looking at the role of and the changes in the attitude of the civil and military elites. 
The Turkish bureaucratic elite identified itself with the state and acted as the 
guardian of the state. This elitism appears as a consequence of the Turkish strong 
state tradition, in which it is the state (the state elite) that is responsible for social 
development, as the shepherd-flock metaphor represents.  
 
Accordingly, the agents of Turkish modernization in Atatürk’s view were the 
military-bureaucratic elites, who were in a position to show the true path to the 
people so that they would achieve rationality through education. Heper (1984: 86) 
argues that Atatürk believed in the capacity of the people to reach the level of 
contemporary civilization, but felt they should be helped by the educated elite. In a 
sense, the educated elite was given a temporary task, i.e., the education of the people 
until such time as they gained an adequate rationality. Therefore, he believed that 
reforms had to be imposed “from above.” According to Atatürk, reforms needed to 
be imposed from above because when people are not educated they can be easily 
deceived for undesirable ends. (Heper, 1985: 50-51) “The people were passing 
through the necessary stages of progress towards a more civilized pattern of life.” 
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The leaders should find the paths to those stages and direct society. (Heper, 1985: 
62) Therefore, Atatürk initiated many reforms to break the ties with the past, which 
he considered to be obstacles to revealing the potential of the people. The elitist 
tradition of the Ottoman-Turkish politics constituted a center of significance in terms 
of this issue. 
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4.4 Atatürk’s Conceptions of Science and Religion  
 
Atatürk, as “an admirer of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment,” said, "For 
everything in the world ─for civilization, for life, for success─ the truest guide is 
knowledge and science." (Cherry, 2002: 22) Believing that Turkey must catch up 
with the Western world, he declared that Enlightenment values were those of 
"universal civilization," and that the nation's supreme goal must be to reach them. 
Andrew Mango (2000 in Cherry, 2002: 21) writes in Atatürk: "Atatürk’s message is 
that East and West can meet on the ground of universal secular values and mutual 
respect, that nationalism is compatible with peace, that human reason is the only true 
guide in life." In line with this understanding, in the speech which Atatürk delivered 
in Bursa on October 27, 1922, to a group of teachers from Istanbul, he gave his views 
on the identity of the new Turkish nation, as well as what he thought should be 
among the principal objectives of this Turkish nation: 
Yes, in social and political life, in educating the minds of the Turkish 
nation our guide will be knowledge and science. Only, through 
knowledge and science, as provided by the schools can the Turkish 
nation, Turkish art, the Turkish economy, Turkish poetry, literature and 
fine arts fully develop… 
 
Wherever knowledge and science is, we as a nation are going to be there, 
and implant these in the minds of individuals… 
 
The basic goal of our educational policy and our educational program 
will be the destruction of ignorance, if this cannot be achieved we shall 
stay as we are, and anything that stays as it means that it is going 
backward… 
 
We must admit that up until three and a half years ago we were living as 
religious community. They ruled over us as they wished. The world 
knew us according to those who represented us. For the past three and a 
half years we have lived as a nation. The concrete and explicit evidence 
of this is the form and nature of our government named by the law as the 
Grand National Assembly. (Kili, 1969: 36-37) 
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Such a deep belief in science is due to the fact that the Young Turks and Mustafa 
Kemal were guided very much by positivism. The republican elite adopted the 
Comtian idea of “progress within order.” Positivism framed their ideas regarding the 
domains of politics, economics, and society. Positivism became the guiding principle 
of the Turkish education system as well. Accordingly, Kemalist laicism should not 
be understood as the separation of politics and religion, but rather as being about 
restructuring society in accordance with positivist philosophy. In practice, this 
restructuring meant eradicating religious impacts in the domains of education, 
economics, family, dress, and politics. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xxi) 
 
The official understanding regarding the issue is well summarized in the Program of 
the People’s Party of the Republic (adopted by the Fourth Grand Congress of the 
Party May 1935, official translation published by the Party, Ankara, 1935). It was 
stated in Part II- The Essential Characteristics of the Republican People’s Party 
[articles 5(e) and 5(f)] that 
The party considers it a principle to have the laws, regulations, and 
methods in the administration of the State prepared and applied in 
conformity with the needs of the world and on the basis of the 
fundamentals and methods provided for modern civilization by Science 
and Technique. 
 
As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers 
it to be one of the chief factors of the success of our nation in 
contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and 
from the affairs of the world and of the State. 
 
The Party does not consider itself bound by progressive and evolutionary 
principles in finding measures in the State administration. The Party holds 
it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions, which 
our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles 
which have since been elaborated. (Kili, 1969: 79) 
 
The R.P.P. Program in 1935 clearly indicated that the Turkish state was to be 
directed by the requirements and the principles of modern civilization and in 
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particular by modern science and technology. Religion was to be separated from 
politics and from temporal affairs. Secularism was considered the sine qua non of 
Turkish progress and development. 
 
Looking at the principle of secularism from the point of view of the RPP’s definition 
as well as from the broader perspective of Atatürk’s secularist reforms and speeches, 
an underlying Kemalist conviction emerges: spiritual matters are other-worldly 
matters, and any matters accessible to reason are secular. Hence, for instance, 
through the complete secularization of the Turkish legal system, the spiritual 
authorities were also deprived of their right to judge on temporal matters. (Kili, 1969: 
104) 
 
Beside such positivistic convictions, Atatürk and his followers were inspired by the 
ideals of the French Revolution. Many of the Young Turks that supported Atatürk’s 
creation of a Republic had spent years in exile in France. The enthusiasm with which 
the Republican reformers approached their project of refashioning society often has 
been compared to that of the Jacobins who dominated the French state between 1793 
and 1794. Like the French revolutionaries, Atatürk believed that modernity, law and 
order were best imposed from a strong center. (White, 2003: 148-149) The reformers 
devoted themselves to moving society, in their terms, from the “old” to the “new” 
and from the “traditional” to the “western.” Reason and science were the 
cornerstones of this drive toward civilization. The assumption was that if the state 
changed the institutions and the physical environment to match that of Europe, 
people’s behavior and attitudes would then change accordingly. The over-emphasis 
placed on such public symbols as clothing, architecture, and the visibility of women 
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in the public sphere can be attributed to this perception. By the late nineteenth 
century, universalistic and liberal ideals of the Enlightenment were appearing in 
some European nationalist projects that defined progress and modernity by allowing 
for no ambiguities and excluding certain “generally ethnically defined cultures as 
unsuitable for progress in their present state.” (Kasaba, 1997: 26-27) In Turkey, as 
well, unity and collectivist purpose, rather than universally applicable civil rights, 
were utilized in the formulation of the new republican citizenship. (Keyder, 1997: 
37-51) 
 
Based as it was on these positivistic and Jacobin influences, the Kemalist conception 
of secularism can be summarized in this way: “Modernity and democracy require 
secularism. Islam, he [Atatürk] believed, was neither secularizable nor privatizable. 
Thus, in order to bring modernity, Islam had to be either kept under strict control or 
confined to personal conscience.” (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xiii) Atatürk (1962: 
722 in Kili, 1969:46) explains this in one of his most quoted passages in the Nutuk: 
Could a civilized nation tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be 
led by the nose by a herd of Sheikhs, Dedes, Seids, Tshelebis, Babas and 
Emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, 
magicians, dice-throwers and amulet sellers? Ought one to conserve in 
the Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such 
as those which had for centuries given to the nation the appearance of 
being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have committed 
the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and 
reawakening? (1925) 
 
As Timur (1968: 121) puts well from a broader perspective, Atatürk showed different 
attitudes towards the high Islam of the official religious scholars, ulama, and the folk 
Islam of the religious brotherhoods. With the former, he aimed to rationalize and 
redefine the religion. In Atatürk’s conception, Islam is the most rational among all 
the religions. Consequently, whatever illogical was also supposed to be contrary to 
 88 
 
Islam. In this sense, Atatürk believed that The Turkish nation must be more religious. 
On the other hand, Atatürk found the religious brotherhoods detrimental to the 
revolution and tried to erase them totally since they could generate alternative 
sources of political power. As Timur (1971: 148) suggests somewhere else, the 
Kemalist positivism aimed at reformulating the official Islam in a secular way, while 
abolishing all the brotherhoods operating throughout the country.  
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4.5 Atatürk’s Conception of the State 
 
The creation and maintenance of an independent, sovereign state is an important 
aspect of Kemalist ideology, as indicated in Atatürk’s speech to Turkish youth 
(Atatürk’ün Gençliğe Hitabesi):  
Turkish Youth! Your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the 
national Independence, the Turkish Republic.  
 
That is the only basis of your existence and your future. This basis 
contains your most precious treasure…. (Kili, 1969: 61-62) 
 
The ultimate aim of the Ottoman modernization, maintaining a strong state, was one 
shared by Mustafa Kemal. This is not a coincidence when we consider that Atatürk 
and his friends, the founders of the new republic, were previously Ottoman pashas.  
 
In the early years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal attempted to unite all powers in 
his personality. The proclamation of the republic is not separate from this 
understanding because he strictly supported the unification of powers as opposed to 
their separation. Along the same lines, the opposition of the Progressive Republican 
Party and the press were regarded as almost illegitimate; after some religious revolts 
occur, they were harshly suppressed through the enactment of the law for the 
Restoration of Order (Takrir-i Sükun). 
 
Heper (1985: 56) states that “Atatürk opted for a Hegelian state -one that would 
safeguard the general interest without overwhelming civil society”. Vatandaş İçin 
Medeni Bilgiler (Citizen’s Handbook), written by Afet İnan in 1931 but dictated 
mostly by Atatürk, provides rich material to explore this kind of conception of the 
state. As the title indicates, the book is intended to help raise a republican generation 
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as citizens of the new, modern nation-state. It includes such themes as state, republic, 
rights and duties, solidarism, division of labor, vocations and work, military service 
and taxation.  
 
Afet İnan’s book (1998: 18, 26) gives the definitions of the Turkish nation by 
Atatürk: “The Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic is called as the 
Turkish nation.” “The Turkish nation is a state governed by the republican regime 
upon the people’s sovereignty.” Similarly, in a conference organized by the 
Republican People’s Party in 1938, state was defined as the nation who comes 
together around Atatürk. (Köker, 2004: 161) As these definitions imply, state and 
nation are fused in the Kemalist understanding, and being a member of the Turkish 
nation is related to the participation in the establishment and development of the new 
republic. 
 
In the same book, Mustafa Kemal argues that citizens’ service is required for the 
government to achieve its goals. Hence, citizens who are charged with giving this 
assistance should be healthy; maintenance of their health is a duty of the government, 
as well. In this regard, state and citizens change places; citizens are conceived of as if 
they were instruments of state. This understanding indicates that Mustafa Kemal is 
talking about the state’s citizens rather than a citizen state. He further declares that  
The state demands healthy, sturdy citizens who have a high level of 
comprehension, national sentiment and affection for the homeland in 
order to maintain order and defend the country. The state is in need of 
highly qualified citizens to do the nation’s business done at home and 
abroad. The state attaches importance to all citizens comprehending the 
state’s laws and appreciating the requirement of obeying them in terms of 
order and the defense of the country. (Afetinan, 1998: 45-46) 
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 Mustafa Kemal does not argue that the state should be strong enough to serve the 
citizens, but rather asserts that the citizens must be strong enough to preserve the 
existence of the state. 
 
In Atatürk’s reckoning, the question of freedom should be considered together with 
the interests of other individuals and the survival of the state and nation. Freedoms 
are not absolute and can be restricted by the rights and freedoms of other individuals 
and by the common interests of the nation.  In this respect, he says that “restriction of 
the rights of individuals is the essence and duty of the state”, and that “freedom 
should not jeopardize state activities”. (Afetinan, 1998: 47-53) 
 
According to Atatürk, sovereignty was to “belong to the people without any 
qualifications and conditions”. In practice, however, this meant that the state elite, 
which was supposed to understand the interests of the people better than the people 
themselves did, would exercise sovereignty in the name of the people. The 
“transcendental” nature of the Republic, as a legacy of the Ottoman state, required 
that community and the state take precedence over their members, whose interest is 
identified with the common rather than the individual good. (Heper, 1985: 7-8) 
Along similar lines, the Ottoman tradition of the father state (devlet baba) created a 
political culture that viewed the interventionist state as legitimate. (Özbudun, 2000: 
147-148) As Mardin (1980: 23-53) pointed out: 
It is conceded in the abstract that the state and its leaders have a right and 
obligation to set a course for society and to use public resources to pursue 
that course…. The emphasis is on the ends of state intervention, and 
checks and balances are not seen as preventing abuse of power but rather 
as impeding the state’s course toward its goal. Therefore, to some extent, 
there has been an acceptance of a high concentration of power –
economic, administrative and military. 
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The dominance of state interests over fundamental human rights, the model of the 
passive citizen, the lack of tolerance for religious influences and ethnic diversity, and 
the role of the military and bureaucratic elite as the guardian of the Western (secular) 
character of the Turkish state have all been longtime features of mainstream Turkish 
political culture.  
 
The superiority of state interests can be observed in regard to religion, as well. 
Atatürk inherited from the Ottomans a state tradition in which religion played a 
marginal role in shaping politically important decisions. Unsurprisingly, Ankara, like 
Istanbul, maintained a monopoly over Islamic functions and there was no change in 
the tradition of incorporating religious personnel into the state bureaucracy. 
Understandably, the “secularist” republic wanted to control Islam even more 
effectively than had the “Islamic” Ottoman Empire. 
 
This continuity can be explained in more pragmatic terms. The Kemalist founding 
elites were fully aware that any kind of opposition to their secularist reforms in the 
cultural and social sphere could be mobilized only by religion. They therefore feared 
that the caliphate could become a counter-revolutionary force. This explains why, 
after the abolition of the sultanate-caliphate and all other Islamic institutions of the 
Ottoman Empire, Atatürk established a governmental agency for religion. The 
Republicans decided to replace the Ottoman Ministry of Shari’ah and Religious 
Foundations with the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which has given responsibility 
for teaching and maintaining the Republican interpretation of Islam. (Shankland, 
2002: 86) In later years, on the basis of the same reasoning, Muftis and imams 
(prayer leaders) were appointed by the government, and religious instruction was 
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taken over by the Ministry of National Education. “The establishment of these 
directorates clearly shows that the Kemalist perception of secularism meant not so 
much separation of state and religion as control of the state over religion.” (Zürcher, 
1993: 195) What Atatürk was doing was actually the establishment of state control 
over religion and the religious classes. This included controlling and limiting 
religious education, outlawing religious brotherhoods, and severely limiting forms of 
dress associated with Islam. These were questions of power and control. (Keddie, 
1997 : 32) 
 
This pragmatic concern can also be seen in the abolition of the Islamic brotherhoods. 
Reaction to the revolution was most likely to come from militant Islamic 
brotherhoods (tarikats), the ex-Unionist leaders, and the Communists. It is interesting 
to note that the religious reaction came more from the brotherhoods than from the 
ulama, because the ulama were already a part of the state. According to Özbudun 
(1997: 96), this explains why the Kemalist regime tended to ban all the activities of 
the brotherhoods, while incorporating the official ulama under the new Directorate of 
Religious Affairs with weaker functions. 
 
Bureaucratized Islam in the Republic, then, having submitted to the requirements 
taken on the task of unitary state-building, was pressed into service for constructing a 
“regime-friendly Turkish-Islamic identity,” just as its predecessor in the Ottoman 
Empire had attempting to justify the Kanuns in religious terms. (see Kili, 1969) 
Secularism, in this sense, was not a process that de-politicized Islam. Rather, it 
removed it from its political role in the old system and eliminated those empowered 
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by this role, while using Islam in new ways to program the project of the new 
regime. 
 
In general, in order to accurately understand the state’s centrality in Atatürk’s 
reckoning, one should remember that the “Atatürkist state… is not the state that 
existed during Atatürk’s life time, but the state as it was espoused by him.” (Heper, 
1985: 48) Atatürk’s basic aim was the creation of a “transient moderate 
transcendental state”. Moderate transcendentalism means that a consensus is imposed 
upon society through static norms, around which the state is institutionalized. (Heper, 
1985: 8) Those who do not understand this goal “have not been able to distinguish 
Atatürk’s strategy from his tactics. Thus, even his opponents could pose as ‘genuine 
Atatürkists’, because, when necessary, they could find a quotation from Atatürk, 
which apparently supported their point of view.” (Heper, 1985: 11) Atatürk’s 
authoritarian politics should be evaluated accordingly. 
 
In the view of some scholars, in 1920s Turkey, democracy would have been as much a 
top-down imposition as the rest of Atatürk's modernization program. When he came to 
power, most Turks were illiterate farmers used to living under the absolute power of 
the imperial sultan. Many liberal historians have argued that benevolent dictatorship 
was necessary to prepare Turkey for constitutional democracy. In one of the first 
biographies of Atatürk, British historian H. C. Armstrong concluded, "His dictatorship 
-a benevolent, educating, guiding dictatorship─ was the only form of government 
possible at the moment." (Cherry, 2002: 21) In fact, the modernist elite in the early 
Republican period feared that democracy could pave the way to the public 
representation of religious symbols. State authoritarianism, “enlightened despotism,” 
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and single-party regimes often became the only possible options for the secular 
Westernist elites. (Göle, 1996b: 19) The authoritarian period was considered to be 
tutelary. Consequently, the single party period prepared its end itself. Köker (2004: 
228) criticizes at this point that although the undemocratic regime was not seen to be 
permanent, it was still the Kemalist ruling elite who would decide when the right time 
was to switch to full democracy. 
 
After Atatürk’s death in 1938, the regime deteriorated. As Bernard Lewis (1961: 297-
298 in Barkey, 2000: 93) argues, “in the hands of lesser men than himself, his 
authoritarian and paternalist mode of government degenerated into something nearer 
to dictatorship as the word is commonly understood.” His successor, İnönü, sought to 
build the regime’s legitimacy on a strict interpretation of Kemalism, rather than the 
founder’s pragmatism and vision. Politics was relegated to the boundaries of the 
single party, which gave the bureaucratic-military elite-dominated state an almost 
“sacred” status. The rationale behind Inönü’s policies was that he understood the state 
as a realm above politics, and aimed at guarding the long-term interests of the 
community by preserving national unity. At this point, Inönü, like Atatürk, argued that 
religion was a sensitive issue that could be abused for political purposes and disrupt 
national unity embodied by the state. (Heper, 1998: 98-103) 
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4.6 Pragmatism in the Kemalist Revolution 
 
 
As many scholars observe, Atatürk’s “resourcefulness, careful exploration of 
alternatives, and keen sense of timing” contributed to his ultimate success. (Atabaki, 
2004: 61) When analyzing Atatürk’s style in introducing and implementing his 
reforms, one can recognize that a tactical component of the revolution dominated the 
process: pragmatism. The revolution was pragmatic since, it appeared as a response 
to the needs of modernization. To achieve his goals, Atatürk sometimes made use of 
opposing views and different groups whose ideals he did not share. Pragmatism, 
beside being a practical necessity as a result of the sensitive balance of power at that 
time, was the mentality of the Ottoman secular officialdom to which Atatürk and his 
friends had once belonged.  
 
As a reflection of his pragmatism, Atatürk built the new state step by step, although in 
a short period of time. He was patient about waiting to declare views for which the 
political environment was not yet ripe. One example of Atatürk’s political astuteness 
in this area is his dress reforms. Çakmak (2002: 66) argues that Atatürk tried to 
develop his country men and women in terms of the way they dressed, because he 
wanted his people look like Europeans. He wore a Panama hat in Kastamonu and 
became a model for them. In 1925, the “Hat Law” was enacted. Officials had to wear 
hats instead of the fez, the Ottoman version of a hat. The reform was not easy, because 
a man’s headgear indicated his religion, and even his social status and job. When a 
man died, his headgear was put on his coffin, and his gravestone was usually shaped 
like this headgear, showing his status. A hat was a non-Muslim style. The acceptance 
of the hat, representing the West, instead of the fez, “the symbol of Ottomanhood and 
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eradicator of all national differences” provided the basis for a more difficult reform, 
the abandonment of veiling. (Göle, 1996a: 61) The effort to ban the veil took concrete 
form on January 15, 1924, in a declaration that teachers with a veil on were not 
allowed to enter the classroom. On April 3, 1924, a legal regulation was enacted 
concerning the official attire of judges and members of judiciary. Henceforth, local 
administrations made some attempts in parallel lines. In the 1930s, the number of 
women, who were educated and had a professional career increased. Accordingly, the 
young generations of women gave up wearing veils. (Yakut, 2002, 26-31) Geoffrey 
Lewis (1982: 18-19) notes that Atatürk did not abolish the veil: “Good soldier that he 
was, he knew that you should never give an order which you know won’t be obeyed.” 
Amanullah, the king of Afghanistan, tried to imitate Atatürk’s secularization policies 
after his visit to Turkey. It was reported that Amanullah’s men forcibly tore women’s 
veils off. Perhaps at least in part as a result of this, in May 1929 he was deposed. 
 
In the very same way, the pragmatic understanding sometimes moved Atatürk to 
express some opinions which he did not in fact share. In his book Nutuk, he gives his 
declaration about the opening of the Grand National Assembly as an example: “I find 
it appropriate to present you the declaration I made on April, 21, 1920 to indicate my 
situation in which I was obliged to get parallel with the feelings and understanding of 
that time.” (Nutuk, 1996: 430-432) Elsewhere, Atatürk (1981: 8) describes this 
situation as follows: 
Here, I should confess something important. The army and the nation, 
while not having been aware of the dishonesty of the Sultan and the 
Caliph, were also sincerely loyal to the palace with religious and 
traditional ties strengthened through centuries. The army and the nation 
… could not imagine independence without the Caliph and the Sultan. 
What a pity for those who express their opinions in contradiction with 
this belief.  They will be immediately called as irreligious, traitor, 
homeless, unwanted. 
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As Kinross (1990: 180) reports, Atatürk emphasized this at the Erzurum Congress 
(1919), too: 
To a trusted friend who inquired privately of Kemal at the [Erzurum] 
Congress, ‘Are we going towards the Republic?’ he replied, ‘Is there any 
doubt of it?’ But this could not yet be divulged. He was careful at this 
stage to make it clear that the movement was not aimed against the 
monarchy and the Caliphate, but was united behind them against the 
threats of the foreigner. 
 
For this reason, he sometimes spoke as if he were supporting the Caliphate: 
From now on, the future will show exactly how abundant the Caliphate 
will be for the Turkish State and the Muslim world. The State of Turkey, 
which is both Turkish and Muslim, will be the happiest state of the world 
as being the cause for two times happiness. (Nutuk III, 1996: 1251) 
 
 
We observe the same attitude in Atatürk’s relation to the ulama. After the abolition 
of the Sultanate and all the other institutions of the old order and of foreigners, the 
ulama remained as the only power in Turkish society that could challenge the 
leadership of the new regime. Atatürk was aware of their potential threat and, hence, 
at the beginning, he took care not to offend the ulama ─ a number of whom were 
also deputies in the Assembly─ in order to preserve national unity. In fact, fifteen 
percent of the first Assembly was made up of religious men, imams, muftis, and 
medrese teachers, while another fifteen percent consisted of soldiers. In line with his 
policy of making gestures toward religion in order not to lose the support of the 
traditional segments of society, the Assembly, for instance, passed a law prohibiting 
the sale or use of alcoholic drinks on September 14, 1921. (Lewis G., 1982: 12-16) 
 
In another instance, Mustafa Kemal allowed the article regarding the official religion 
to remain in the Constitution, although this did not confirm to his real opinion. 
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Atatürk (1981: 523-524) explains this situation in his Nutuk. While traveling to 
İzmit, he was asked by a journalist whether the new government would have a 
religion: 
“I did not want to be posed such a question. I also did not want to express 
the answer which was indeed very short….I could not say that a 
government could not have a religion. I said the reverse. It has, I said, it is 
the religion of Islam. However, I immediately needed to add that Islam 
provides great freedom of thought. In order not to give an opportunity to 
those who wanted to benefit from this and tended to understand atheism 
from the term ‘laic government’, it is ignored to add a term which makes 
meaningless the second article of the constitution.” (Nutuk, II, 1981: 523-
524) 
 
 
Taner Timur (1968: 92-93) underlines this attitude when arguing that the ideologies 
of the National Struggle (Milli Mücadele) and the Turkish Revolution were different. 
During the whole period of the War of Independence, Atatürk kept his ideas about 
the coming revolution as a secret. The motive behind the National Struggle was 
nationalism. Nevertheless, it coincided with the aim of protecting the sultanate and 
caliphate, as well. In the first Assembly, Atatürk signed many drafts framing this 
aim. Considering the secular character of the Turkish Revolution, we should consider 
this duality as a necessity under the conditions of that time. 
 
Pragmatism was the key feature of the revolution in terms of its methods. 
“According to Reşat Kaynar, ‘Kemalism is not doctrinaire, but pragmatic.’” (Karal, 
1997: 11) For instance, although étatism was taken as one of the six arrows in the 
Kemalist ideology, “Atatürk never wished to give étatism ideological substance”. 
(Özbudun& Kazancıgil, 1997: x) In practice, statism in early Republican Turkey 
consisted of various pragmatic measures necessary for developing industrialization.  
As Özbudun (1997: 87-88) states, scholars usually point out that Kemalist thought 
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was established in response to immediate needs, rather than based upon “pre-
determined thoughts”. “Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, an author close to Atatürk, 
quotes the following exchange with him: ‘My general, this party has no doctrine… 
Of course it doesn’t, my child; if we had a doctrine, we would freeze the 
movement.’” Due to its pragmatic character, Atatürkist thought is not considered to 
be an ideology; it is at most “a ‘soft’ ideology”. Heper (1985: 64-65, 71) thinks that 
it can be better described as a Weltanschauung. Özbudun (1997: 90), however, 
believes that this instrumental character of the revolution makes it “vulnerable to 
rational criticism”. 
 
Recep Peker, one of Mustafa Kemal’s close friends, explained this pragmatic view in 
a speech delivered in 1935: 
We are not among those who scribble on paper before getting down to 
action. We prefer to achieve results first. Superficial people reproach us 
with working without a plan or a program, but they lose sight of the fact 
that the best plans and programs are not always written down; the cardinal 
plan, the source and the starting point of all our programs are the energy 
and the insight concentrated in the brain and in the soul of our spiritual 
leaders. (Dumont, 1984: 25) 
 
Sartori classifies the Kemalist regime as ‘one-party pragmatic’. (Heper, 1985: 65) 
Clement Moore, in the same vein, categorizes one-party ideologies under four 
headings: totalitarian, chiliastic, tutelary, and administrative; and he puts Atatürk’s 
Turkey into the tutelary category, by which he refers to an ideology which 
“combines an instrumental function with the goal of a partial social transformation.” 
(Özbudun, 1997: 90) Kemalist ideology was formulated in response to the emerging 
needs of the modernization process and should be evaluated on the basis of the extent 
to which it fulfilled its stated goals. It did not start from an analysis of the structure 
of Turkish society. Modernization in Turkey was imposed forcibly by the conditions 
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of the War of Independence; the principles of Kemalism arose largely from the 
practical requirements of that process.   
 
Atatürk attempted to use religion whenever he found it useful for his purposes. 
Atatürk was “a great tactician” having used Islam for its revolutionary purposes. 
(Timur, 1971: 38) For example, as of 1919, the Sultan had taken a stand against the 
Nationalist Movement. The Şeyhülislam, the head of the religious hierarchy, in a 
fetva of April 1920, labeled the Nationalists as rebels and ordered all good Moslems 
to kill these rebels whenever they had an opportunity to do so. (Kili, 1969: 18) 
Atatürk replied to this attack in the same kind: “As soon as the Assembly gathered, 
we initiated counter-attacks by getting fetvas (religious confirmation and decisions) 
from high religious scholars.” (Nutuk II, 1981: 327) Since a substantial number of 
the First Assembly’s members consisted of religious scholars and sheikhs. Atatürk 
was able to benefit from their religious approval. For instance, regarding the 
constitutional amendment of October 29, 1923, which proclaimed the republic, the 
representative of Antalya, Rasih Hodja approved from a  religious viewpoint that the 
most appropriate regime is the republic. This prevented others from resisting the 
amendment. (Aydemir, III, 1995: 154) 
 
Mustafa Kemal used the integrative function of the religion while switching from the 
millet system to the unitary state during the nation-building process. Islam as a 
culture was an implicit part of the new Turkish identity:  
“This boundary is not drawn for military purposes, but it is rather a 
national boundary. It is indicated as to be the national boundary. However, 
one should not assume that within this boundary there is only one ethnic 
group. Within this boundary, there are Turks, Circassians, and other 
Muslim groups. Now this boundary is a national boundary within which 
 102 
 
sister nations live integrated to each other with the same goals…” (Öztürk, 
1992: 29-30) 
 
Moreover, Mustafa Kemal, just like the Young Turks during the wars in the Balkans 
and World War I, never hesitated to utilize Islam to mobilize the population against 
the invading European armies and always treated Islam as the bond to integrate and 
blend all Anatolian Muslims into the Turkish nation. “Islam was used to mobilize the 
masses against ‘the infidel.’” National struggle against the will of the sultan was 
legitimized upon Islamic grounds. (Heper, 1981: 350)  “In the formation of the 
Turkish nation, the republic assumed that Muslimness was a sine qua non for 
becoming a Turk.” After achieving national independence, however, the republic 
implemented a rigid program project by denying any role for Islam in the formation of 
the new polity. (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xx) 
 
“Atatürk was careful to keep his options open. He cooperated with various religious 
leaders as he was organizing for the war against Greece, and he accepted the title 
‘Gazi’ that was given to him by the National Assembly in 1921.” The title “Gazi” had 
religious connotations, but “Atatürk used this title throughout the rest of his life.” 
(Kasaba, 1997: 22) In fact, this pragmatism should be seen as a mark of Mustafa 
Kemal’s political talent, which should not be overlooked when examining his policies 
of secularization. For instance, Mardin (1997: 209) explores his use of the (Grand) 
National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi) as the source of political legitimation for 
the resistance. Article I of the 1920 Constitution stated that sovereignty belonged 
without reservation to the millet. Theoretically, the Sultan-Caliph was considered, 
when, in power leader of the Muslim community. However, he was now a prisoner of 
the Allied forces. The term millet, which originally denoted religious sub-divisions, in 
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this context was used to imply that the Muslim community would re-establish its 
sovereignty. In fact, the term had been used from the end of nineteenth century on to 
translate the word ‘nation’. The ambiguity of the term is the main reason that the 
article was passed without any objections.  
 
Combining all these findings together, we observe a pragmatic attitude towards 
religion. Islam was not supposed to legitimize the regime or to be an appropriate base 
for political action; yet, one’s claim to membership in the political community was 
validated by the possession of Islamic credentials. In later years, the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs would send out “model sermons” to imams (preachers) who might 
then encourage the citizens to, for example, pay their taxes, or contribute to 
foundations established to assist the armed forces; in this way, “secular acts are 
identified as religiously desirable”. (Turan, 1991: 40-42) 
 
As Turan (1991: 42) argues, the Turkish state, while not viewing religion as giving 
direction to its policies and actions, continues to treat it as a resource which may be 
mobilized for ‘purposes of state’ whenever this is found useful or necessary. Some 
people have described the above-mentioned application of secularism in Kemalist 
Turkey as the “one-sided character of Turkish secularism”. Writing about Turkey in 
the mid-thirties, Henry Elisha Allen (1935: 175 in Kili, 1969: 104-105) stated that 
the Kemalist attitude “is favorable to whatever in Islam is consistent with the 
Republican ideas, relentlessly opposed to anything which might endanger Kemalist 
success, and, for the rest, more or less neutral”. In the Kemalist perception it was, on 
the one hand, impossible to keep Islam as it was; on the other hand, it was impossible 
to violently eradicate Islam. The government took the sole option: removing Islam 
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from the legal and educational system, removing all the religious leaders, and 
directing religion into channels that would contribute to the governmental program, 
insofar as possible. 
 
According to Ayata (1996: 41), the founders of the new Republic recognized Islam 
in its both positive and negative aspects. They were aware that Islam was important 
for unifying and mobilizing the nation, as well as for its contribution to social and 
moral welfare. However, they also saw Islam as the root cause of backwardness in 
the country and an obstacle toward reaching their goals. “The attitude of the 
Republican leaders was supportive when Islam was consistent with Republican 
reforms, but extremely hostile when it was at cross-purposes with the main 
objectives of modernization.” In a sense, Mustafa Kemal and his friends perceived 
Islam as a mixed legacy, especially during the very early stages of the Republic’s 
foundation. In pragmatic terms, they recognized the dominant role of religion in 
Turkish society and its importance in promoting social cohesion across ethnic and 
linguistic cleavages. On the other hand, they understood the strength of religion as a 
competing source of legitimacy. They aimed to remove the legitimacy of existing 
traditional religious institutions. 
 
Especially in the early years of the new Republic, the ruling cadre did not try to 
completely remove the authority of religion totally in the moral sphere. What they 
aimed at was eradicating the public visibility of Islam through certain acts and 
reforms. Previously, there had been some initiatives to use religion toward the 
modernization of the country. The Gökalpian type of modernization, which took 
religion to be a relatively important factor in the nation-building process, was not 
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totally discarded by the Kemalist ruling elite, especially at the very beginning of the 
new regime. They rather aspired to control and further restructure religion in 
conformity with the general objectives of the Revolution. “Islam was accorded a 
relatively influential role only insofar as it endorsed the principles of the new 
regime.” (Aydın, 2003: 244) 
 
Göle (1997: 1) states that state identity with regard to secularism has become a 
contested arena, usually modifying the bounds of religion and politics in the Turkish 
context. She (1997: 48) points out that the new nation-state’s attempt to reconcile 
“the disparity” of the masses and state involved a process of “social engineering”. 
Indeed, “secularization itself became part of that process of social engineering rather 
than an outcome of the process of modernization and societal development.” In other 
words, secularization became both a means and an end in the creation of the new 
Turkish state. Secularization was used as a means to destroy the legitimacy and 
identity of the Ottoman system and to build the new state, while it also became a part 
of the Turkish identity with the modern state.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
FROM DEVLET-İ ALİYE-İ OSMANİYE 
TO KUTSAL TÜRK DEVLETİ 
 
 
 
One of the students of Turkish politics, Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu (1993: 352) claims 
in his article “Modernity, State, and Religion: Theoretical Notes towards a 
Comparative Study” that “the peculiarities of modern-state building in Turkey 
emerged largely in response to the economic conditions of the time, particularly 
those domestic and international conditions that prevailed during the 1920s and the 
1930s.” In his reckoning, the lack of a civil society in the 1930s cannot be explained 
simply on the basis of the Turkish state tradition. It must instead be considered as a 
consequence of the exigencies of the conjectural and structural conditions that 
shaped the period. 
 
 107 
 
In analyzing the state-led modernization process in Republican Turkey, this thesis 
does not ignore the specific internal and external conditions of the 1920s and 30s, 
which compelled the political elites to build a stronger center and act in a more 
authoritarian manner. The global economic depression in early 1930s and, 
consequently, the decreasing credibility in the world of liberalism and liberal 
economic principles, along with the emergence of a number of totalitarian regimes in 
Europe and Asia; the Sheikh Said Rebellion; the Menemen incident; and, the failed 
experience of the multi-party system (the closures of the Progressive Republican 
Party and the Free Party) are the most apparent of those contextual patterns. As 
Nalbantoğlu’s  (1993: 352) argument implies, it is quite logical to link étatism to the 
political context that allowed the Kemalist elite to observe the Soviet system of state 
planning in the economic field. 
 
I think where Nalbantoğlu and other scholars with similar views differs from the 
arguments supported in this thesis is primarily in the area of what we understand by 
the Turkish state tradition. The reflection of Turkish state tradition in the Republic is 
not merely the authoritarian administration, which could be regarded as a 
continuation of the so-called “Oriental despotism” in the Ottoman past. The basic 
assumption behind this state tradition is, instead, the superiority of statehood over all 
other social values. This perspective let the rulers approach other social determinants 
(religion, culture etc.) pragmatically. If we deliniate the concept in this way, then 
even the étatism of 1930s can be taken as a manifestation of that state tradition: if it 
is étatism which would be most beneficial for the empowerment of the state, then it 
should be (pragmatically) adopted. Along similar lines, as Göle (1997: 48) argues, 
even secularization becomes both a means and an end for the Republican elite: 
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secularism, which was incorporated into the principles of Kemalist ideology and 
adopted in the Constitution in 1937, was also, in fact, an urgent necessity if the new, 
small nation-state was to survive and develop out of the ashes of the old Ottoman 
political structures. In this study, secularization is taken as a reflection of the strong 
state tradition in Turkey. 
 
This thesis follows Dyson’s (1980: 51) argument that the form of secularization 
depends upon the political culture in terms of state autonomy. The weaker the state, 
the more liberal a form of secularization develops. For example, in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, state-church separation took place in a relatively peaceful manner. 
Conversely, an extreme secularity is observed in strong states, e.g. France, with deep 
conflicts in the secularization process. The French state “whose construction 
occupied all of French history may be taken as the ideal type of the state” (Badie and 
Birnbaum, 1983: 107) and, consequently, as the best example of extreme secularity, 
in which the state dominates religion, rather than just separating it from the polity.  
 
When describing the strong state, Heper (1987: 3-4) says, “… in some polities public 
interest means more than the sum of private or groups’ interests. From this particular 
perspective we can talk about the phenomenon of the state… which reflects a notion 
of public interest with little affinity to sectional interests”. The agents of the public 
interest are the state elites. In this regard, Turkey, like France, is one of the best 
examples of the strong state model. (Barkey, 2000: 87) Similarly to French 
secularization process, the Kemalist elite did not seek to separate religion from 
politics; it rather aimed to dominate religion, making its thinking and institutions 
obedient to the state. A comparable situation can be observed in Egypt, as well, 
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where in comparison to other Arab countries a state tradition exists. For example, the 
Nasserist regime imposed reforms on the Al-Azhar Islamic educational institution, 
and this had the effect of bureaucratizing the religious scholars as a prelude to 
making them subservient to the state. Resembling the Kemalist configuration of a 
state-Islam link, in Nasserist Egypt it was the ruling elite who appointed the head of 
Al-Azhar. (Nasr, 2001: 20) 
  
To grasp the impact of the strong state tradition on the Early Republican 
secularization reforms, this thesis has analyzed the Ottoman past. The Ottoman 
Empire managed to maintain its existence for six centuries due to its strong center. 
There were several determinants sustaining this centrality of the state. For instance, 
the local authorities, eşraf and ayans, could not form alternative sources of authority, 
since the ultimate ownership of the lands and other properties belonged to the Sultan. 
Tımar, the Ottoman land system, was based on the same principle. In addition, the 
bureaucratic circle had adopted the adab tradition, a secular pragmatic conception of 
the state, which valued statecraft in itself and separated it from the persona of the 
Sultan. These bureaucrats came mostly from the Ottoman recruitment system 
(devşirme), according to which a certain number of male children of Christian 
subjects were taken away and raised as slaves of the Ottoman state to eventually 
serve in its bureaucracy and army. This system empowered the center by eliminating 
the possibility of the formation of alternative interest groups. Moreover, the only 
remaining possible opposing force, the ulama, were suppressed, having been 
incorporated into the state apparatus. When religion clashed with the secular interests 
of the state, the religious concerns were superseded by the secular ones. Although the 
Ottoman state had a strong religious character, the role of Islam was often moderated 
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by the state’s pragmatic concerns. (Gerber, 1994: 76) Beside this superiority of the 
state in Turkish political culture, the state has been perceived as the sole agent 
responsible for social change. Accordingly, modernization in the Ottoman Empire 
was launched by the state and considered a state matter only.  
The Turkish Republic inherited this strong state tradition. In this respect, firstly, the 
state adopted a pragmatic attitude toward Islam. Atatürk utilized Islam to mobilize 
the masses against the invasion of the European armies and always saw Islam as the 
link to integrate and merge all Anatolian Muslims into the Turkish nation. National 
struggle against the will of the sultan was legitimized upon Islamic grounds, too. On 
the other hand, Atatürk saw religion as the main cause of backwardness of the 
country and so secularized the country in all facets of social and political life. This 
dual attitude, implemented as Turkish secularism, appears to have been “a successful 
project” on the whole. People have remained “sincere Muslims”, while having a 
secular approach on political matters. (see Heper and Toktaş, 2003) 
We can observe the implications of the strong state tradition in the Turkish process 
modernization from above as well. Due to the elimination of power formation in the 
periphery, e.g., by the fiefholders or local notables, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed the 
situation of having a strong center versus a weak periphery. As a consequence, the 
main structural feature of the relations between the state and society or religion has 
been the relative independence of the state bureaucracy and the elitist political 
culture. Modernization was, at this point, seen as a matter for the state. It was the 
responsibility of the center to save/modernize the country. Influenced by this 
tradition, as well as by the specific circumstances of the inter-war period, the 
Kemalist elite maintained the same mentality. One should not forget that the 
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founders of the new nation-state were once Ottoman pashas. The Republican state 
elite acted as the “self-appointed guardians” of secularism and Turkish nationalism. 
They took on the duty of “elevating the country to the level of the contemporary 
civilization” on behalf of the people.  
 
In line with the Turkish state tradition, Atatürk maintained the high value placed on 
the state. He opted for a Hegelian state. (Heper, 1985: 56) The Ottoman modernizers’ 
ultimate goal of maintaining a strong state was shared by Mustafa Kemal. In the 
Kemalist conception of the state, citizens’ service is required in order for the 
government to achieve its targets. Citizens are looked at as if they were instruments 
of the state. In Atatürk’s reckoning, freedoms are not absolute and can be restricted 
by the rights and freedoms of other individuals and by the common interests of the 
nation.  In theory, sovereignty was supposed to “belong to the people without any 
qualifications and conditions”. In practice, however, this meant that the state elite, 
which was assumed to understand the interests of the people better than did the 
people themselves, would exercise sovereignty in the name of the people. Atatürk’s 
conception of state reflects the Turkish state tradition, by which I primarily refer to 
the supremacy of the state and the view of the state as the agent of social change. 
 
The 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey constantly uses the phrase “Kutsal 
Türk Devleti” (Sublime Turkish State). This very much resembles the Ottoman 
conception of “Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye” (The High/Sublime Ottoman State). This 
little comparison illustrates very well the fact that despite the transformation from a 
religious multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multi-linguistic empire to a modern secular 
nation-state, the sublimity of the state has always remained its most salient feature. 
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